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ABSTRACT 
African development has long been described as behind or below that of 
‘advanced’, ‘First World’, industrialized nations.  Consequently, discourses of African 
progress from colonialism to the present have focused on transforming African 
societies from ‘backwardness’ and ubiquitous poverty to more prosperous, ‘modern’ 
conditions.  African societies are generally understood as dichotomously configured 
between elites and impoverished masses.  As a result, contemporary African 
development is aimed primarily at policing wanton elites and providing for the 
precarious poor.  While both these objectives are worthwhile, they create a limited 
representation of African societies; one focused exclusively on extremes.  The 
existence and experiences of African middle classes are largely ignored.  Recently, 
however, reports have signaled the emergence of an African ‘middle class’ and 
forecasted its positive impact on development.  
This thesis investigates a particular subset of West African middle classes in 
development discourses at the end of empire.  I argue for the longstanding existence of 
modern African middle classes in West Africa and describe how popular notions of 
African development and modernity have limited our ability to see African middle 
classes.  I examine Western-educated segments of the middle classes at the end of 
colonialism, and identify them as significant middling groups because of their position 
between supposedly ‘backwards’ African traditionalism and Western modernity as 
well as their position astride capital and labor.  Because of their middling character, 
Western-educated middle classes in West Africa emerged as both subjects and objects 
of development in the transition from colonial to nation-states.  I emphasize how 
notions of progress created by and about Western-educated West Africans focused on 
the imperatives of modernization and state-led development.  
  
 
The thesis focuses on definitions of African middle classes, notions of African 
modernity, and visions of national development at the end of empire.  I examine social 
theories about middle classes in general and African class structures in particular 
before discussing visions of development as expressed by influential Western-
educated Africans (namely Edward Blyden, Africanus Horton, Kwame Nkrumah and 
Félix Houphouёt-Boigny). I point to nationalism as a unifying class project for 
Western-educated Africans at the end of colonialism, and underscore how Western-
educated Africans envisioned the advent of African nations as the continent’s entry 
into the modern world.  National development  then appeared as a strategy for 
‘backwards’ nations to ‘catch-up’, and Western-expertise was offered as an expedient 
way to boost growth and modernize new nations.  Examples from Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire are provided throughout the thesis to illustrate general claims and to highlight 
variation within West Africa.  At the end of colonialism, ideas about development in 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire were almost antithetical. These two countries demonstrate 
how differences in ideology, imperial relations, and state-led development strategies 
necessarily affected the size and strength of Western-educated middle classes at the 
end of empire.  
In all, this thesis highlights the power of development discourses in 
constructing certain images of ‘African society’ which, in turn, propel particular 
development projects. How we imagine and represent African societies has important 
effects.  This thesis pushes the way we understand Africa’s past as well as 
contemporary class constructions. I attempt to insert the middle classes into 
representations of African societies with the belief that including the middle classes 
will produce more accurate and realistic ideas about African development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ideas about African social, economic, and political ‘development’ required 
new attention in the middle of the twentieth century as colonies transitioned into 
nation-states and colonial subjects became rights-bearing citizens.  Former colonies 
were, all of a sudden, ‘poor’ ‘backward’ countries, and ‘development’ was introduced 
as a means of improving living standards and national standings.  As empire faded, 
colonial categories changed and conceptual space opened to include Africans in the 
‘modern’ world. 1  This thesis examines ideas of progress at the end of empire in order 
to challenge contemporary categories of African development.  Specifically, I call into 
question the idea that African nations are divided dichotomously between ‘elites’ and 
poor masses.  From analysis of the transition from empire to nation, I argue for the 
longstanding existence of ‘the middle class’ in West Africa, and suggest its 
importance to national development.     
‘Development’ is a contested idea associated with ideas of progress; the 
problems it identifies and solutions proposed reflect desired changes for the present as 
well as visions of alternative futures.   Contemporary discourses of ‘African 
development’ generally express plans to move the continent away from poverty, 
nepotism and the caprices of war towards more economically prosperous and 
politically stable ‘modern’ societies.  Most African development discourses, and the 
projects they inspire, rest on one of two general conceptions of ‘African society’. 2  In 
the first, African societies are characterized by extreme deprivation and excessive 
                                                 
1 As colonial African subjects, once perceived as incapable of self-determination, became emancipated 
national subjects there was a necessary re-thinking of the capacities of Africans; a process that required 
rejecting old narratives and categories, and expanding the boundaries of the possible.  
2 ‘African society’ is, of course, a generalization with no substantive meaning. This reference to 
‘African society’ is made as an allusion to the ways “sub-Saharan Africa” is collapsed into a 
development problematic in research as well as practical development work.  Despite vast continental 
differences, there remains an impulse to understand the problems of ‘Africa’ collectively.  
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privilege.  Africa is the continent of unparalleled poverty and extraordinary plunder – 
the unfortunate battle death and disease while authorities profiteer and bully for bribes.  
Development, it is suggested, must focus on assisting the infirm, impoverished, and 
powerless masses on the one hand, and policing corrupt, pillaging, and tyrannical 
elites on the other.  African development is, consequently, framed as a conglomeration 
of national projects aimed at meeting basic needs, raising measures of economic 
productivity, and facilitating good governance.  The characterization (and reality) of 
‘Africa’ as a place of unrivaled deprivation and undependable elites provides the 
principle justification for the existence of development agencies, programs, and 
policies on the continent. The development ‘industry’ – comprised of international 
institutions, NGOs, and state organs – uses this discourse of extremes to 
unconsciously construct a two-class model of ‘African society’.  In accordance with 
this dichotomous depiction, national development projects focus on the exigencies of 
the poor and extravagances of Africa’s rich.  
Another less popular but equally evocative image of ‘African society’ in 
development discourse focuses on populations of potential.  Pointing to the continent’s 
abundant natural resources and fast-growing industries, this discourse suggests that 
savvy entrepreneurs, skilled professionals, and technical experts can propel the 
continent towards greater ‘development’.  The discourse maintains that untapped wells 
of oil, dense forests, and other natural repositories can boost national prosperity if 
harnessed with the right technology and technical know-how.  Furthermore, 
development potential is identified in industries such as telecommunications, 
information technology3, finance, entertainment4 and fashion.  The 2009 Information 
                                                 
3 The idea of technological ‘leap frogging’ is especially popular as a form of ‘development’ in African 
industries such as information technology, telecommunications, and banking. 
4 West African entertainment has expanded exponentially in recent years. Examples of growth in film 
and television include: 1.) ‘Nollywood’, the Nigerian film industry which produces in excess of 
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Economy Report, for example, refers to Africa as undergoing a “mobile phone 
revolution” and reports that since 2003 mobile phone subscriptions in sub-Saharan 
Africa have grown faster than any other region of the world.5  Accordingly, Africa is 
advertised as “open for business”, and described by venture capitalists as the “world’s 
fastest-growing continent”.6  The IMF has supported this notion by projecting that the 
African continent will grow faster than any other continent in the next decade.7 
In this discourse of industry growth and economic opportunities, 
‘development’ is focused on expanding the availability of capital, technology, and 
specialized knowledge to people who can unlock the continent’s potential. More 
recently, in addition to the significance of innovation and productivity from 
entrepreneurs in this process, more attention has been paid to the importance of 
Africa’s growing ‘middle class’ as a base for the consumption of commodities and 
services.8  This discourse of development presents the proliferation of small 
businesses, the growing strength of African stock markets, and expansion of 
commercial markets as markers of success and proof positive of the continent’s hidden 
potential.   
The two narratives of ‘African development’ outlined above are necessarily 
simplistic caricatures of a complex continent but the images they conjure are 
important.  In the first discourse, African development is characterized as a problem of 
                                                                                                                                            
US$200 million a year; and 2.) DStv Multichoice, a cable TV network based in South Africa but 
broadcasted in 47 African countries with well over 48.5 million viewers. 
5 The report was published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
in 2009. Mobile phone subscription in Africa, it reported, had a growth rate of 550% between 2003 and 
2008. 
6 African Capital Markets News, < http://www.afrigrow.com/?p=92 > (22 September 2009).   
7 Africa Recovery, 12:2 November 1998, 12. 
8 Bernstein and Johnston (2005) begin their article in the Business Day newspaper, “The onset of higher 
economic growth and soaring levels of confidence in the South African economy has prompted 
burgeoning awareness of the emerging African middle class. The entry of growing numbers of Africans 
into higher income brackets is good news…and leads to all manners of hopes and expectations…” 
While this comment is directed specifically at South Africa, a very particular development ‘success’ 
story, this quote captures an increasingly popular sentiment about other African countries.   
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extremes with no recognition of middle classes. The second development discourse 
focuses on the social significance of entrepreneurs and consumers without placing 
these groups in relation to others in their societies. These two discourses are seldom 
combined and, generally, the dominant discourse of poor masses and wanton elites 
shapes understandings of African development problems.  Following the dominant 
construction, African middle classes are either assumed not to exist or to be in small, 
incipient sizes. Beyond simply noting how powerful these representations are in 
defining development programs and strategies, we can also consider what they tell us 
about the significance of the ‘middle class’ to African development.  Paradoxically, 
the ‘middle class’ is absent in dominant notions of African development, but the 
growing ‘middle class’ is seen as central to (and a signal of) the growth of industry.  
This paradox begs the question:  Who are the middle classes in African nations, and 
what are their relationships to African development?   
Middle classes in African nations are surprisingly understudied; their 
composition and characteristics are seldom specified, and their sizes in different 
national contexts are largely unknown. Increasingly, however, publications in 
magazines, newspapers, and blogs have hailed the emergence of Africa’s “new middle 
class”, and pointed to its expansion as a sign of hope on an otherwise bedraggled and 
dysfunctional continent. 9  These articles describe the African ‘middle class’ as people 
whose incomes and consumption habits afford them lifestyles in step with presumed 
‘middle class’ norms.  For example, a Washington Post journalist writes, the middle 
class: 
 
includes working Africans who make as little as $200 a month, a paltry sum by 
Western standards, yet hardly the $1 or so a day in earnings that describe life 
for about half the continent's population. Perhaps a third of all Africans, or 300 
                                                 
9 African blogs are ubiquitous and the emergent middle class is a popular topic especially on “Timbuktu 
Chronicles” written by entrepreneur Emeka Okafor. 
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million people, fall into a middle category -- people struggling to put their kids 
through school and pay rent, but able to buy a cellphone or DVD once in a 
while.10  
 
While the sources and methods used to acquire these estimates are not disclosed, the 
author nonetheless describes a widely observable reality in countries across the 
African continent.  Shopping complexes, fitness centers, cable television, gated 
communities, and home mortgages – trimmings commonly associated with the 
‘middle class’ in Western nations – are noticeably present in African countries.   
Recent World Bank and development reports are also acknowledging an apparent 
growth of the ‘middle class’ in developing nations. 11  They identify middle classes in 
developing countries as populations living between the mean incomes of Brazil and 
Italy 12 or, in the least developed countries, those living on between $2 and $10 a 
day.13 
If new middle classes are indeed emerging in African countries how do we 
identify them and how do we explain their sudden rise? What does their presence 
portend for national development? These questions have not been adequately 
addressed in academic or development literature, despite the significant impact they 
might have in shaping development projects.  At present, discussions of Africa’s 
‘middle class’ rely on colloquial understandings of the term, and employ arbitrary 
income levels to identify middle class membership.  It is difficult to believe, however, 
that we can describe middle classes on the basis of income without attention to social 
                                                 
10 Stephanie McCrummen, “In Africa, a New Middle-Income Consumerism,” The Washington Post, 1 
September 2008. 
11 The World Bank has piqued interest in rising middle classes in developing nations, insinuating that 
the strength of the middle class will translate to increased political stability, improved national GDP as 
well as boosts to infrastructure and social services. Milanovic and Yitzhaki “Decomposing World 
Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?” Review of Income and Wealth (2002): 
155-178. 
12 Milanovic and Yitzhaki 2002. 
13 Banerjee and Duflo, “What is Middle Class about the Middle Classes Around the World” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives (2008):3-28. 
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relations. We cannot treat the ‘middle class’ as an isolated segment of a national 
population separated from other classes and disconnected from historical class 
formation.  Classes do not exist a priori but, rather, are made and re-made within 
social context.   
Furthermore, informal use of the term ‘middle class’ relies on idealized notions 
of Western middle classes and loosely connected symbols of ‘modern’ living.  There 
is no reason to assume, however, that African middle classes mirror Western models 
since the histories and geopolitical positioning of African nations is unlike Western 
nations.  Furthermore, the fact that African middle classes are so poorly defined 
should make us cautious in making claims about their influences on growth and 
national development.  The existence of African middle classes cannot be taken for 
granted – they must be identified on their own terms and researched in context.  This 
thesis is an attempt to engage in more focused sociological investigation of this 
altogether ignored or too-readily presumed category.  I provide a working definition of 
African middle classes and use the transition from empire to the nation-state to discuss 
their historical relations to national development. 
 
Despite the paucity of research on African middle classes, there appears to be a 
certain investment in them; a hope that their presence, even in diminutive form, will 
unlock new economic potential or provide political stability.  These notions hail in 
part from studies in Western literature that identify the ‘middle class’ as a source of 
economic development.  As far back as the 1800s the middle class was identified as 
the “driving force of nations.”14  More recently, Western societies displaying high 
inequality with small middle classes have been linked to low levels of growth and 
                                                 
14 Joaquim Nabuco, O Abolicionismo (Brasilia: Senado Federal, 1863, reprinted 2003) 
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limited capital accumulation.15  Beyond their economic influence middle classes are 
also identified as significant political actors with the power to change political 
configurations, buttress intransigent political orders, or serve as democratizing forces 
in ‘mature’ nations.16  Furthermore, development theories have associated the 
leadership of urbanized middle classes with successful modernization and 
democratization.17  The ‘middle class’ appears, therefore, as a popular but elusive 
force associated with Western progress – its presence is believed to remake or 
strengthen the social fabric. However, research in African contexts is yet to validate 
the benefits of the ‘middle class’ to economic development or political stability.   
This thesis suggests that we investigate African middle classes more closely 
before drawing conclusions on their contribution to national development.  I focus 
here on a subset of West African middle classes at the end of colonialism, and argue 
that the African middle classes receiving attention toady are not new social forces but, 
rather, part of class structures with much longer histories. I look at Western-educated 
Africans specifically and identify them as an especially significant segment of the 
middle classes.  While Western-educated Africans do not represent the ‘middle class’, 
they shaped the contours of development discourse and practice in the transition from 
empire to nation.   
 
  
                                                 
15 David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (New York: Norton, 1998); Irma Adelman and 
Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, politics, and economic development: a quantitative approach (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Oded Galor and Joseph Zeira, “Income distribution and macroeconomics” 
Review of Economic Studies (1993):35-52.  
16 Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1987); M. Savage et al, Property, bureaucracy and culture. Middle class formation in 
contemporary Britain (London: Routledge,1995) 
17 Leela Fernandes, India's New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); S.M. Lipest, “The Changing Class Structure and 
Contemporary European Politics” Daedalus (1964):271-303. 
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Development and Modern Middle Classes 
The end of colonialism and emergence of African nation-states marked fundamental 
shifts in the political relevance, economic advantages, and social functions of 
Western-educated Africans.  In this transitional moment, Western-educated Africans 
stood poised to assume positions of authority and exploit new opportunities.  As 
seemingly more ‘modern’ than others, Africans with Western schooling were 
presumed to be necessary in moving Africa into modernity and were, consequently, 
inserted into development discourses and imaginaries.  
The dominant development ideas at the end of colonialism were characterized 
by evolutionary mindsets, teleological projections, and optimistic outlooks about the 
potential to transform Africa from traditionalism and backwardness to the likeness of 
Western modernity.  This was a period of grand narratives that (over)confidently 
pronounced the mechanisms and stages of social progress.  From the 1940s until 
approximately the 1970s, dominant development discourses supported state 
intervention as the primary means of implementing development projects.  In the 
process of decolonization and nation-building, therefore, the nation-state emerged as 
the primary unit of development and Western-educated Africans appeared as the 
mainstay of modernity.    
Notions of development proposed to completely transform African from 
‘backwardness’.  At their core they placed economic growth as the ultimate measure 
of modern development.  In both capitalist and socialist discourses of development in 
this transitional period, African nations were perceived as temporally behind 
industrialized nations, and conceived strategies for Africa’s economic ‘catch-up’. 
Politically, the emergence of nation-states fanned hopes that Africans would finally 
receive the same treatment as other human beings and enjoy rights of citizenship 
accorded members of the comity of nations; namely, political participation and access 
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to modern institutions (such as hospitals, schools, courts etc.).  With economic, 
political, and social changes in mind, African modernity was imagined as a package of 
institutions and processes linked to economic growth, industrialization, urbanization, 
infrastructural development, bureaucratization and secularization.  These development 
ideas emanated from Africans with nationalist hopes as well as Western scholars in the 
disciplines of anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology with new 
interest in development studies. These groups demonstrated tremendous power in the 
production and dissemination of development knowledge at the end of colonialism.  
Despite their disparate entry points into questions of development, African nationalists 
and Western experts both identified the state as the primary engine for ‘modern’ 
development.   
In the following chapters I examine these ideas of development in order to 
construct historically grounded conceptions of African middle classes and to comment 
on their contributions to national development.  I identify Western-educated African 
professionals as a significant subset of the middle classes and attempt to understand 
them relationally in the transition from empire to nation.  Western-educated African 
middle classes, I argue, stood: in relation to other classes (i.e. between labor, capital, 
traditional authority figures etc.); in between ideas (such as ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’); and astride development projects of both the colonial and nation-state.  I 
suggest that because of their middling positions in colonies, Western-educated 
Africans experienced occupational privileges and elevated status as well as the 
frustrations and existential anxieties provoked by political subjugation, racial 
denigration and economic subordination. However, with the emergence of African 
nation-states, colonial discourses were dismantled and new narratives of socio-
political and economic development constructed.  Western-educated Africans feature 
in this transition as both the subjects and objects of development.  
 10 
 
Although the thesis aims to challenge general ideas about ‘Africa’, I focus on 
coastal, tropical West Africa (the region extending from present-day Senegal through 
to Nigeria), and pay special attention to examples from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  As 
former British and French colonies, respectively, and as nations that pursued socialist 
and capitalist arrangements after independence, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire point to 
important contrasts and continuities in the ways ‘development’ was conceived in West 
Africa and how social contexts differed.  I do not attempt an in-depth case study of 
either nation, but focus instead on developing a conceptual understanding of 
development and Western-educated middle classes in West Africa more generally.  
I have chosen West Africa as the focus of this project because of its 
importance in the development of African nationalist ideas and its historical 
connections to Diaspora communities across the Atlantic and in Europe.  A triangle of 
transatlantic influences exchanged ideas between Africa, Europe, and the so-called 
‘New World’ and produced especially powerful discourses of progress in terms of 
racial liberation, pan-Africanism, and nationalism.18  Western schooling in coastal 
West Africa also took hold at an earlier time than in other parts of the African 
continent.  Consequently, West Africa contained pockets of bilingual intelligentsia, 
clerks, lawyers, doctors and the like who often helped administer colonial states as 
well as forming ideas about African ‘development’. Lastly, focus on West Africa 
allows comparison of the differences between French and British colonialism. As the 
two leading imperialists in Africa, the legacies of France and Britain still manifest 
today and affect visions and execution of ‘African development’. 
In examining development discourse I explore myriad categories from classes 
and colonies to empires, nations, and “races”.  I acknowledge the nation-state as the 
                                                 
18 Ayodele Langley, Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Afirca 1900-1945: A Study in Ideology 
and Social Classes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) 
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preeminent unit of analysis in development discourse, but also factor non-national 
units such as racial movements, regional federations and global institutions into 
discourse analysis.  I follow Stuart Hall’s definition of discourse as a particular form 
of representing things and the relations between that which is represented.  “A 
discourse”, Hall writes, “is a group of statements which provide a language for talking 
about – i.e. a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic.”19 
“Discursive practice” is the process through which discourse is formed and meaning 
produced through a collection of interrelated categories and statements.20  Discourses 
not only provide language and frameworks for representation, but also limit or exclude 
certain categories and topics from discussion.   
Discourses, therefore, produce knowledge and circumscribe the realm of the 
possible as an expression of power.   The ability to delineate what is ‘known’ and 
impose this knowledge as ‘truth’ is a reflection of discursive power. Michel Foucault’s 
assertion that “power produces knowledge” is especially evident in discourses at the 
end of empire as the voices and visions of Western-educated Africans and Western 
experts dominated conceptions of development.21 According to Foucault, “when 
power operates so as to enforce the ‘truth’ of any set of statements, then such a 
discursive formation produces a ‘regime of truth’.”22  Development ‘truth’ at the end 
of empire rested on the assumption that state-led industrialization and modernization 
were the means of development – a belief referred to in this thesis as 
‘developmentalism’.  From the 1940s until the 1970s, a developmentalist regime held 
                                                 
19 Stuart Hall, The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, ed. Hall et al (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing 1996), 185-227. 
20 Discourse, therefore, emanates from various sources, and is not dependent on any given institution or 
actor to validate it or give it a particular coherency or ‘integrity’. Discourses are diffuse and derive their 
strength from the multifarious ways discourses reproduce themselves through diffuse capillary-like 
systems.  Discourses are open systems with as much consensus as there is contradiction (Hall 1996). 
21 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977  (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1980): 27    
22 Hall 1996: 205 
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sway; encouraging a variety of theories about state-managed development and 
initiating a host of state-led development projects.  Today state intervention and 
modernization are no longer development ‘truths’, but their lingering effects are felt in 
various ways.23 Contemporary and historical development discourses matter because 
they frame and inform development interventions and, as such, produce real social 
effects. 
The crisis and end of empire is an especially instructive moment to examine 
development discourses . Transition periods bring declining discourses up against new 
ones and can make tacit or taken for granted assumptions more explicit; highlighting 
discursive contradictions and continuities.24 This thesis juxtaposes colonial narratives 
of progress with African national discourses of development in an effort to elucidate 
underlying assumptions and point to disparate development projections.  The 
centrality of Western referents to both pre and post-colonial visions of African 
progress is a sign of the power wielded by the ‘West’ over ‘Africa’ as well as by 
Western-educated Africans over other Africans in this transitional period.  
The thesis weaves between discourse analysis and historical narrative in order 
to form conceptual understandings of both development and middle classes.  
Historical details give context for development discourses while also providing details 
to support conceptual claims.  Condensing the oftentimes contradictory and complex 
realities of social life into sociological categories (like class) and theoretical processes 
(like development) is necessarily distorting, but the particularities of history help 
minimize the tendency towards idealism and the violence of abstraction.  V.Y. 
Mudimbe claims “There is no description of Africa that does not involve destructive 
                                                 
23 The notion, for example, of African ‘backwardness’ is still prevalent, and despite acknowledgment of 
the impractically of African ‘catch-up’ with Western nations this idea is still widely promoted. 
24  Ralph Rosnow, Paradigms in transition  (New York: Oxford University Press 1981) 
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and mendacious functions.”25 When the multiplicity of ethnicities, religions, gender 
relations, classes and cultural practices on the continent are considered it is clear that 
any attempt to discuss ‘Africa’ or ‘African society’ is based on essentialized and 
abstract notions. However, development discourses, especially in the transition from 
empire to nation, were often constructed in continental and pan-African terms and 
development strategies for a generalized ‘Africa’ were (and still are) commonly 
invoked.  So, despite acknowledgment of vast differences across the continent and 
sensitivity to the need for historical specificity, I attempt to develop somewhat 
generalized conceptions of West African middle classes and their relation to national 
development. 
This work is not an attempt to empirically prove the existence of African 
middle classes or specify their quantitative dimensions (although a case for their 
historical and contemporary presence is made in myriad ways). Nor is the intention 
here to glorify the middle class as a critical variable which, when inserted into the 
right development formula, will yield long-anticipated results.  I aim instead to 
expound on one stratum of African middle classes in the middle of the twentieth 
century, to indicate what roles they played in specific development discourses, and 
explore the impact they were presumed to portend for social, political, and economic 
advancement.  I do not attempt to provide tidy resolutions about African middle 
classes and their impact on development.  I do, however, move away from presentist, 
colloquial conceptions of the ‘middle class’, while also delineating transformations in 
development discourses at the end of empire.  I aim to highlight overlaps, 
contradictions, and continuities in conceptions of African middle classes, African 
development, and African modernity.   
 
                                                 
25 ” V.Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1988) 
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The thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter one establishes a definition of 
African middle classes in the transition from empire to nation.  The chapter describes 
how the expansion of colonial states and economies increased differentiation in the 
division of labor in African societies, and produced new middle classes comprised, in 
part, by Western-educated administrators, bureaucrats, and salaried professionals.  The 
chapter outlines sociological understandings of middle classes as conceived by Karl 
Marx and Max Weber.  I proceed, however, to develop a definition of middle classes 
that considers particular West African social categories as well as notions of 
modernity and development. I argue that a self-conscious class of Western-educated 
Africans emerged in the transition from empire to nation, and congealed their identity 
around visions of national development.   Western-educated African middle classes 
envisioned development through the nation-state as a way to liberate Africans from 
colonial conquest and, simultaneously, elevate their local and global status.  Chapter 
one argues for a relational understanding of African middle classes, and for the 
identification of its Western-educated members in this period through their 
engagement with nationalist and developmentalist projects.   
The chapter indicates that Western-educated middle classes were central to 
development ideas about: 1.) vertical integration of Africa into the modern world and 
2.) horizontal expansion of ‘Western modernity’ to all Africans in nation-states.  
Vertical integration refers to the presumed attainment of African liberty, equality, and 
restored dignity through the nation-state.  National status, it was suggested, would 
bring Africa into the modern world and raise Africans to the same level of humanity as 
other members of the comity of nations.  Horizontal expansion of ‘Western 
modernity’ alludes to projections of development that forecasted the replacement of 
African ‘backwardness’ with institutions and practices of the ‘West’ (and in socialist 
cases the ‘East’).  The privileges of modernity, this argument suggested, could be 
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extended to more segments of society if African nation-states sponsored development 
projects and implemented modernizing measures.  Chapter one, therefore, defines the 
middle classes and lays the foundation for later discussions about modernity and 
developmentalism. 
Chapter two examines vertical integration more closely by investigating anti-
colonial and nationalist development discourses.  I describe how shared experiences of 
colonial oppression promoted solidarity between Africans with Western education, 
and facilitated the construction of a racialized ‘African’ identity.  From their position 
between labor and capital and astride Western and African worlds, African middle 
classes enjoyed opportunities for occupational security, capital accumulation and 
elevated social power and prestige, while also experiencing racial subjugation and the 
unbearable weight of the color bar. West African discourses of development pointed to 
the nation-state as a means of expanding personal opportunities and elevating the 
general status of the black “race”.  I explore how these liberatory discourses often built 
on conceptions of an idealized African past while advocating for a modern African 
future.  African societies, Western-educated Africans argued, had to be regenerated 
and restored to recover African values and dignity robbed by imperial domination.  
Promotion of African identity and nationalism became ways to confirm African 
humanity and assert African modernity. 
In this chapter I highlight ideas of progress expressed by significant 
personalities such as Edward Bylden, Africanus Horton, Kwame Nkrumah and Félix 
Houphouёt-Boigny.  I also examine Pan-African and negritude movements as 
significant influences in the formation of discourses of ‘development’ and sustained 
attempts to vertically boost Africa’s status in the ‘modern’ world.  These movements 
allowed Africans with Western exposure to use their knowledge of imperialism and 
the ‘black’ experience to express particular visions of national development.  I argue 
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that opportunities for Western-educated Africans to sharpen their conceptions of 
‘development’ increased with the organization of transatlantic conferences, the 
expansion of print capitalism, and the growing strength of Diaspora communities in 
North America and Europe.  However, because Western-educated Africans aimed to 
(re)establish African humanity while simultaneously pursuing venerated Western 
ideals their lives and development ideas betrayed a host of contradictions.  As Kwaku 
Larbi Korang writes: 
  
Imagining African modernity in the nation-form, [African] writer-intellectuals 
disclose a paradox at the level of concept. They are to be seen simultaneously 
affirming – saying an intimate “yes” to – an alien dominant even as they 
mobilize its categories to say “no” in revolt against it…[T]hese nationalist 
intellectuals represent in themselves the place where “Africa” and “modernity,” 
native and alien, intersects as an ontological predicament” (Korang, 2003: 13) 
  
This second chapter, therefore, explores discourses of development proffered by 
Western-educated Africans, and argues that their narratives of progress reflected their 
existential dilemmas as Western-influenced Africans as well as their collective 
ambitions to inaugurate African modernity.   
Chapter three turns our attention to hopes for the horizontal expansion of 
‘modernity’ expressed in developmentalist discourses and projects. The chapter 
examines developmentalist regimes and modernization paradigms, and highlights how 
the former hailed African states as the engines of development and the latter instructed 
Africans to relinquish ‘backwardness’ and embrace the virtues of ‘Western 
modernity’.  African societies in this developmentalist period were assumed to 
progress in linear fashion towards the standards of living and lifestyles of Western 
nations.  Development theories placed hopes on Western-educated African engineers, 
doctors, teachers, administrators and the like to economically build and modernize 
emerging African nations.  Also, with national independence, Western-educated 
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Africans became occupants of the state and expressed their own conceptions of 
‘development’.  Chapter three, therefore, examines Western-educated African middle 
classes as both the objects and subjects of state-led ‘development’.   I also examine the 
importance of Cold War rivalries in shaping development projects, and stress the 
developmentalist dimensions of both socialist and capitalist discourses.  Regardless of 
their ideological leanings, development initiatives in this period were explicitly state-
led; examples from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are given once again to illustrate this 
fact.  
Chapter three, therefore, highlights the strength of developmentalism and 
modernization in shaping visions of post-colonial Africa and discourses of 
development. In both Marxist and capitalist projections of African development, 
traditional backwardness was to be shed and replaced by modern industrialization. 
Western knowledge was considered premium and Western experts or Western-
educated Africans were presumed to hold the key to unlocking secrets of modern 
development. The expansion of Western-educated African middle classes was 
expected to signify successful renouncement of traditionalism and the onset of modern 
practices. The more thoroughly Africans imbibed Western culture and mannerisms, 
the more quickly they were projected to transition into modernity and become 
‘developed’. 
Altogether, the thesis highlights the power of development discourses in 
determining notions about African societies. How we imagine and represent Africa is 
of critical importance. Elaborating African middle classes is not a solution in and of 
itself but rather a missing part of the development puzzle.  By making the middle 
classes more visible we can begin to ask more comprehensive development questions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Middle Classes, Modernity, and Development 
The end of European imperialism in Africa marked a fundamental shift in discourses 
of modernity.  With the demise of empire and rise of African nations, colonial 
narratives of ‘primitive natives’ incapable of self-rule were no longer tenable. These 
discourses gave way to development narratives asserting that Africans were not 
confined to backwardness, but could in fact develop into more ‘advanced’, ‘modern’ 
societies.  The advent of nations in Africa  elevated ‘natives’ to the same world 
category as their erstwhile ‘colonizers’, and intimated African access to modern rights 
and privileges.  For Western-educated Africans especially, entry into the comity of 
nations implied significant changes in their identity and status within the modern 
world. 26   Western-educated Africans stood between ‘African backwardness’ and 
‘Western modernity’ and, as such, emerged as important middling groups between 
colonialism’s constraints and Africa’s potential for national growth.  Western-
educated Africans in certain occupations (such as doctors, teachers, engineers and the 
like) were also positioned between owners of capital and highly exploited laborers.  
Their middling character, therefore, was not only between traditionalism and 
modernity but also as middle classes between labor and capital.  This chapter 
investigates these two middling dimensions of Western-educated Africans in the 
transition from empire to nation in order to argue the longstanding existence of 
‘modern’ West African middle classes.  
Middle classes in West Africa are necessarily plural; they represent the 
multifarious and fragmented groups between owners of property and the propertyless.  
                                                 
26 I use the term ‘Western-educated’ Africans here refer to Africans schooled in Western educational 
systems (either in West Africa or abroad). 
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African middle classes include salaried professionals as well as employees in 
commerce, industry, and service jobs; self-employed and direct producers such as 
farmers, artisans, and crafts makers; and also small-scale capitalists such as 
shopkeepers, operators, family firms, and small agricultural and industrial owners of 
production.27  The central argument in this chapter is that at the end of colonialism, 
Western-educated Africans represented a subset of the middle classes that stood 
between Western ideals of modernity and African hopes for national development. 
Their class identity formed as a function of their middling social, economic, and 
political standings which, in turn, propelled them towards particular nationalist 
projects. The chapter identifies Western-educated African middle classes in the 
transition from empire to nation by their relation to traditionalism and modernity, 
labor and capital, local status groups, and their proclivity towards various nationalist 
projects.  
I open with a discussion of modernity followed by elaboration of classes in 
‘modern’ capitalist societies. I build on insights from Karl Marx, Max Weber and 
others about middle classes in capitalist societies, and suggest ways to conceptualize 
or identify West African middle classes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
class relations in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in order to illustrate the plurality of middle 
class configurations.  
 
Colonial Narratives of Modernity and the Rise of the Nation-State 
Colonial discourses upheld the West as the epicenter of the ‘modern’ world.  As the 
supposed source of industrial capitalism, constitutional government, and 
representative democracy Western societies were depicted as beacons of progress 
                                                 
27  Diane Davis, Discipline and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
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demonstrating the way forward for less developed societies.  Imperial narratives 
promoted European institutions and practices as markers of ‘civilization’, and 
presented political, economic, and social structures of the West as seemingly unified 
components of ‘modern’ nations.28  Western societies, it was suggested, not only 
exhibited elaborate market relations and high degrees of monetization they also, 
allegedly, were comprised of rational decision-making citizens, with secular belief 
systems that freed them from the strictures of religion and restrictive kinship bonds.  
Europe was characterized by “individualism, the centrality of Reason, autonomy of 
action, liberal democracy, the Rule of Law, the open future, and an obsession with 
novelty.”29  The trappings of ‘modern’ Western life were, it was suggested, also 
evident in the existence of small nuclear families with access to rapid 
communications, advanced forms of transportation, and innovative technologies.  In 
both private and public spheres, Western social structures and lifestyles were 
portrayed as signs and standards of ‘modernity’.   
Africa on the other hand was portrayed as modernity’s Other. ‘Traditional’ 
African societies, imperial discourses suggested, were stuck in static, closed systems 
with ascribed social roles and extensive kinship patronage. Africans were, supposedly, 
governed by animalistic urges, belief in superstition, and ritual practices.  
Unaccustomed, for the most part, to urban life, Africans displayed all the uncouth 
behaviors of ‘uncivilized’ people – bearing exposed chests, engaging in polygamy, 
and living in rudimentary housing structures. Discourses of modernity in the colonial 
period were characterized, therefore, by a series of antinomies supposedly 
                                                 
28
 James Ferguson Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, (Durham: Duke University 
Press 2006), 177. Modernity, Ferguson explains, was presented in imperial discourses as a ‘package’ of 
institutions, despite the fact that disparate components of Western nations emerged separately and 
contigently. 
29 Olufemi Taiwo, “Prophets Without Honor: African Apostles of Modernity in the Nineteenth Century” 
West Africa Review, (2001):1-3 
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distinguishing Western and African societies.  In simplified form, the binaries of 
colonial narratives differentiated between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ societies, 
‘advanced’-‘primitive’, ‘urban’-‘rural’, ‘scientific’-‘superstitious’, ‘secular’-‘animist’, 
and ‘calculating’ versus ‘supposing’.  These supposed dichotomies undergirded 
European imperial ideology, and provided legitimizing categories for colonial 
missions and projects.30  While we must recognize imperial heterogeneity, it is clear 
that colonial discourses bifurcated the world into opposed antinomies and placed 
Africa outside the realm of the modern world.  
Furthermore, colonial ideas about African modernity (or assumed lack thereof) 
adopted a continental, more specifically, sub-continental dimension.  Africa, 
understood as the ‘dark continent’, was assigned a racial identity through its encounter 
with Europe, and people of African descent subsequently, to varying degrees, 
internalized a Black identity.  ‘Sub-Saharan’ or ‘Black’ Africa was ‘invented’ by 
homogenizing disparate peoples on the basis of a constructed racial identity.31  Coastal 
West Africa specifically and ‘Africa’ in general, were subsumed in racialized, 
reductionist discourses of modernity that organized Africans into the subordinately 
ranked category of ‘Blacks’.  However, when the ethnic plurality of African societies 
is considered, there is little reason to discuss the sub-continent as a unified whole aside 
from its legacy of imperial incursion and colonial subjugation.  Inscribed into racial 
and imperial hierarchies, Africa’s colonially-given identity as a Black continent played 
a central role in shaping conceptions about African modernity. ‘Africa’ equaled 
‘Black’ and the extent to which ‘modernity’ applied was questioned in accordance 
with imperial beliefs about racial capacities and social hierarchies.32  Colonial 
                                                 
30 Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, Tensions of empire: colonial cultures in a bourgeois world 
(Berkeley: University of Berkeley1997) 
31 Mudimbe 1988 
32 James Ferguson’s treatment of moral, racial and social hierarchies is instructive (Ferguson 2006). 
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narratives of African modernity were formed, therefore, from contrived notions about 
the collective ‘backwardness’ of Black people, more so than from specific analysis of 
the everyday practices and idiosyncrasies of, say, Mende, Hausa, or Akan people.   
To be sure, accounts by European anthropologists were decisive in generating 
ideas about ‘primitive’ African societies, and their ‘expert’ opinions were bolstered by 
popular European literature, imperial propaganda, and ‘scientific’ theories on racial 
and social hierarchies.  The categories and classifications devised by anthropologists 
and colonial officers still have profound, ongoing effects on local and global 
perceptions of African peoples. Despite the diversity of African societies, processes of 
racial essentializing and the construction of Africans into ‘uncivilized’ ‘tribes’ decided 
their position in a colonially-prescribed modern world.  Africa, a continent of varied 
ethnic and religious groups with complex political and economic structures that 
changed continuously through exchange and encounter with people from other parts of 
the world, was constructed as a perennially ‘primitive’ place distinct from the 
‘modern’ West. As James Ferguson writes, modernity is a “powerful discourse of 
identity” which, in the colonial period, constructed Africans as hopelessly backward, 
constrained by their racial deficiencies and traditional ascriptions.33  Understood in 
colonial discourse as racially inferior and socially regressive, the global status of 
Africans was beyond and beneath that of ‘modern’ societies.   
 
Modernity Re-defined 
In the period around World War II, colonialism’s contradictions became abundantly 
clear, and notions of modernity were necessarily reconfigured.  Africans, employed to 
fight on behalf of their respective colonial powers, observed mass carnage and misery 
                                                 
33  Ferguson 2006:177 
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in Europe which challenged imperial myths of ‘civilization’ and diminished the 
‘White man’s’ mystique.  Also, at the same time that Allied forces denounced Nazi 
and Japanese imperial aggression, rebuffed anti-Semitism, and declared the evils of 
occupation, France and Britain maintained vast colonies in Africa and Asia, insisted 
on enforcing the color bar, and subjected others to their external rule.  These 
inconsistencies met more outrage and resistance in the period around World War II.  
In the United States, Europe and across the African continent vociferous demands 
were made for self-determination and racial equality.  Opposition to discrimination of 
‘Negro’ people around the world posed a particularly strong challenge to racial 
hierarchies, and exacerbated the growing crisis of empire.   
In this context of contested and declining empire the notion of African nations 
was pushed to the fore.  The idea of African nation-states implied self-rule, the 
conferral of citizenship rights, and recognition of African equality by other nations. In 
the mid-twentieth century imaginary, Africa nations stood as the promise of 
advancement – the universal stamp of political legitimacy and insurer of rights and 
privileges.34  As members of the comity of nations, Africans moved category from 
colonial subjects to national citizens, adopting new local and global identities in the 
process.  Modernity, it seemed, was no longer the possession of a ‘superior race’ but, 
rather, a characteristic of advanced societies in the race of nations. Nations existed, as 
it were, in a geopolitical hierarchy in which countries with economic and military 
might gained superordinate position. Presumably, with the formation of nation-states, 
Africans had the dual opportunities to be recognized on a global level as well as to 
move their new nations up the rungs of the global hierarchy of nation-states.  The 
nation appeared as the gateway to African modernity. ‘Development’, it was 
suggested, would fast track the establishment of modern institutions (such as hospitals, 
                                                 
34
 Ferguson 2006 
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factories, universities etc.) as well as infrastructure and amenities (like paved roads, 
bridges, electricity and running water), thus propelling African nations squarely into 
the modern world.  
This narrative of ‘modernity’, however, is grossly problematic.  Firstly, the 
notion that Western nations ‘developed’ in a unilinear, systematically planned fashion 
elides the plethora of contestation involved in the establishment of modern republics 
and parliamentary democracy in Europe and North America.  There was no inevitable 
march of history or magical formula by which Western nations produced institutions 
and mentalities associated with modernity. Instead, nation-states were formulated 
contingently and gradually through unpredictable civil wars and social revolutions.  
The long history of liberalism and capitalist expansion in Europe and the United States 
would be impossible to reproduce, and could never emerge as a ‘package’.35  The 
version of ‘Western modernity’ extolled in the transition from empire to nation and 
suggested as the universal telos of all nations was, in fact, the product of particular 
histories that included massive plundering, social dislocations, and political upheaval 
that we could not (nor would we want to) replicate in the geopolitical arrangement of 
nations.36   
Furthermore, the accumulation of capital in the West was directly related to 
surplus generated from the trans-Atlantic slave trade, imperial extraction of natural 
minerals and resources, and the exploitation of labor in colonies.37  The ‘modern 
                                                 
35 Barrington Moore (1966) and Karl Polanyi (2001) demonstrate the contingency and contestation of 
democratic and capitalist historical development. Liberalism cannot be assumed as a universal given. I 
also am acknowledging here the contributions of slavery and colonialism to the growth of Western 
metropoles.  
36 Borrowing from Enrique Dussel, Lewis Gordon refers to the horrors of conquest since 1492 (i.e. 
genocide, slavery, exploitation etc) as “modernity’s underside” (Lewis Gordon Existentia Africana: 
Understanding Africana Existential Thought (New York: Routledge 2000): 1). This phrase explains 
why there should be no desire to replicate the actions taken for the capital accumulation that led to 
‘Western modernity’. 
37 Underdevelopment and dependency theories clearly make the connection between the economic 
growth of Europe and the restricted or disfigured growth of African countries. These theories are 
addressed in more detail in chapter three of this thesis.  
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world’, consequently, was built with and by Africans, not before or without them.  
Modernity was never an exclusive feature of advanced Western civilizations but, 
rather, the “shared historical present” of all people within the reaches of an expanding 
capitalist world system.38 As Geschiere et al suggest, ‘African modernity’ cannot be 
divorced from developments elsewhere, nor can it be described as a delayed attempt to 
converge with a Western future.39  African modernity is not the unilinear adoption of 
Western institutions and practices but, rather, the acquisition, cooption, and 
transformation of elements from both Western and African traditions.  This leads to 
the belief that, “Europe was made by its imperial projects, as much as colonial 
encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe.”40 African modernity is, and has 
been, coeval with Western modernity.  Neither one is clearly definable but both must 
be understood as developing in conjunction with each other through material, cultural, 
and ideological exchange.  As more scholars encourage us to conceive it, African 
modernity is a product of bricolage – a patchwork of traditions, cultures, and 
epistemes.41 
 
Middle Classes in the Modern World 
Discourses of ‘modernity’ were instrumental in constructing notions of African 
progress at the close of colonialism; they (problematically) prompted Africans to 
pursue models of ‘development’ exhibited in Western nations. Importantly, however, 
the prosperity associated with ‘modernity’ in Western societies was, in large part, a 
                                                 
38 Ferguson (2006): 168 
39 Peter Geschiere et al, Readings in Modernity in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) 
40 Cooper and Stoler (1997):1 
41 Pierre-Joseph Laurent “The Process of Bricolage Between Mythic Societies and Global Modernity” 
(2005); Geschiere et al (2008); Brian Larkinm “Degraded Images, Distorted Sounds: Nigerian Video 
and the Infrastructure of Piracy” (2008); Jojada Verrips and Birgit Meyer, “Kwaku's Car: The Struggles 
and Stroies of a Ghanaian Long-Distance Taxi Driver” (2008); Frederick Cooper “Modernizing 
Bureaucrats, Backwards Africans, and the Development Concept”(1997) 
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product of decades of capitalist accumulation.  Capitalism is a socially transforming 
system that separates societies on the basis of property ownership. The two great 
classes it creates are owners of capital and those who own nothing but their labor. 
Capitalism cannot merely be understood, however, by its constitutive parts but must 
instead be understood by relations between them. Thus it is the relation of capital to 
labor that establishes a capitalist system. Capitalism must be analyzed as an “organic 
whole” – a system of social relations with structures and dynamics of its own.42   
However, productive relations exist beyond those of capital and wage-working 
labor – these include, importantly, a variety of middle classes.   The rest of this chapter 
examines the ‘middle class’ in Western social theory and provides a conceptual 
framework for how we might understand West African middle classes.  I affirm the 
existence of capitalist development in West Africa, and investigate the use of ‘class’ in 
African contexts. By analyzing debates at the end of empire I point to the salience of 
class as well as the utility of acknowledging middle classes. I identify Western-
educated Africans as dominant segments of the middle classes in the transition from 
empire to nation, and indicate ways to identify West African middle classes more 
generally.  In making West African middle classes more visible we begin to see 
‘African modernity’ as more than just creation of the nation, but also as the 
introduction of occupations, lifestyles, and consumption patterns characteristic of 
modern middle classes.  
Capitalist Expansion in Africa 
From the sixteenth century on African societies have been entangled in webs of 
capitalist development, and engaged in exchange of ‘goods’ such as slaves, palm oil, 
                                                 
42 Robert Antonio, Marx and Modernity: key readings and commentary (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 
2003).  While Antonio urges for the explication of capitalism as an “organic whole” this is a challenge 
of immense proportions; it requires the construction of a theory of capitalism akin to Marx’s Das 
Kapital. Needless to say, this kind of scholarship is not easy to come by. 
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cowrishells, natural dyes (such as indigo), textiles, gold, diamonds and ivory. Even 
though Africa was not a particularly large zone of European investment in comparison 
to Asia and the Americas, the centrality of trade to imperial projects in Africa can 
scarce be denied.  Trading companies, like the French West Africa Company (CFAO), 
played a significant role in expanding imperial holdings and conferred the dual 
advantage of imperial and capitalist expansion.43 At the end of the nineteenth century, 
African markets became a new, albeit limited, frontier for European capitalists, and 
helped alleviate European balance of trade problems as well as the over-production 
crisis caused by shrinking European markets.44  Natural resources were increasingly 
extracted from Africa, sold in European markets and exported back to Africa in the 
form of cheap commodities.45 In addition, cheap labor and limited competition made 
overseas investment attractive and profits large for European stockholders.    
As European interests settled more on the continent, plantation economies 
grew and contributed to the production of groundnuts, cocoa, tea, coffee and the like.  
Colonialism exacted African labor to produce surplus, instituting, among other things, 
taxation policies designed to increase cultivation and magnify metropole profit.46 The 
colonial era implanted a capitalist ethos in African societies by displacing populations 
from their lands and turning populations towards wage labor.47 In addition, farmers 
were oriented to capitalist production through the pressures of taxes, and goods 
transporters, shopkeepers, and distributers of various kinds engaged in capitalist 
                                                 
43 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: a history of French overseas expansion (New York: Palgrave, 1996).   
44 John Hobson “Imperialism, A Study” (2006). According to John Hobson, and later followers of his 
theory such as Lenin and Trotsky, the “shrinking” of European markets was a significant factor in 
imperial ambitions and conquest.  
45 James Olson and Robert Shadle, Historical Dictionary of the British Empire (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1996) 
46 Michael Crowder, “Whose Dream was it Anyway? Twenty-five Years of African Independence” 
(New York: Garland Publishers, 1993) 
47 The extent of capitalism’s reach in African territories before and during colonialism is debatable. 
What I am flagging here is the introduction and expansion of market mentalities related to commodity 
exchange.  
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exchange. The expansion of capitalism was not, of course, a solely economic or 
market-based transformation; it entailed radical revisions to social relations at all 
levels of society, and changing centers of wealth coincided, necessarily, with revisions 
in political arrangements. 
 
Emerging Classes in African Contexts 
Class stratification is widely acknowledged as a feature of capitalist societies as small 
populations accumulate capital and inequalities between the haves and have-nots 
increase dramatically over time.  A seldom glorified but central component of 
capitalist expansion is its conversion of propertyless people into wage laborers, and 
their subsequent dependence on capitalists for their livelihood.  Of course, varying 
theories of capitalist development exist, but many recognize that the system is 
premised on the multiplication of surplus in the hands of capitalists and the growing 
reliance of wage-workers on those with capital.48  Whereas class is an immensely 
useful heuristic in analyzing the distribution of property and power in Western 
societies, its applicability to African contexts is more contested.  Analyses of African 
social divisions typically focus on ethnicity or “tribe” and tensions between various 
ethnic groups like the Yoruba, Igbo, Krio, Mende, Fante and Asante.49  Religious 
distinctions are also frequently examined as the “triple heritage” of Christianity, Islam, 
and African religious traditions are noted as significant factors in social and political 
life.50  Similarly, gender and age differences receive attention as the differentiated 
                                                 
48 Karly Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (1852) in Antonio 2003; Karl Polanyi, 
The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 2001) 
49 Scholars have noted, however, that many constructions of African ‘tribes’ and ‘tribal’ rivalries 
emerged from colonial policies of ‘divide and conquer’.   
50 Ali Mazrui, The Africans (New York: Little Brown and co., 1987) 
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experiences of men, women, youth and elderly people are recognized as important 
social divisions.   
It is also undeniable, however, that in African colonies and the nation-states 
that followed them, select African and European populations benefited handsomely 
from market economies, while others clearly became subordinate to capital and 
suffered as dispensable wage-workers.  Groups of laborers, managers, and owners 
received differentiated amounts of capital and, consequently, enjoyed varying 
lifestyles and life chances.  Beginning with labor protests in the late 1920s the 
language of class gained currency in African contexts through the idea of an emergent 
but restive modern “working class”.  Colonial offices attempted to manage African 
labor unrest by employing strategies used to placate European industrial laborers; 
through negotiations with labor unions and provision of labor protections colonial 
officers hoped to quell African laborers.  Class rhetoric also surfaced in anti-colonial 
ideology which suggested that imperial powers were a “ruling class” over exploited 
black people.  African nationalists employed the language of class to justify 
revolutionary action.  As empires waned, therefore, the rhetoric of class conflict and 
revolutionary classes became increasingly more prevalent.  
Most significantly, however, the end of empire coincided with a shift in the 
balance of power that saw the rise of the United States and Soviet Union as 
antagonistic global superpowers.  Ideological positions expressed through the Cold 
War played a central role in configuring post-colonial Africa.  Factions identifying 
with anti-West, anti-imperial, and or anti-racist agendas evoked Marxist-inspired 
beliefs to oppose colonialism on one hand and capitalist expansion on the other. In 
West Africa, the logic of capitalism so forcefully promoted by colonialism was cast as 
the great divider of African communities and oppressor of ‘Negro’ people at large.  
Various West African leaders and activists claimed that colonialism had created 
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classes in African societies which had previously been “classless”.51 They argued that 
European intervention on the continent had disrupted “traditional” African principles 
of communalism and egalitarianism, and left in their stead uneven class-stratified 
societies.  As African nations emerged, they believed, efforts had to be made to re-
instate more equal societies.  At the end of empire, therefore, West African liberatory 
movements incorporated class categories and theories (often Marxist-inspired) into 
visions of postcolonial Africa. The acknowledgment of class-based exploitation and 
critiques of capitalism made in this period were undoubtedly fuelled by the Cold War, 
but also derived more generally from revolutionary movements grounded in Marxian 
analysis. 
However, the applicability of class in West African contexts is still widely 
challenged and the next sections elaborate why.  Of the varied and oftentimes 
contradictory perspectives on class in Africa, three bear elucidation here: 1.) The 
rejection of class as a heuristic for African social analysis; 2.) Use or adoption of 
Marxist conceptions of class structure and class conflict; and 3.) Focus on political and 
ruling ‘elites’ instead of dominant classes.  A brief examination of each perspective 
follows.  
 
The Salience of Class in West Africa 
The suggestion that classes exist in West Africa is reviled by some who see social 
hierarchies as simply a vestige of colonialism, and dismissed altogether by others who 
maintain the idea of African classlessness.  Those who reject the relevance of class 
often cite African value systems and social relations that are antithetical to capitalist 
development and class formation.  The thrust of these arguments is often that 
                                                 
51 S.N. Sangmpam, “Sociology of "Primitive Societies", Evolutionism, and Africa” Sociological Forum 
(1995):609-632.   
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capitalism has not taken hold in Africa or has not formed the classes typically 
associated with capitalist development.  Scholars who hold this position contend that 
prior to colonialism African societies were largely “pre-capitalist” and operated on 
simple moral economies.  Within moral economies, communitarianism prevails and 
no-one starves or wallows for work as customs of cooperation and reciprocity ensure 
basic subsistence for all.  The ethos of moral economies, or “economies of affection”, 
prompt distribution of resources according to need, not accumulation, and result in 
largely “classless” or egalitarian societies.52  Tremendous variation of this argument 
exists but the major conclusions drawn include: the all-out rejection of the existence of 
classes in African societies; elevation of kinship or lineage relations of production 
over capitalist ones53; and the recognition of hybrid or “pseudo-capitalist” social 
relations that reflect a mix of traditional African models of subsistence and imperially 
enforced material production.54  Despite variation in arguments about the salience of 
class, there is common suspicion about the strength of capitalist classes in Africa and 
skepticism about the capacity for large scale capital accumulation in societies with 
supposedly communalist or kinship-based ethos.55  
Further supporting the dismissal of class analysis in Africa is the fact that class 
affiliations are seldom articulated.  West Africans would sooner self-identify as 
members of particular ethnic groups, religious institutions, political parties and 
national polities before making claims about supposed class identities.  The natural 
question that follows this observation is whether class identities can be assigned if 
they are not professed.  Can claims about African “bourgeoisie” be credible if 
                                                 
52 Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) 
53  Sangmpam (1995) 
54  S.N. Sangmpam, Pseudocapitalism and the Overpoliticized State (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
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Africans do not self-identify as such? The argument can be made that ‘tribes’ or 
ethnicities, religion and gender are strongly held identities that transcend property 
differences and, consequently, nullify or at least challenge the appositeness of class.  
I hold that class is a relevant and useful social analytic concept in Africa. 
Although weak in some places and stronger in others, capitalism was firmly 
entrenched in Africa by the time independence was achieved. Capitalist social 
relations were evident in the colonial production chains that linked African 
commodities to global markets, the expansion of wage-work and exploitation of labor, 
and the accumulation of capital in both urban and rural settings by Africans and non-
Africans alike.  In African colonies, institutions and mechanisms of Western capitalist 
development became more established in the form of commercial, financial and, 
eventually, industrial economic activity. These changes entailed the introduction of 
money exchange56; the establishment of banks (as early as 1853 in West Africa)57; 
normalization of wage-work and money income; construction of port cities and 
customs legislature; increase in commodity flows; and an ever-expanding and 
complex division of labor. Capitalist developments produced new social 
configurations as some groups amassed wealth and privilege while others were 
dispossessed of their means of production and became more dependent on wage labor.  
Compared to periods prior to colonization, West African societies by the end of World 
War II contained new forms of social organization and economic stratification.  Novel 
forms of wealth were on display alongside new types of work and remuneration. 
Landed owners, local businesses, foreign interests, manual laborers, salaried clerks, 
and a host of other ‘workers’ all comprised the unequal capitalist economies of 
                                                 
56 Various mediums of exchange were used in West African trade prior to the introduction of coins and 
eventually paper money.  Cowrie shells and bronze ingots were particularly popular forms of currency.  
57 The Banque d’Afrique Occidentale was created by the French in present-day Senegal in 1853. It was 
originally called Banque du Sénégal, but changed its name in 1901 when it expanded and began 
administering a common currency for French West Africa.  
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colonial West Africa.  Examples of changing classes and social relations provoked by 
capitalist expansion are provided later in the chapter.  Regardless of the existence and 
continuation of moral economies, the fact remains that capital accumulation, private 
ownership, and money economies are, and have been, significant components of West 
African societies.  
  Constructions of “classless” African societies romanticize the past or tell 
impartial accounts of the present.  Disparities in wealth and privilege are evident all 
over West Africa and extend back to pre-colonial stratification within and between 
villages, kingdoms and empires.  Class does not apply solely to the conditions of 
production found in capitalist societies but can, rather, be used as a universal concept 
to signal production, property, or prestige-based social stratification. Inequalities in 
wealth and status reflect class distinctions and influence social relations even in the 
presence of strong cultural and ethnic divisions.  This is not to say that class is the 
predominant organizer in all societies. It is merely one of a variety of distinctions used 
to arrange social orders.  Class, ethnicity, religion, gender and race are not mutually 
exclusive but, rather, important intersecting, and sometimes overlapping, social 
constructions.   Colonialism constructed new social relations and identities including 
new class configurations introduced through colonial extraction and capitalist 
production.58  
Moreover, moral economies operate in conjunction with expanding capitalist 
economies, not entirely outside of them.  At the end of empire African colonies were 
engaged in commodity production of cash crops and industrial commodities.  This fact 
does not change when we consider that large populations (probably the majority) of 
Africans were not fully involved in these production chains.  Social reciprocity and 
                                                 
58 Bruce Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State” African Affairs (1998) 305-341 
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communitarian affection in African communities neither arrested nor attenuated 
capital accumulation or capitalist inequalities. 
    
Marxist Influences on African Class Structure 
In the 1920s African colonies began to be described in European-style class terms.   
Discussion of the fact (or fiction) of European-style African classes was spurred in 
large part by labor unrest and the spread of Marxist-inspired revolutionary ideology.  
Towards the end of empire, Marxist concepts and class categories were adopted by 
anti-colonial projects, political parties, and national liberation movements that used 
ideas about exploitation of ‘working classes’, domination by ‘international 
bourgeoisie’ and revolution by the ‘masses’ to explain the colonial predicament and 
call Africans to action.  Topics such as forced labor, land rights, hut taxes, and the 
violent repression of trade unions increasingly assumed class dimensions and were 
discussed in class terms. Marxist readings of African colonial problems prompted 
attempts to identify or construct revolutionary consciousness amongst African farmers 
and laborers.  African ‘working classes’ were presumed to exist (when they often did 
not) and assumed to be harbingers of social revolution.  Attempts to map Marxist class 
categories on to African contexts led to inconsistent and bizarre constructions like the 
following:  
 
In Africa, the peasant masses constitute the largest part of the working 
class and potentially the fundamental element of a socialist revolution. 
But these masses are dispersed, unorganised and generally speaking 
non-revolutionary.59  
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Statements to this effect demonstrate desperate desires amongst anti-colonial 
groups and scholars to find revolutionary classes within African societies, and to 
identify revolutionary forces as ‘working class’. 
In the period around African independence, the USSR played a decisive role in 
introducing Marxist notions to African contexts.  Following its inception in 1919, the 
Third Communist International (also known as the Comintern or Third International) 
pursued an aggressive agenda of “world revolution”.  The Comintern was committed 
to applying “all available means, including armed force, [to] the overthrow of the 
international bourgeoisie and the creation of an international Soviet republic as a 
transition stage to the complete abolition of the State.” 60 With this objective in mind 
the Comintern supported Communist organizations, unions, and revolutionary thinkers 
around the world, influencing notable Pan-Africanists such as W.E.B. DuBois and 
George Padmore.61   Though it met colonial resistance, the Comintern eventually 
infiltrated African colonies and influenced African nationalists with revolutionary 
ideas.  It successfully supported nascent trade unions and militant anti-colonial 
movements.62  However, the USSR’s actions were far from altruistic.  The Soviet 
Union spread socialist ideology to promote its strategic and diplomatic interests, and 
neglected rigorous theoretical analysis of African class structures and social issues.  
As Jean Copans writes, the “Bolsheviks had little to say about African contexts and 
presumed the avant garde nature of the working class even in the face of its 
absence.”63  Thus Marxist-Leninist rhetoric was adopted in African contexts in 
somewhat grafted form, structured in the likeness of European class struggle to fit 
Soviet ideological and diplomatic needs. The USSR played, therefore, an influential 
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role in shaping the discourse of African class structures and directing visions of 
national development.64  Descriptions of African societies, inspired in large part by 
Karl Marx, prompted the addition of class analysis to the imagining of African 
nations. 
This is not to say, however, that the USSR entirely dominated class analysis in 
the transition from empire to nation. African nationalists, union leaders, and 
intellectuals presented varying notions about African class struggle and African 
Socialism. In general, however, these class theories were anti-imperial in nature, and 
modified Marxist categories about production to fit racial divisions in colonial 
stratification.  Anti-imperial ideology generally constructed European colonizers as 
bourgeois ruling classes, and portrayed Africans as collectively oppressed masses.   
Class struggle, therefore, was between European imperialists and colonized Africans, 
and African Socialism the remedy for reversing European instillation of private 
ownership and individualism over communitarian African orientations.  To make this 
argument, African nationalists minimized or ignored differences between Africans, 
emphasizing instead the common objectives of a unified African revolutionary front.65   
Class struggle, anti-imperial movements suggested, applied solely to tension between 
Europeans and Africans, and was not an endemic feature of African societies. These 
constructions of class were necessarily ambiguous and befuddled; they mapped race 
onto class and denied class distinctions between black Africans.  A partial exception 
was made in references to the so-called “labor aristocracy” that stood as a co-opted 
                                                 
64 Chapter three of this thesis provides more analysis of the ways Soviet influence directed national 
development. Perhaps the most devastating aspect of the Cold War for Africa is that the debates in the 
West and East were played out violently in African contexts through assassinations, coup d’etats, and 
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65 The journal Afrique Noire published the following statement in 1951: “Class struggle, the very basis 
of communism, has no raison d’etre in a country whose society is not a divided one” (Copans 1985: 
28).  This statement, alongside hundreds like it reinforced the idea that African societies, while caught 
in class struggle with imperialists, were not engaged in internal forms of stratification or class 
antagonism.  
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stratum of the working class that furthered the interests of local and foreign ruling 
classes.66  In general, however, careful class analysis was not extended to African 
social relations; instead, West Africans imposed Marxist class terms on racialized anti-
imperial agendas and proliferated baffling class constructs. 
The theoretical confusion of anti-imperial class analysis is illustrated in Sekou 
Touré’s writings. 67  He writes in 1959:  
 
We [have] adopted Marxism insofar as it applies to Africa…Marxism 
can be applied in all its doctrinal aspects by the international working 
class when it concerns itself with class struggle, but this latter element 
has been removed to allow all African social categories to engage 
themselves in the general anti-colonial struggle.68  
 
Touré suggests that Marxism applies to African contexts but goes on, however, to 
reject the relevance of class struggle on the continent.  His focus is anti-imperial 
struggle, not analysis of African class stratification.  Used in this way, Marxism 
provides revolutionary terminology and concepts but is not applied rigorously to 
inequalities in African colonies and emerging nations.  As a result, theoretical 
difficulties abound in the writings of African liberation leaders at the end of empire.69  
I cannot perform a thorough treatment of this literature here, but the above discussion 
emphasizes that Marxism was hugely influential in introducing class categories to 
analysis of African colonial struggles and in constructing visions of post-independence 
development. 
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Political and National Elites 
Finally, questions about the salience of class in African contexts arise in discussion 
about the formation and function of ‘elites’ in emerging African nations.  Typical 
narratives of African independence suggest that African leaders who assumed the reins 
of power from Europeans came from and developed into political ‘elites’.  As West 
African nations gained independence, those who spoke, read, and wrote European 
languages filled administrative positions in national bureaucratic structures.  The 
suggestion made in political science literature is that leaders of nationalist movements 
came from elite groups and replaced colonial officers as national elites. The transfer of 
power from colonial to African leaders, therefore, resulted in the formation of a 
“managerial bourgeoisie” composed primarily of Western-educated African elites.70   
Much debate has ensued about whether national leaders and government bureaucrats 
comprise a class of their own, and no facile conclusions reconcile differing opinions 
on this issue.71 One point of agreement, however, is that following independence 
Africans associated with the nation-state acquired tremendous political and economic 
privileges.  As they gained more control of new offices and institutions, African state 
officials and government bureaucrats increasingly mismanaged and abused their 
powers, pilfering from national coffers and enjoying excessive luxuries.72  National 
independence created, therefore, a new African aristocracy or national elite enriched 
primarily through the state. 
One of the explanations for the emergence of ‘national elites’ is that capitalist 
classes in Africa were weak or nonexistent which compelled state bureaucracies to 
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expand and provide infrastructure and general services that entrepreneurial classes 
would otherwise provide.73  However, as government bureaucracies swelled they 
bloated.  State bureaucrats engaged in corrupt and clientelist behavior intended to 
enrich themselves and their cronies. By manipulating political and economic 
advantage they accumulated capital through the state, and developed into dominant 
national classes.  As Dale Johnson summarizes, “states assumed entrepreneurial 
functions, giving birth to technocratic, managerial, and technical groupings that [did] 
not owe their existence to private property” but, rather, to the patronage systems of 
excessively large bureaucratic state structures.74   
The concern in much of the literature on national ‘elites’ is about comportment 
of the African state, and ways in which African leaders deploy political power for 
personal aggrandizement.  Essential to this argument is that African states have 
encouraged the formation of elites with corrupt, if not parasitic, tendencies.  African 
political parties and state institutions have become ladders for promotion, economic 
advancement, and social power for the lucky few in position to exploit nepotistic and 
clientelist relationships.  Within this focus on national elites and corrupt bureaucracies, 
heavy emphasis is placed on the state as an agent of class formation and progenitor of 
‘politics of the belly’.75 Social inequality is created, therefore, by the state which was 
taken over initially by Western-educated Africans but hijacked in earnest by pervasive 
greed.  Systems of patronage in African nations operate as corrupt versions of moral 
economies with each person taking a cut from national coffers for themselves and their 
people.76 African national elites are, consequently, associated with corruption and 
selfish embezzlement more than constructive entrepreneurial activity or nation 
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building.   Thus, in this literature, analysis of social inequalities has turned to 
investigation of authoritarian regimes, one-party democracies, corruption, ‘tribal’ 
patronage, and the problem of ‘Big Men’ in African states.77  Though valid, these 
preoccupations discourage more careful consideration of the distribution of power and 
social stratification in African contexts.  
The use of ‘elites’ as analytical concept is restrictive, and tends to focus 
analysis only on groups with the highest authority, privilege, prestige and status.  
However, talking about ‘elites’ provides little information about non-elites.  Non-
elites, we must assume, lack power and prestige and, as such, are defined more by 
what they are not rather than who or what they are.  Furthermore, discussion of ‘elites’ 
fails to capture social relations between elites and non-elites.  In short, we gain little 
analytic purchase by referring to African ‘elites’.  While some Africans undoubtedly 
became part of exclusive political and economic groups at independence, others 
occupied less powerful positions within West African societies, and were simply 
engaged in increasingly diverse divisions of labor.  Instead of simplistically using 
‘elites’ to refer to dominant groups, we can disaggregate the term and think more 
expansively about social positions and roles played by Western-educated Africans and 
others at the end of empire. This type of analysis, I believe, is made possible with the 
language of class which allows for more carefully description of social relations, and 
property and status based stratification.  
 
In the preceding sections I covered three of the most popular ways class 
emerges in discussions of West Africa in the transition from empire to nation: some 
insist that African societies are fundamentally classless, others adamantly apply 
Marxist class concepts, and various others shift focus to manipulative and exploitative 
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‘elites’.  None of these approaches provide analytic room to theorize Western-
educated Africans as a middle class.  Social categories such as  ‘native’, ‘civilized’, 
‘working class’, ‘peasant’, ‘bourgeoisie’, and ‘ruling class’ poorly describe Western-
educated Africans at the end of empire. Before independence they were neither labor 
nor the ruling classes; they occupied a more amorphous middle category. Western-
educated Africans functioned as clerks, teachers, engineers, doctors, lawyers, and 
administrators.  Though few in number, they were an important professional core and 
represented a new bureaucratic order.  After independence some assumed or continued 
positions in the state apparatus but, as indicated above, labeling them elites indicates 
very little about social relations.  Some Western-educated Africans were undoubtedly 
part of incredibly privileged political groups, but others qualified more as members of 
modern middle classes – propertyless workers who expressed their status through 
lifestyle and consumption habits.   
 
‘Modern’ Middle Classes 
Middle classes are often recognized in ‘modern’ societies but poorly defined.  Their 
character as a class is much contested, as is their role in national development.  In 
‘modern’ societies, which as discussed previously typically refers to ‘Western 
capitalist’ societies, middle classes are generally understood as the intermediate 
groups between labor and capital. They are the propertyless workers, salaried 
professionals, and self-employed who enjoy some degree of occupational stability and 
status but do not necessarily control their production or wield tremendous social 
power.78  Middle classes in the twentieth century or ‘new’ middle classes, as they are 
sometimes called, appear with the increased division of labor and expansion of 
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bureaucratic structures typical of growing market economies.  They represent an ever-
increasing and heterogenous segment of capitalist societies that expands with growth 
in scale of industrial, commercial and state bureaucracies.79  The notion of middle 
classes blurs class categories, and the boundaries between working classes, salaried 
classes, bureaucrats, and owners become harder to define.   One clear trend, however, 
is that occupations in ‘modern’ societies become more differentiated and work is 
increasingly more organized towards the keeping of accounts and conformation to 
legal standards.  Procedures, protocol, and regulations develop to direct work, 
institutions, and social relations towards greater rationality and efficiency.80    
Furthermore, modern states produce a host of institutional structures intended 
to improve social order through bureaucratic oversight and legal administration.  
Nation-states also create public and governmental institutions that require 
administration by a variety of functionaries, technocrats and officials organized 
hierarchically within bureaucratic structures.81  As a consequence, managers, 
administrators, and professionals emerge as ‘middle class’ occupations in ‘modern’ 
societies.  Whether located in large institutions, employed as white-collar 
professionals or self-employed, middle classes enjoy a certain degree of job security, 
benefits, and status not typically accorded to manual laborers and ‘working classes’.  
As typically educated members of society located between rich and poor classes, 
middle classes are also assumed to contribute to the strength of civil society and other 
democratic structures.  They serve, scholars suggest, as a balancing force, ensuring 
that democracy is not controlled by either ‘ignorant’ masses or manipulative elites.82  
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Therefore, development of ‘the middle class’, alongside the rise of the nation-state, is 
pointed to as a harbinger of deliberative democracy and Western modernity at large.83   
Middle classes in non-Western societies have historically been understood 
against these Western ideals, and hopes are placed on middle classes to serve as 
leaders in modernization and democratization in ‘developing’ countries.  However, 
comparisons between Western ideal types and non-Western societies have “tended to 
transform the middle class in non-Western countries into an overladen (though 
understudied) sociological category.”84 In the following section, I construct a 
definition of West African middle classes based on Western conceptions of middle 
class formation and Western social theory.  However, rather than super-imposing 
Western categories onto African contexts or simply comparing them to Western 
models, I attempt to account for socio-cultural, political and economic factors 
particular to West Africa.  My definition acknowledges Western influences while 
signaling the importance of West African-specific sociological theorizing. I start, 
however, with a brief summary of analysis of middle classes in Western social theory. 
 
Middle Classes in Western Societies: Marx, Weber, and the Boundary Problem 
 
The middle class is necessarily an ill-defined entity. This does not reflect a 
lack of theoretical penetration but rather the character of reality…[We must] 
consciously strive to capture this essential ambiguity of [the middle classes] 
rather than dispose of it.85  
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The ‘middle class’ is a nebulous and contested social category.  As Loïc 
Wacquant intimates above, it is “ill-defined” because of its tremendous complexity 
and not, necessarily, as a result of analytic feebleness.   Despite ambiguity in its 
meaning, the ‘middle class’ is an oft cited social category believed to possess 
significant political and economic meaning.    In popular literature, the ‘middle class’ 
is deployed without conceptual or empirical specification, but its use conjures strong 
enough sentiments to justify changes in government policies and development 
strategies.  The more the ‘middle class’ is divorced from historical specificity, the 
more it depends on abstract imagery.  In this sense, the ‘middle class’ is more a myth 
than reality; it is a reified concept based on sentimental idealized images of socio-
historical types formed in the recent past primarily from social images in the United 
States. The model of the U.S. ‘middle class’ is furthered in the popular imagination by 
the imagery of white picket fences protecting nuclear families, cars and hi-tech 
appliances that symbolize the ‘typical’ modern life.  In common parlance the ‘middle 
class’ refers to educated salaried professionals whose lifestyles and proclivities reflect 
modern Western normality.  The ‘middle class’ in the West is conceived as an 
individualistic, meritocratic, and progressive stratum of society. Its associated 
ideology is that hard work and respect for education yields economic rewards and 
opportunities for social mobility, and that the benefits enjoy by the ‘middle class’ are 
available to every determined citizen in a democratic and economically advanced 
nation-state.  Threats to the ‘middle class’ are seen, therefore, as threats to the health 
and well-being of the modern nation, and the expansion of the ‘middle class’ is framed 
in a congratulatory narrative of economic and material progress.   In this way, the 
‘middle class’ is woven in as a principal thread in the broader narrative of 
modernization and liberal-democratic capitalist development.86   
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Marx and the Two-Class Bias 
We must not, however, speak of the ‘middle class’ but rather middle classes.  Middle 
classes have been theorized by a plethora of Western social theorists from Aristotle to 
more contemporary scholars but, arguably, the most influential analysis has come 
from Karl Marx and Max Weber.  Marx postulated a dual class structure in capitalist 
societies.  He argues in Capital that capitalists generate surplus value through the 
exploitation of labor and strategic deployment of technological innovation.  In a 
capitalist mode of production, propertyless workers are forced to sell their labor for 
their subsistence, and are made increasingly more dependent on capital.  As a 
byproduct of this structural relation of production, exploited wage workers form as 
one class and proprietors and capitalists as another.  Marx describes these classes as 
proletariat and bourgeoisie respectively and contends that they develop into “two great 
hostile camps” based on the structural imbalance inherent to capitalist relations of 
production.87  Formation of these dichotomous classes in capitalist development is a 
highly uneven and relational process, with neither bourgeoisie nor proletariat able to 
form without the other.88  As capital is concentrated in capitalist groups and wage 
workers are systematically exploited, the classes are increasingly more polarized.  
Individuals within a given class share the same position in their society’s system of 
property relations and experience similar material constraints. Amongst the proletariat 
collective awareness of exploitation breeds class consciousness, while the bourgeoisie 
seeks to maintain dominance through state structures and ruling ideology.89 Class 
establishes the socio-material conditioning of individual lives and shapes beliefs 
according to class relations to the means of production.  The tendency of capitalist 
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development, therefore, is to generate structurally unequal social relations at the level 
of production which leads to the formation of antagonistic classes with opposed 
interests and conflicting political objectives. Marx claims that “separate individuals 
form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another 
class.”90  
While Marx insisted on dichotomous internecine class structures formed 
through historically determined systems of social production, he also noted the 
existence of intermediate classes.  Recognizing that small producers, self-employed 
groups, artisans and commercial wageworkers occupy different positions to capitalist 
production than the proletariat and bourgeoisie, Marx theorized formation of these 
intermediate classes and their alliances with either workers or large capitalists.91 Marx 
identified these middle classes as “petite bourgeoisie” and described them as groups 
between labor on the one side and capitalists and landed proprietors on the other.92  
Petite bourgeoisie exist in several forms, which include simple commodity producers 
(such as commercial traders, artisans, and small farmers) who produce commodities 
directly and also own their means of production.  Other petite bourgeoisie (managers, 
supervisors, bureaucrats, and salaried professionals etc.) employ labor power, but tend 
to work alongside their employees and have no control of the means of production.  
Still others exist as propertyless workers (such as clerks, administrators, and 
technicians) and small-scale capitalists (like shopkeepers) that are vulnerable to 
exploitation and devastation by big capital.  According to Marx, the inability of these 
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middle classes to compete with or oppose large-scale capitalists leads to their eventual 
disbandment and subsequent absorption into the working classes.  As Marx and Engels 
describe in Capital, the “diminutive capital [of petite bourgeoisie] does not suffice for 
the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition 
with large capitalists, partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless by 
new methods of production.”93   
Marx also suggests that intermediate strata, such as religious clergy, 
intellectuals and politicians, ally themselves with ruling classes and assist the 
domination of exploited groups through moralizing, naturalizing, and legalizing 
ideology.94  In this logic, ideational and cultural production in capitalist societies is 
undertaken by intermediate classes for the benefit of capitalists and landed classes.  
What’s more, propertied petite bourgeoisie rely on surplus generated by direct 
producers and “rest as a burden on the laboring foundation, [increasing] the social 
security and power of the upper [classes].”95  Marx thus envisioned the 
reestablishment of a dichotomous class system with intermediary groups cast into 
either bourgeois or proletariat ranks, absorbed eventually into the fold of one of two 
polar classes.  With ever-increasing polarization in the social organization of labor, 
Marx foresaw the declining significance of middle classes and their eventual demise.  
History has borne out Marx’s prediction to some degree.  Self-employed 
workers and small-scale producers have suffered at the hands of large-scale modern 
producers and evidence of their decline in ‘industrial societies’ has been amassed.96  
However, Marx failed to account for the emergence of a ‘new’ middle classes of 
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professional, technical and administrative labor forms.97  Marx misjudged the 
persistence of clerks, technicians, managers and professionals in capitalist societies, a 
blunder that has been dubbed the ‘embarrassment of the middle classes’.98  Marxists 
have since attempted to account for the persistence of middle classes in capitalist 
societies, and their relation to labor and capital.  One position holds that clerks, 
technicians, managers, and professional workers are so dependent on the authority of 
ruling classes they simply serve as an extension of it, and function as a pliable 
appendage of capitalist interests.99  A second perspective focuses on similarities 
middle classes share with working classes based on both groups’ lack of ownership 
over their means of production.  Middle classes, therefore, share interests with 
working classes that supersede any of the similarities they have with ruling classes.100  
Yet another position contends that middle classes bifurcate along two lines: 
bureaucrats that ally with ruling classes, and white collar workers who labor alongside 
proletarian classes.101 Others argue for middle classes as ambivalent groups that 
simultaneously experience proletarian market situations as well as bourgeois work 
conditions, producing equivocal interests and mixed allegiances.102 For Renner (1953) 
and Goldethorpe (1982) middle classes are defined by a “service contract” that 
provides them with salaries and clearly differentiates them from wage workers.103  
Receipt of stable remuneration, security of tenure and relatively good conditions of 
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service transform the “service class” into a conservative dominant group, distinct from 
bourgeois groups but indebted to their favor.104   
The above positions represent attempts by various Western theorists, starting in 
the 1950s, to dialogue with Marx and grapple with the persistence of middle classes. 
However, deliberation by Marxists on middle classes in capitalist societies peaked in 
the 1970s with the so-called ‘boundary debates’.105 These debates highlighted the 
contradictory and ambiguous social position of middle classes and challenged 
simplistic taxonomic division of classes into either bourgeoisie or proletariat.  
Recognizing the blurred nature of boundaries between the two classes scholars 
suggested that either: middle classes occupied their own distinct place in social orders 
and were irreducible to one of the two polarized classes106; or middle classes 
maintained multiple and ‘contradictory class locations’.107  Marx himself noted that 
“middle and intermediate strata…obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere” but he, 
nonetheless, insisted on a clearly delineated two class structure.108 Despite attempts to 
amend Marx’s oversight of the new middle classes and recognize their complexity, 
Marxists generally maintain the primacy of a two class structure and endeavor to 
elaborate alliances and overlapping interests of middle classes with either proletarian 
or bourgeois forces.  While Marxists now acknowledge middle classes as enduring 
features of capitalist societies, analysis of middle classes is always second order 
priority for Marxists, overshadowed by the need to explain the social relations of 
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production between capitalists and working classes.  A discrete two class structure 
remains the immovable foundation of Marxist class analysis.  
 
Weber and Class Complexity 
Weber’s analysis of the middle classes shares significant similarities with 
Marx’s explication. Like Marx, Weber locates social class differentiation in 
possession and non-possession of property.109 However, while Marx points to 
production as the underlying structuring process of class in capitalist societies, Weber 
suggests market capacity as the basis of social stratification.  According to Weber, 
economic disparities develop based on the ways social rewards are acquired and 
distributed, namely through processes related to prestige, status, occupation, and life 
chances.110  Weberian class relationships are structured, therefore, through market 
exchange more so than relations of production. Social class differences are visible 
through disparate consumption patterns, and variations in lifestyle, including access to 
leisure, location of residence, and commodity-based expressions of social position.  
Beyond possession of property and differences in relations of production, therefore, 
Weber focuses on the formation of classes, use of status, and party affiliation as 
interacting forces in the determination of social power and stratification in capitalist 
society.111  For Weber, class does not determine status nor does status determine class, 
but their association provides hope and incentive for social mobility. He also 
emphasizes bureaucracy as the organizational form of modern capitalist societies and 
stresses its production of hierarchical authority structures as well as the need for ‘staff’ 
of modern commerce and bureaucratic institutions.  Division of labor within modern 
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enterprise and authority relationships produce new forms of prestige and new 
occupations within capitalist societies.  As a result, Weber argues for three types of 
classes (property classes, commercial classes, and social classes) and presents a three 
class social structure to account for the most privileged, middle, and negatively 
privileged groups.112  Each type of class distinction is structured by occupation as well 
as different dimensions of wealth, prestige and power within a given society.   
The middle classes in Weberian analysis comprise the middle propertied (small 
land owners), middle commercial classes (self-employed, retailers, farmers, artisans 
etc.), and middle social groups (petite bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and salaried 
professionals).  Status for bureaucratic and professional middle classes derives from 
occupational prestige, which is linked to formal education and technical expertise, and 
expressed through lifestyle, display of material goods, and interaction in social circles 
of high esteem.   Middle classes are highly differentiated groups “showing far greater 
disparities of conditions within [then] than the working class.”113  Middle classes, for 
Weber, are fragmented groups that display little unitary cohesion and become more 
diffuse with the development of capitalism and its associated division of labor. As 
with Marxist analysis of middle classes, the ‘boundary problem’ surfaces again as no 
clear criteria circumscribes the most privileged, middle, and negatively privileged 
social strata in Weberian analysis.   Weber embraces this complexity and suggests that 
social stratification operates on multiple graded hierarchies rather than discrete class 
distinctions.  Middle classes especially are fragmented with fluid associations and 
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boundaries and, in addition to property differences, the interplay of wealth, status and 
authority structures social location.    
Various scholars have elaborated and modified Weber’s conception of the 
middle classes, leading to a plethora of theoretical propositions.  There is considerable 
debate and variation, for example, in Weberian theories about the relative importance 
of property, occupation and authority in formation of middle classes and class 
stratification more generally.  C. Wright Mills argues that occupation not property is 
the basis of social differentiation.  In his seminal piece, White Collar, Mills describes 
the work of professionals, bureaucrats, and functionaries as a particular experience 
distinct from wage-working laborers and large-scale capitalists.  Middle classes are 
characterized by their occupational indebtedness to institutions and bureaucratic 
structures, and the relative security they enjoy by virtue of their occupation. Despite 
the benefits and stability white collar workers experience, Mills contends the middle 
class worker is “always somebody’s man, the corporation’s, the government’s, the 
army’s; and he is seen as the man who does not rise.”114  He further asserts that the 
middle classes are characterized by heterogeneity and fragmentation, and the complex 
forms of stratification fail to map into neat conceptual categories.115 
Ralf Dahrendorf, another influential theorist of the middle classes, contends 
that authority more than property is the basis for class divisions.  In somewhat Marxist 
fashion, Dahrendorf (1959) divides modern societies into two main classes – those 
who possess authority and those without authority.  However, his analysis adopts 
unquestionably Weberian dimensions in his suggestion that authority is primarily 
exercised through occupational association, and hierarchical positions in institutions, 
industries, and groups of high social esteem.  The middle classes according to 
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Dahrendorf comprise aids of modern organizations and “staff of enterprise”, civil 
servants, administrators, and professionals who assume an indispensable place in 
modern bureaucracies and capitalist firms.116  They are a “service class” that, when 
functioning within bureaucracies, are relatively insulated from the austerity of 
capitalist authority and, consequently behave in the interests of ruling classes.  
Dahrendorf is clear, however, that middle classes “always belong to the ruling class 
but as such never are the ruling class’ (Dahrendorf 1959: 301, original emphasis).  
This sentiment is furthered by the suggestion that middle classes are “everywhere an 
important repository of ideas and sentiments supportive of capitalism and the 
institutions of liberal democracy.”117 
Another perspective of note is that of Anthony Giddens.  Giddens suggests 
class stratification derives from market capacities of which he notes three important 
ones: “Ownership of property in the means of production; possession of educational or 
technical qualifications; and possession of manual labour-power.”118  These varying 
market capacities produce three classes in capitalist society – capitalists, white-collar 
workers or middle classes, and working classes.119  Education and technical training 
are the distinguishing features of the middle classes, and the basis for their rewards of 
higher remuneration, fringe benefits, and greater job security.120  This analysis 
constructs the middle classes as socially distinct and permanent sectors of capitalist 
societies that, despite tremendous variation, can be characterized on their own terms 
without being understood as partially proletariat or bourgeoisie.  Identification of 
middle classes as educated, technically trained, skilled workers and salaried 
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professionals does not, however, erase the boundary problem – even with this framing 
questions remain about where the middle classes begin and end.  
The last Weberian insight of note here is that by focusing on status and 
authority Weberian class analysis opens discussion of various sources of prestige and 
power outside economic and property-related relations.  Factors such as race, gender, 
age, ethnicity, and religion can be considered as critical sources of stratification and 
social ordering.  These social affiliations, in combination with class, intersect, overlap, 
and compete in the structuring of capitalist societies and the distribution of social 
power.  This produces a very pluralist conception of social differentiation in which 
status organizes individuals who share a common lifestyle into hierarchical social 
positions.  Parkin (1979) observes that insights from this expansive consideration of 
status variables are missed by Marxists because of their unfailing commitment to 
production as the source of stratification.121  Parkin writes: 
 
The Marxist preoccupation with the realm of production, increasingly 
held up as its mark of theoretical rigour, obscures from view any 
recognition of the possibility that some line of cleavage other than that 
between capital and labour could constitute the primary source of 
political and social antagonism. To accept that social inequalities and 
injustices stemming from racial, religious, linguistic, and sexual 
divisions could have a reality sui generis, not reducible to causes buried 
deep in the capitalist mode of production, would look suspiciously like 
a Weberian approach with all its peculiar fascination for distributive 
patterns and outcomes.122 
 
Weberian analysis of middle classes, therefore, provides a complex model for 
understanding their location within stratified societies. No clear boundaries mark the 
contours of middle classes, but they are nonetheless identified as distinct, expansive, 
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occupationally-identified groups located between positively and negatively privileged 
groups.  My definition of middle classes draws inspiration from this Weberian 
appreciation of complexity and identifies the pursuit of modern status as a defining 
class characteristic of Western-educated segments of West African middle classes in 
the transition from empire to nation. 
  
West African Middle Classes 
Middle classes, I conclude, are always multifarious, fragmented groups between 
owners of property and the propertyless.  They include salaried professionals; 
employees in commerce, industry, and service jobs; self-employed and direct 
producers such as farmers, artisans, and crafts makers; and small-scale capitalists such 
as shopkeepers, operators, family firms, and small agricultural and industrial owners 
of production.123  A dominant fragment of West African middle classes is comprised 
of Western-educated and technically trained bureaucrats, functionaries and salaried 
professionals.  The higher strata of these groups are managers of enterprise, officers of 
bureaucracy, and principal agents of ‘development’; they are technical experts, 
supervisors, inspectors, foremen (and women), accountants, lawyers, engineers, 
doctors, teachers, and intellectuals.   In addition to receiving financial remuneration, 
benefits, and job security these occupational groups also exercise some degree of 
social power and authority.  Certificates, diplomas, and promotions mark their 
occupational prestige and differentiate them from the non-credentialed.  The lower 
strata of bureaucrats and salaried workers include administrators and service workers, 
technicians, assistants, clerks, secretaries, nurses, and operators of ‘modern’ industries 
and institutions.   
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In West Africa, Western educated professionals, managers and administrators 
developed in large part with the need to order colonial production and the colonial 
state. Status for Western-educated middle classes in West Africa at the end of empire 
derived from their location within hierarchies of ownership and production, as well as 
from their association with ‘modern’ work.   However, they collectively experienced 
the weight of the color bar as well as the sting of discourses that denied African 
capacity for self rule. 124  Standing astride two worlds Western-educated segments of 
the middle classes formulated visions of progress in reference to the West while 
working towards greater social mobility, political authority, and human equality for 
Africans like themselves.  Struggling to overcome contradictions of colonial 
structures, Western-educated Africans congealed as a ‘class’ through nationalist 
projects.  E.P. Thompson’s (1963) notion of class identity is helpful here.125 
Thompson states:  
 
Class [is] not a condition or a “thing” but a relationship, defined both by 
horizontal solidarities (for example, with other workers) and vertical 
antagonism (against a bourgeoisie); class belonging [comes] fundamentally 
from one’s place in production, if not by a strictly Marxist notation of labor 
power and surplus value then certainly by one’s relationship to work; class [is] 
experiential, shaped by consciousness of shared histories and recognizable 
through the accretions of a common culture.126  
 
Western-educated Africans solidified as a ‘class’ through vertical projects of 
assimilation into the ‘modern’ world as well as horizontal affiliations that bolstered 
their identity as ‘Africans’.  Like Thompson I suggest that Western-educated 
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fragments of West African middle classes forged horizontal affiliations, vertical 
oppositions, and cultural commonalities based on shared experiences and status 
aspirations.   
In the colonial era, Western-educated middle classes, what Benedict Anderson 
calls the bilingual literati, served as linguistic and geographic intermediaries between 
colonizers and colonized and, as such, learned and translated Western knowledge 
systems while also performing bureaucratic duties of empire. 127  Despite lip-service to 
their status as ‘civilized’ or ‘evolved’ groups of Africans, African bureaucrats and 
salaried professionals received periodic reminders of the limitations of their social 
mobility within colonial structures through affronts to their personhood.  These groups 
repeatedly discovered that they were “not quite/not white” and were bound to be 
permanently relegated to second class citizenship in an imperial world order.128  
Opposing the constraints of colonialism and elevating the status of Africans through 
the nation-state emerged as a unifying objective for various Western-educated 
Africans at the end of empire.  The nation, from their hybrid stance, promised equal 
treatment and status for all citizens as well as membership in the comity of nations, 
which intimated African entry into the modern world.  Their ‘class consciousness’ 
formed as a consequence of vertical antagonism to European rule, and collective 
(though not uniform) belief in African political and economic capacity. African 
development held the hope that Africans would someday share horizontal economic 
membership with the people of more ‘advanced’ nations.  United by shared disdain of 
colonial repression and hopes of a Western-inspired national imaginary, fragmented 
groups of Western-educated Africans turned their frustration with colonial 
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contradictions into self-conscious nationalist projects and movements for national 
development.  
Upon independence, Western-educated Africans in many cases populated new 
political positions ranging from president to high court justices. High political ranks 
were filled by those with the educational capacity to maintain or reform institutions 
colonial administrations had put in place.  These positions provided opportunities for 
political and economic aggrandizement, and produced new upper strata in West 
African societies. However, not all Western-educated Africans gained access to the 
state, and those who did not were compelled to build personal wealth independently.  
So while upper strata filled up with new politically-supported Western-educated 
Africans, others in the middle classes struggled for greater financial stability (obtained 
by selling their services) and social status (augmented by acquiring credentials and 
titles). 
Where, however, is the boundary between upper and middle class West 
Africans?  West African class boundaries, I would contend, are necessarily fluid. 
Indeed, fluidity is a central feature of middle classes in general as their apparent 
openness to ‘everyone’ marks political equality and progressive social ordering 
expected of the liberal nation-state. Formal education and technical training in 
Western institutions are marketed as the most assured means of social mobility and 
secure methods of acquiring financial stability, positions of authority, and political 
power.   Though permeable, the boundaries of the middle classes are produced through 
symbolic and material expressions of prestige.129   These expressions manifest in 
social titles, cultural tastes, lifestyle choices, living standards, leisure activities and the 
like.  For Western-educated segments of African middle classes symbolic and material 
expressions of prestige display decidedly Western flare.  The patterns of consumption, 
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possession of certain commodities, acquisition of particular vernacular, cultural 
choices and social activities betray Western inspiration and local adaptation.  
Everyday practices at home, work and on the streets present opportunities for 
conspicuous or veiled messaging of status-inscribed meaning.130  Middle class 
membership, therefore, extends beyond occupational or economic positioning and the 
requisite training, and includes a host of behaviors and proclivities that construct a 
particular social identity.131  In the transition from empire to nation, in addition to 
sharing occupational experiences and existential angst, Western-educated middle 
classes also assumed political sensibilities that assist in recognizing their social 
identity and simplify some of the theoretical challenges associated with determining 
middle classes sociologically.   
Also of note, however, is that status derived from Western education and 
training interacted, complemented and competed with a variety of West-African 
status-giving constructs.  Social differentiation in West African was also shaped, 
therefore, by ethno-cultural political regimes (i.e. the logic and political ordering of 
various West African kingdoms, city-states, lineage relations, and ethno-cultural 
hierarchies), gender dynamics and distinctions, age differentials in deference, religious 
divides and hierarchies of holy orders and, of course, indigenous property relations 
and occupational structures.  Middle classes at the end of empire have to be 
understood in conjunction with these other forms of stratification and interlacing 
status-giving factors.  Western-educated Africans in particular may have dressed in 
suits, spoken European languages with refined accents, lived in homes with ‘modern’ 
appliances, purchased radios, and engaged with liberatory ideology in the form of 
newspapers, bulletins and literature.  But these populations may also have paid 
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dowries, cooked on wood stoves, and lived in thatched homes.  Their titles of status 
from Western education such as Dr. and Professor must be considered alongside and 
against local appellations of status such as chief, baálě, and obirempon. Also 
important in West African contexts is the place of religion, and authority from both 
Western religions and African religious and spiritual practices must be acknowledged.  
This would necessitate consideration of the social roles, status, and power of imams, 
priests, deacons and pastors as well as marabouts, babalawos etc. 132  In addition to 
social hierarchies introduced through education and religion, military might, ethnic 
affiliation, gender, and age also significantly structure social stratification in West 
Africa.  Envisioning West African middle classes, therefore, requires acknowledging 
the varied occupations held in a given society, recognizing different forms of social 
authority, and accepting the plethora of lifestyle choices and habits engaged in by 
these populations.   
Figure 1 presents a scheme of complex occupational stratification with an 
attempt to account for interaction with political, religious, and military distinctions 
found in several West African nations.  The diagram highlights that status does not lie 
exclusively in the realm of education, nor can Western-educated Africans be collapsed 
into a category of national political ‘elites’.  The scheme provided is by no means 
comprehensive but rather attempts to fill out and order occupations and status relations 
within West Africa.   I have constructed three broad class categories: luxury/ruling 
classes, middle classes, and working/vulnerable classes. They attempt to capture 
variation in not only economic terms but also social stability and political power.  
While West African middle classes can be identified from their position in production 
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 (as a Marx might suggest), it is al
affect their status and identity outside of productive relations.  Drawing from 
‘traditionally’ African, religious, military, and ethnic affiliations, West African middle 
classes reflect a combination of
consumption, lifestyle, and social prestige.
 
Figure 1.1: Scheme of West African Occupational Differentiation 
 
Class and Context in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire
Though Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are neighboring countries they do not share the same 
social complexity. A brief review of both countries helps to highlight that while the 
discussions above provoke us to construct more nuanced conceptual understandings of 
‘African society’, each national context is replete with idiosyncratic features that 
complicate theories of class stratification.  I discuss the ethnic and religious characters 
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of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire as well as their social composition in the transition period 
from empire to nation.  
The Republic of Ghana spans approximately 92,098 square miles and is 
flanked by Togo in the East, Burkina Faso in the North, Côte d’Ivoire to the West and 
the Atlantic Ocean in the South. Ghana is ethnically diverse with approximately 47 
local languages spoken.  Approximately 50% of the population identifies as Akan, but 
within this umbrella group different ethnicities such as Ashanti, Akuapem, Akyem, 
Fante, Baoule, Nzema, Bono and others are found.  The other 50% of the population 
are ethnically heterogenous with no dominant group represented – they include Ga, 
Ewe, Guan, Gurma, and Mole-Dagbani groups. Ghana is estimated to have more than 
100 different ethnic groupings.133  Within its territory, Ghana also includes traditional 
states, kingdoms, and remnants of ancient empires – such as the Bono (now known as 
the Brong-Ahafo) and the Ashanti – that operate at times as subsocieties within the 
nation (Foster and Zolberg 1971). Ghana is predominantly Christian (approximately 
60%) with Muslim populations (30%) concentrated in northern regions, and less than 
10% of the population practicing indigenous religions. 
The Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, with square mileage of approximately 124,502, 
is a slightly larger land mass than Ghana. Its southern coast is on the Atlantic Ocean, 
and it shares borders with Liberia and Guinea in the West, Mali and Burkina Faso to 
the North, and Ghana in the East.  In Côte d’Ivoire approximately 65 local languages 
are spoken, and while Akan groups are also present their numbers as smaller and no 
predominant ethnicity exists. This is perhaps because no ancient states of significant 
size survived in the territory that became Côte d’Ivoire even though the Malinké, 
Koulango, Abron, Agni and Baoulé kingdoms were highly influential before the 19th 
                                                 
133 Kwame Boafo-Arthur, Ghana (London:Zed Books, 2007) 
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century.134  Common ethnic groups in present-day Côte d’Ivoire include Baoulé, Kru, 
Mandé and Sénoufo peoples.  An estimated 40% of the population identifies as 
Muslim, 30% Christian, 10% practice indigenous religions and 15% claim no-religion. 
At the end of colonialism and emergence of these two territories as 
independent nations, their respective social arrangements were quite disparate. Ghana 
was more urbanized with several thriving cities, whereas urban life in Côte d’Ivoire 
was centered largely in Abidjan. By the 1960s, approximately 40% of the population 
in Ghana resided in towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants as compared to less than 
20% in Côte d’Ivoire.135  In both nations, however, commercial and urban activity was 
concentrated in the southern half of the country, with northern regions sending migrant 
labor and capital from cash crops to further boost southern development.  This uneven 
development is still evident in contemporary Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.  
Importantly, education systems in Ghana were more extensive than in Côte 
d’Ivoire.  These educational differences will be explored in more detail in subsequent 
chapters.  What is important to note here is that Ghana had larger, more differentiated 
populations of Western-educated workers.  Elite schools such as Achimota School and 
William Ponty School, in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire respectively, trained students who 
would become political authorities and members of the highest ranks of Western-
educated Africans.  These Africans became occupants of the state and implemented 
development strategies that would, in turn, rearrange social configurations.  As chapter 
three of this thesis explains, development in Ghana focused industrializing with local 
expertise while in Côte d’Ivoire emphasis was placed on developing agricultural 
sectors.  
                                                 
134 Richard Stryker, “Political and Administrative Linkage in the Ivory Coast” in Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast: Perspectives on Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971):73-102. 
135 Remi Clignet and Philip Foster, “Convergence and Divergence in Educational Development  in 
Ghana and the Ivory Coast” in Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1971):265-292 
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Various occupational groups and classes existed in Ghana in the middle of the 
twentieth century. They included a rather small professional bourgeoisie – made up of 
the leading politicians, businessmen, professionals (doctors, lawyers, accountants, 
engineers, architects etc.), and bureaucrats.  Western-educated members of this upper 
stratum of society also often had ties to local authority systems in the form of 
chieftaincies or royal lineages. Beyond the small merchant-professional-bourgeoisie, 
there were a considerably larger number of middle classes136 including less wealthy 
professionals, small business owners, clerks, teachers, journalists, printers, 
photographers, traders, brokers, small contractors, pharmacists, nurses, small shop 
owners, tailors, shoemakers, artisans, and a “small but significant number of the 
500,000 or so cocoa farmers [that] had incomes and values which placed them in the 
middle class.”137  Workers with less property, fewer labor protections and less social 
authority included a growing number of skilled and semi-skilled wage laborers 
(employed in factories, ports, infrastructure projects, construction and the like), 
unskilled laborers, peasant farmers and small agriculturalists, workers in small fishing 
and pastoral communities, and many non-Ghanaian migrants who struggled to 
integrate into political and economic life.138  While various occupations were 
represented in politics in this period, the political domain was dominated by lawyers 
and concentrated in urban areas in the southern half of the territory (namely in Kumasi 
and Accra).  Starting in the 1920s labor various occupational groups in the Gold Coast 
                                                 
136 Middle classes can be ordered into upper and lower middle classes, but no attempt to do that is made 
here.  
137 Philip Foster and Aristide Zolberg, Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1971):36; T.E. Anin, Essays on the Political Economy of Ghana (London: Selwyn Publishers 
Limited, 1991) 
138 Foster and Zolberg (1971) 
 65 
 
began organizing into trade unions.  The largest and most organized trade unions by 
the 1950s included teachers, civil servants, and cocoa farmers.139 
 
At the close of colonialism In Côte d’Ivoire the upper echelons of society were 
comprised of planters (large farm or plantation owners), businessmen, and a large 
population of French settlers who managed colonial administration and engaged in 
entrepreneurial activity.  French settlers were known as colons and, while they all 
received privileges denied to Africans, colonial officials and large traders wielded the 
most social authority. Ivorian public officials and civil servants were small in number 
but possessed disproportionate amounts of power. As a result, between “1945-1959, 
the public health official, teacher, civil servant, and clerk were the top positions open 
to Ivorians, who then became elected officials.”140  The French took pains to restrict 
formal education to a small ‘elite’ and so (in comparison to Ghana) numbers of trained 
doctors, nurses, pharmacists, engineers, technicians, lawyers, and teachers remained 
low.  More prevalent in the middle classes were independent farmers, shop owners, 
traders, truckers, tailors, shoemakers, and artisans.141   The most economically 
vulnerable and disempowered workers were the expansive groups of wage laborers 
employed primarily in agriculture.  The political realm was dominated by planters, 
doctors and pharmacists prior to independence, and while planters retained political 
influence after independence, groups of scientists, technicians, lawyers and students of 
humanities gained power through the state.142  Agricultural unions represented the 
                                                 
139 Jon Kraus “Political Change, Conflict, and Development in Ghana” in Ghana and the Ivory Coast 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971):33-72 
 
140 Tessilimi Bakary, “Elite Transformation and Political Succession” in The Political Economy of 
Ivory Coast (New York: Praeger, 1984):46 
141 Aristide Zolberg, “Political Development in the Ivory Coast Since Independence” in Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971):9-32 
142 Bakary (1984):39 
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interests of planters, farmers, and laborers, but few other unions were significantly 
organized.  
Without even exploring the social formation of these groups or their relations 
to one other we see in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire vastly different class configurations 
and social stratification. In both cases, however, middle classes can be identified – 
some of whom have Western-education as a background. Standing between 
colonialists and the ‘masses’, and between capital and labor, these ‘modern’ Western-
educated middle classes experienced angst about their social constraints and impulses 
for African development.  The next chapter goes on to explore some of these notions. 
Conclusion 
African class categories at the end of empire were muddled by imperial misreadings of 
African societies, and clarity on class was further obscured by African liberatory 
agendas that relied on Marxist class categories or recalled romantic ideals of African 
classlessness. In Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire a variety of occupational groupings could be 
identified and, in reflection on their social power, placed into appropriate classes 
(which I have simplistically divided here as upper/luxury classes, middle classes, and 
lower/vulnerable classes).  While relations between classes ultimately determine their 
character, the point here has been to argue for the existence of modern middle classes 
and to indentify Western-educated populations as an important segment amongst 
them. 
Like more recent scholarship, I view modernity as a shared present, and not as 
the temporal or material possession of a supposedly ‘advanced’ West.  It is often 
assumed to initiate or mark a break from ‘traditional’ lifestyles and to usher in 
advances from Europe.  As such, modernity is associated with the nation-state, rights 
of citizenship, economic growth, and a wide range of technologies for communication, 
 67 
 
transportation, production and consumption. However, the modern world is not 
created in one locality or culture and transplanted onto others but, rather, is co-
experienced and co-produced.143  Modernity was not transferred from the metropole to 
colonies, but was produced through the experience and production of social life in 
both places.   Both African and Western societies benefited from exchange of labor, 
capital, culture, and knowledge systems which resulted in the mutual, though uneven, 
development of Africa and the West in the modern period.144  Modernity, therefore, is 
the cotemporaneous experience and production of social life amongst highly 
differentiated yet intimately connected people. 
Narratives of modernity in the transition from empire to nation largely failed to 
capture the complexity or motley composition of African societies.  Categories such as 
‘primitive’, ‘traditional’, or ‘native’ conveyed the notion of Africans outside the fold 
of modernity.  Meanwhile, descriptions of ‘civilized’, ‘evolved’ or ‘elite’ Africans 
projected the idea that only small populations of Africans had converted to capitalist-
based Western lifestyles and, in so doing, encountered modernity.  Contrary to 
suggestions that capitalist modernity had to be introduced to the continent, Africans 
employed in colonial bureaucracies or in ‘traditional’ positions of power were engaged 
in amassing capital at the same time as ‘native’ populations were forced off land and 
into wage-labor.  Dispossession and accumulation were two sides of the same coin of 
capitalist expansion and as lifestyle choices expanded so did economic, social and 
                                                 
143
 This argument suggests thinking about world processes as a “unified field of analysis” (Mongia 
1997) such that modernity was not something the West extended to Africa but that exchange of natural 
resources (including minerals, slaves, commodities etc.)  ideas and cultural practices always included 
contributions from regions all over the world (Radhika Mongia, “Historicizing State Sovereignty: 
Inequality and the Form of Equivalence” Comparative Studies in Society and History (2007): 384-411) .  
‘The West’ would not have developed in the ways it did without ‘the Rest’; suggesting co-production of 
modernity more than mere transference.  
144  I use the notion of a ‘modern period’ loosely here and use it to mean the period from the 15th and 
16th century in which Western hegemonic principles of parliamentary democracy and liberal capitalism 
expanded globally. ‘Modernity’ has resulted from exchange through these global encounters.  
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political inequalities within colonies and across regions.  While some populations 
enjoyed luxuries others became more marginalized and vulnerable.  However, instead 
of only seeing this dichotomy, I have urged the recognition of middle classes in this 
process of growing capitalist exchange, commodity consumption, and the addition of 
novel ways of living to local traditions.  African colonies and the nations that followed 
them were not governed exclusively by a capitalist logic and clearly divided into 
classes of capitalists and wage-workers. On the contrary, they included variegated 
value systems, social relations and forms of stratification that reflect Africans attempts 
to imitate, co-opt and augment practices typically associated with the West.  Capitalist 
classes, including middle classes, have emerged as part of this development, and West 
African societies display a mix of ‘traditional’, ‘modern’, class, ethnic, colonial, and 
gendered social arrangements.  
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CHAPTER 2 
African Visions of Progress: Black People in the Modern World 
 
This chapter focuses on Western-educated Africans as anti-imperial agents and 
examines their notions of progress at the end of empire as desires for ‘modernity’.  
During this period, Western-educated Africans were located between supposedly 
‘backwards’ African traditions and ‘modern’ Western customs and lifestyles.  Their 
experiences of imperial denigration, however, produced collective consciousness of 
colonial inconsistencies as well as feelings of alienation. I argue that Western-
educated Africans consciously constructed racial identities and nationalist visions to 
respond to existential angst provoked by straddling ‘Africa’ and ‘the West’.  To the 
Western-educated Africans examined in this chapter, the nation appeared as a vehicle 
for pan-African ‘regeneration’ and upliftment of the ‘Negro race’ to the same 
economic and political status as other members of the modern world.  Paradoxically, 
Western-educated Africans aimed to reinstate the humanity of black peoples by using 
Western ideals of the ‘nation’.  African nations were imagined as symbols of the 
equality of black Africans with their former oppressors, and signs of African 
membership in the ‘modern world’.  Despite shared desires to move Africans into 
‘modernity’, Western-educated Africans held a plethora of disparate notions of 
progress.  Conservative camps envisioned ‘development’ under imperial guidance 
(protected by the economic and military purview of Western patrons), while more 
radical groups proposed complete independence from imperial powers and 
reclamation of a repressed ‘African’ ontology.    
The chapter is divided into two parts. Part one looks at existential predicaments 
of Western-educated Africans, and their attempts to address colonial contradictions 
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through the formation of ‘African’ identity and African nations. I emphasize the 
writings of Edward Blyden, Africanus Horton as important figures in discourses of 
progress in the colonial period.  Though not necessarily ‘representative’ of middle 
classes, each of these men provides insight into the limitations and aspirations of 
Western-educated Africans.  I also discuss the Négritude and Pan-African movements 
as significant forces in the formation of racial solidarity and nationalist ambitions. 
This part of the chapter stresses the importance of bilingual literati in conceptualizing 
African development in terms of black liberation and African nationalism.  
The second part of the chapter turns to Kwame Nkrumah and Félix 
Houphouёt-Boigny as important Western-educated, but rival, leaders in the transition 
from colonial to nation-states. As the first presidents of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
respectively, Nkrumah and Houphouёt-Boigny provide exemplary contrasts of radical 
and conservative development ideologies.  Their perspectives reveal opposing beliefs 
about ‘African’: identity and solidarity; orientation to former colonial powers; and 
affiliation with emerging Cold War superpowers.  While I recognize the unique 
subjectivity of Nkrumah and Houphouёt-Boigny as charismatic, erudite, and 
exceptional leaders, I use them as proxy perspectives for other Western-educated 
Africans in the initial years of independence.  
Taken collectively, the two sections in this chapter provide a partial genealogy 
of discourses of progress as articulated by Western-educated Africans in West Africa 
from approximately 1860 to 1960. I argue that despite divergent beliefs in both 
Anglophone and Francophone examples, Western-educated Africans aspired to 
achieve ‘African modernity’ and congealed as a ‘class’ in their struggles towards anti-
colonial ends.  
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Part 1: 
The (Un)Making of African Identity: Western Educated Africans and the 
‘Modern’ Predicament 
 
 “Africa is to rise once more, she will take her place with the most 
Christian, civilized and intelligent nations of the Earth.”145   
 
From the middle of the nineteenth century onward, the demands of commerce, 
Christian proselytizing, and colonial expansion produced growing numbers of 
European-influenced West Africans. Serving as cultural and linguistic translators, 
Africans mastered European languages, converted to Christianity, and assisted in 
brokering political and economic deals. 146  As trade and imperial interests expanded, 
Europeans divided Africans into one of two simple categories: “native” or “civilized”.  
‘Natives’ were the embodiment of backwardness, the very antithesis of ‘modern 
civilization’.  They were, allegedly, inferior and illiterate masses engaged in animistic 
and savage behavior.  ‘Civilized’ Africans, on the other hand, purportedly 
demonstrated appreciation for Western culture, professed the truth of Christian 
divinity, and comported themselves with decorum befitting believers.  In the minds of 
missionaries, ‘civilized’ Africans stood as beacons of Christian light in an otherwise 
dark and bedraggled continent.147  As European commercial and missionary enclaves 
expanded into colonies in West Africa, ‘black Europeans’ assumed greater importance 
                                                 
145  The quote is by James Johnson (1867) who was a Sierra Leonean cleric of Nigerian origin who 
subscribed to ideas about a glorious African past and Christianity as a vehicle for Africa’s restoration 
(Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776-1991, (Washington D.C.: 
Howard University Press, 1994): 22-23. 
146 ‘Middling’ Africans acted as important intermediaries between Europeans from the sea and Africans 
from the continental interior.  Their linguistic and socio-geographic position “poised [them] between 
the African hinterland and the tiny but powerful class of white administrators, missionaries and 
traders.” (Kwaku Larbi Korang, Writing Ghana, Imagining Africa (Rochester: University of Rochester 
Press, 2003):295 
147 A strong association was made between Christianity, Western civilization, and education to the point 
where clear lines between them were hard to draw. To be civilized was equated with being Christian, 
and the more lettered Africans were encouraged to hold Western ideals as well Christian zeal.  
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as administrative and political intermediaries. 148 In addition to mission schools and 
churches, institutions of higher learning were also established to cultivate small but 
highly influential groups of Western educated ‘native intellectuals’.149  
 Included in the ranks of Western influenced groups in West Africa were 
repatriating people of African descent returning from the so-called ‘New World’.  In 
the late 1800s, technological advancements, namely in the form of the steamship, 
increased mobility across the Atlantic Ocean and, propelled by a spate of repatriation 
movements in the Americas, led to increased return of freed slaves to West Africa.150  
For some returnees, ethnic and cultural heritage was lost in the Middle Passage; they 
had no cultural connections or affiliations with the African ethnic groups and regions 
to which they returned and they existed, as it were, as their own ethnicity sui 
generis.151 Whether socialized in the Western hemisphere or mission or college 
educated in West Africa, groups of Western-influenced Africans proliferated in the 
nineteenth century.  Notions of ‘progress’ articulated by these populations exposed 
their hybrid heritage – they simultaneously attempted to elevate the condition of 
‘Negro’ people while venerating Western traditions.  In fact, mission educated and 
repatriated Africans often acted as appendages of civilizing missions, extending 
                                                 
148 Secular schools were established in regions where Islam was the dominant religion. Also, 
Settlements along the coast of West Africa were made more permanent once schools (like Fourah Bay 
College in Sierra Leone) and colonial institutions were established. The term ‘black Englishman’ was 
especially popular in describing Africans whose contact with European civilization led to life altering 
behaviors (Philip Zachernuk, Colonial Subjects (Charlotte: University of Virginia Press, 2000).  
149 Of particular note here are Fourah Bay College (established in 1827) and Liberia College 
(established in 1863). 
150 Immanuel Geiss writes in The Pan-African Movement, “The steamship line increased the horizontal 
mobility of the modern elite on the West African coast…[and] facilitated the tendency of the West 
African elites to coalesce into a homogenous urban class along the coast from Gambia as far as 
Cameroon.” Korang (2003): 290. 
151 Returnees often developed into élite or middle caste like the Saros of Nigeria, Americo-Liberians 
and Krios of Sierra Leone.  They oftentimes maintained distinct family ties from indigenous African 
communities, spoke different languages from those around them, engaged in occupations unfamiliar to 
local Africans, and maintained association with groups in Europe or the Americas. Before these groups 
engaged in more extensive social and reproductive relations with local groups, they maintained 
exclusive ethnic differences from the other Africans who surrounded them.   
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imperial hegemony through personal efforts to convert and re-educate indigenous 
African populations.  For the first generations of Western-educated Africans in the 
nineteenth century, progress generally entailed adoption of Christianity, ‘regeneration’ 
of black people, and emulation of Western civilizations.152  James Johnson, West 
African Bishop and nationalist (1836-1917), demonstrates in the epigraph above how 
members of the first generations of Western-educated Africans tied ‘Africa’s’ progress 
to Christian conversion and joining “civilized and intelligent nations of the Earth.”153 
 
Edward Blyden and Africanus Horton: Alienation versus Assimilation 
Two incredibly influential voices in the early generations of Western-educated 
Africans were Edward Blyden and Africanus Horton. Edward Blyden was one of the 
first African intellectuals to address the condition of Western-educated Africans and 
black people more generally. Blyden perceived an erosion of African social, cultural 
and moral philosophy as a consequence of Western hegemony.   As a repatriated 
African, his concern extended to the “Negro race” at large, and he identified religious 
missions and Eurocentric education as the chief agents of Western domination. For 
Blyden, Western-educated Africans were caught in a moral and existential dilemma as 
their efforts to be ‘civilized’ according to European standards required abandonment 
of the things that made them culturally distinct.  Blyden called this the “African 
problem,” and suggested that encounter with the Western world and its subsequent 
onslaught of cultural antagonism, threatened to destroy the very essence of Africans 
or, as he termed it, the “African personality.”    For Blyden the “educated Negro” was 
                                                 
152 Critical to these discourses were the first generation of Western-educated African doctors, lawyers, 
missionaries, and teachers. Particularly influential figures include J. Ajayi Crowther, Africanus Horton, 
Edward Blyden and James Johnson.  Robert William July, The Origins of Modern African Thought 
(Asmara: Africa World Press Inc., 2004) comprehensively records the origin and elaboration of these 
early thinkers. 
153 Esedebe (1994):23 
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at risk of “alienation”, which he described as the temporary or permanent erasure of 
cultural connections produced by the impossible pursuit of European identity.  
Alienated Africans, he suggested, were neither their true selves nor the aspired 
Other.154   
However, while Edward Blyden lamented the ubiquity and oppressiveness of 
Western civilization, Africanus Horton bemoaned its limited diffusion.  In Horton’s 
estimation, there was no need to preserve a dissipating African essence; in fact, Africa 
had not been changed enough.  Horton saw tremendous benefit in Western civilization 
and determined that its further extension was Africa’s greatest hope. He believed, “It 
is impossible for a nation to civilize itself; civilization must come from abroad.”155  
The way he saw it, civilization was not a European invention or trademark, all 
societies improved through contact with more advanced groups.  Horton argued 
ancient Egypt had subdued its neighbors as part of civilizational exchange and 
improvement before it succumbed to the might of Roman civilization. Horton 
envisioned the spread of European civilization in Africa as the antidote to 
‘backwardness’, which he saw as a cultural, not inherent, shortcoming.  African power 
and progress depended on the extension of European civilization in the form of the 
nation state which, Horton supposed, would be championed by a vanguard class of 
Western-educated Africans.  Equipped with instruments of European civilization, 
‘enlightened’ Africans would relieve their brethren of their nescience by extending 
Western education, medical procedures and forms of economic improvement.  
Ironically, Horton anticipated that “civilizational assimilation” would restore African 
“hope, that in the process of time, [Africans’] turn [would] come, when they [would] 
                                                 
154 As Korang duly notes, Blyden’s insights predate Franz Fanon’s analysis in Black Skin, White Masks. 
Blyden’s clairvoyance about the racially provoked desires and contradictions are the substance of 
Fanon’s book written almost a half-century after Blyden’s observations.  
155James Africanus BealeHorton and George Shepperson, West African Countries and Peoples 
(Edinburgh: University Press  1969) 
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occupy a prominent position in the world’s history, and…command a voice in the 
council of nations.”156  
 
Colonial Constraints and Opportunities for Western-Educated Men 
The formal expansion of European colonies in the 1870s also began a period of 
official racism.  As colonies took full form in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, Western-educated Africans found themselves more deeply inscribed in a 
racial hierarchy.  According to colonial logic, Africans could no longer prove their 
humanity through religious conversion or Western acculturation.  They were, instead, 
inherently consigned to inferiority by their racial affliction.  As Rina Okonkwo puts it, 
“The term black Englishman, which denoted the concept that given equal education 
and opportunity the African could achieve equality with the European, soured to an 
epithet at the end of the nineteenth century.”157 The establishment of African colonies, 
therefore, was premised on racial difference, and introduced separatist and regionalist 
policies to amplify and contrive divisions between Europeans and Africans, as well as 
between African “tribes”.158  ‘Civilized’ Africans aspiring to stand on equal plane as 
Europeans, found themselves crushed by the weight of an immovable color bar.  Their 
attempts to challenge colonial authority and assert their equality with Europeans was 
met with annoyance from Europeans and suspicion by other groups of Africans.  The 
burgeoning colonial authority in the Gold Coast, for example, described Western-
                                                 
156 Ibid 
157 Rina Okonkwo, Heroes of West African Nationalism (Enugu: Delta Publishers, 1985):1 
158 Scholars have long investigated the construction of “tribes” in West African, elucidating why the 
term “tribe” carries so much historical and contemporary baggage.  Thomas Spear’s “Neo-
traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa” (2003) provides an interesting 
account of the ‘creation of tribalism’ and ‘invention of tradition’ in Africa. From this and other accounts 
we see how colonialism functioned on separatist foundations, using race and ethnicity to construct 
hierarchies of privilege and power, and creating ‘tradition’ and tensions in Africa.  
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educated Africans in the area as “a thorn in the side of the [imperial] Government”, a 
hindrance to imperial sprawl.159   
At the same time, however, establishing colonial authority and administrative 
control required more skilled manpower than European settler communities could 
possibly provide.  Western-educated Africans suddenly became assets to colonial 
governments.  They could not be dismissed as “untrustworthy and disruptive 
agitators” but had to be seen as a locally based labor force capable of overseeing 
colonial functions.160 They assumed more high status jobs relative to other Africans, 
whose value within the “racial capitalism of colonial imperialism” was largely reduced 
to an “inferior laboring class.”161  Western education through missions and colonial 
government schools became, therefore, a primary means of upward social mobility 
within colonial structures, albeit with racially defined restrictions and ceilings.  
Demand for educated Africans in colonial bureaucracies allowed those with European 
language fluency and the appropriate educational background to attain new levels of 
prosperity and engage in previously unknown cultures of consumption.  These 
Africans became clerks, colonial officers, lawyers, functionaries, clergy, doctors, 
teachers and the like, and adjusted their living arrangements and social engagements in 
accordance with their social status and professional opportunities.  Social mobility and 
economic advancement depended more heavily on the colonial educational system, 
especially in British colonies. In French West Africa, there were smaller numbers of 
professional men and diminutive, but influential, groups of westernized elites.162  
Education in West African colonies became the primary vehicle for professional 
advancement and created more lucrative, prestigious salaried positions to a growing 
                                                 
159 Korang (2003):44 
160 Korang (2003): 43 
161 Korang (2003):61 
162 Wallerstein (1965) 
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“administrative bourgeoisie.”163  To indicate and consolidate their status, more 
affluent Africans purchased membership in exclusive social clubs, and expressed 
Westernized cultural preferences such as affinity for Western music, designer clothes 
and European technologies.  
Despite general economic advancement and cultural solidarity enjoyed by 
Africans with Western education, tremendous variation existed as a function of French 
and British education policies in West African colonies.  While reserving the right to 
supervise and direct instruction, early British educational policies in African colonies 
generally encouraged pedagogical adjustment to local conditions, allowed vernacular 
instruction in primary schools, and outlined plans for mass education.164  In contrast, 
imperial France practiced the policy of ‘Assimilation’, which strove to directly 
inculcate Africans with knowledge and pride in French traditions.  Initial education 
policies in French colonial territories demanded instruction in French at all ages, 
offered employment to all students who completed primary education, and promised 
all students selected for secondary school educational standards equivalent to those in 
France.165  Ostensibly, African subjects in French colonies were considered citizens 
provided they adopted French culture and customs.  Africans emerging from British 
and French educational systems discarded indigenous attributes differentially, but all 
exhibited, to varying degrees, local expressions of metropolitan European culture.  
By World War I, small but significant numbers of Africans had passed through 
mission and colonial schools and entered tertiary education in West Africa, Europe, 
and the United States.  Though still a minority of the total population, they occupied 
                                                 
163 Wallerstein (1965):3 
164 It is widely noted that the British employed the policy of ‘Indirect Rule’ to administer their colonies. 
Generally, this approach advocated appointment of local authorities as proxy rulers and the opposition 
of ‘tribes’ against each other to maintain a balance of power in favor of Britain.  
165 Cowan (1965) describes in detail the changes and implications of colonial education policies. His 
careful analysis also illustrates how these policies evolved according to local African and metropolitan 
needs.  
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key positions in colonial institutions, mastered various Western occupational duties, 
and gained exposure to Western living standards and lifestyles.  Employed as 
administrators, technicians, functionaries, and professionals, they learned the workings 
of colonial economies and political institutions, acquired Western consumption 
patterns, and adopted European etiquette.  Their occupational positions afforded 
advantages in remuneration and job security, as well as privileges in the political 
realm whenever literacy was made a requirement for suffrage.166  However, by 
straddling local and Western ways, Western-educated Africans were open to scrutiny 
from all sides; framed as traitors or renegades by their own people, they also faced 
rejection from Europeans as hapless racially inferior replicas.  Moreover, Western-
educated Africans were denied the freedoms and respect given white settlers and 
European officers. Western-educated Africans experienced racial degradation, social 
exclusion and professional embarrassment at the hands of racists and racially inscribed 
institutions in Europe, Africa and the Americas.   
Flanked between European knowledge systems, African traditions and 
customs, unlettered masses, and colonial ‘masters’, Western-educated Africans were 
construed as culturally distinct but not racially deserving.  They were go-betweens, 
buffers, and intermediaries, middling agents of all kinds whose position astride 
multiple worlds led to contradictory experiences of social power in some instances, 
and disregard and disrespect in others.  Accordingly, Western-educated Africans faced 
existential confusion. Inculcated with European customs but denied European rights 
and privileges, they became conscious of their ‘place’ within colonial structures. 
Nevertheless, they applied Western epistemologies to African contexts, and formed 
conceptions of governance, production, consumption, and religion aimed to elevate 
                                                 
166 Western-educated Africans were in cases the only indigenous African populations to participate in 
colonial electoral practices as the unlettered were considered unfit to contribute to governance (Korang 
2003). 
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Africans to ideals of Western ‘modernity’.  The ideas Western-educated Africans held 
were distinctly Western oriented but, as a consequence of their experiences of racial 
oppression, were centrally concerned with the African, or Black, condition.  They 
stood, therefore, in contradistinction to European colonizers and ‘traditional’ African 
authorities.  They represented a diffuse group of privileged workers united through 
shared experiences of racial oppression, fluency in European languages, knowledge of 
Western institutions, and conscious of the paradoxes of cultural enrichment and social 
alienation produced by their social condition.   
 
United Against Imperialism: Pan-Africa and the Black African State 
Western-educated Africans recognized with disdain and existential alarm that their 
identity as African colonial subjects placed them in a secondary position to Europeans 
and at a distance from other Africans.  With their Western exposure and education 
they straddled two worlds; familiar with both but at home in neither one. Resentful of 
personal and political restrictions imposed by racial hierarchies and colonial strictures, 
Western-educated Africans expressed their frustrations in print and speech.  In 
conversation with bilingual literati and political organizers in Europe and the 
Americas, Western-educated elites and middle classes discussed ways to improve the 
lot of racially subjugated and economically exploited people of African descent.  Pan-
African conferences emerged as key venues for the development and dissemination of 
ideas about African progress and empowerment.  As Hakim Adi explains, “The main 
cultural and political orientation taken was to fashion Pan-Africanism, as both a 
movement and an idea, corresponding to the needs and requirements of all those 
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whose exile from the African continent was a consequence of the impact of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade, modern colonialism and imperialism.”167   
The first Pan-African conference was convened in London in the year 1900 by 
Trinidadian lawyer Henry Sylvester Williams.  Subsequent conferences in the 1920s, 
organized by the African American scholar W.E.B. Du Bois, were held in Paris, 
Brussels, Lisbon and New York City. Representatives from Africa, Europe, the 
Caribbean and the Americas debated pan-Africanism as a political ideology intended 
to promote unification and self determination of African peoples.  Nationalism and 
capitalism were heavily treated at these conferences in response to ideas from Marcus 
Garvey’s Black Nationalist movement as well as the agitation and contributions of 
international labor movements.168  By the Pan-African Congress of 1945 held in 
Manchester, these ideas had crystallized and were expressed unequivocally.  Delegates 
declared:  
 
We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence, so far and no 
further than it is possible in this ‘One World’ for groups and peoples to rule 
themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation…We are unwilling 
to starve any longer while doing the world’s drudgery in order to support by 
our poverty and ignorance a false aristocracy and a discredited imperialism.  
We condemn the monopoly of capital and the rule of private wealth and 
industry private profit alone. We want economic democracy as the only real 
democracy.169 
 
While disparate philosophies animated the conferences and cannot be elucidated in 
full here, it is clear that the priorities of literate people of African descent shifted from 
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concern with Christianity and ‘civilization’ to more focused interest in the 
establishment of fraternal solidarity between black peoples and advancement of the 
black condition through the nation.  Pan-Africanism served as a pillar of Black 
nationalism in this period and essential discourse for combating racism and colonial 
domination.170  Despite substantive variation, the conferences generally reinforced 
four central resolutions expressed at the 1921 Pan-African conference.  These 
resolutions: 1.) admonished colonial systems for separating “colored” and “white” 
races; 2.) criticized imperial powers for their activities 3.) insisted on the continued 
sovereignty of Abyssinia, Haiti, and Liberia; and 4.) issued a challenge to the world. 
The challenge was to proclaim: 
 
either the complete assimilation of Africa with two or three of 
the great world states, with political, civil and social power and 
privileges absolutely equal for its black and white citizens, or the rise of 
a great black African State founded in Peace and Goodwill, based on 
popular education, natural art and industry and freedom of trade; 
autonomous and sovereign in its internal policy, but from its beginning 
a part of a great society of peoples in which it takes its place with 
others as co-rulers of the world (my emphasis).171 
 
Their visions aimed not to reproduce African societies as they were in some 
idyllic past, but to create a modern future for Africans based on their adaptation of 
ideals of state citizenship.  The objective of African liberation was, ultimately, to 
“hasten its introduction into the modern world.”172 For Western-influenced Africans 
the nation-state appeared as the best way to propel Africans into modernity.  Their 
consciousness of imperial contradictions, bilingual fluency, international connections 
and self-ordained positioning as vanguards of African liberation, gave Western-
educated Africans the power to envision and articulate a postcolonial world in which 
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Africans belonged to nations. Nationalism became a political project for classes of 
literate Africans.  Their frustrations with colonialism and faith in the nation 
encouraged formation and delivery of national ideology in local, regional and 
international audiences.  
 
Nationalism and the nation: Postcolonial hopes and visions  
Nationalism is here understood as the idea, belief or principle of the rights of a group 
of people to constitute a nation through territorial sovereignty or the preservation of a 
cultural identity.173 Nationalism is associated with the pursuit of self determination 
and, as such, emanates from a variety of groups within a given territory.  
Nationalisms, therefore, express a “polyphony of voices, overlapping and criss-
crossing; contradictory and ambiguous; opposing, affirming, and negotiating their 
views of the nation.”174 A variety of nationalisms compete in rhetoric and action to 
represent the identity of a given nation.175  The nation, as Benedict Anderson writes, is 
an “imagined political community” in which individuals, regardless of inequalities 
between them, are united in “deep horizontal comradeship” that extends across 
“limited but sovereign” borders.176  Nations are ‘imagined’ because they rest on 
constructions in peoples’ minds of fraternal bonds deriving from shared histories and 
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cultural practices.  Millions of people with differentiated life experiences conjure 
fraternal sentiments and unite through a national imaginary.  
The nation, as Anderson describes it, is a feature of the modern world made 
possible in large part through the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, and spread 
through “print-capitalism”.  Nation-states are territorially bounded political entities 
divorced from monarchical structures and, as such, stand as distinctly different 
political and economic arrangements from previous eras.  In the modern world, 
according to Anderson, the nation stands as the most universally legitimate political 
unit, and the expectation is that “everyone can, should, [and] will ‘have’ a 
nationality.”177  While the centrality of the nation needs to be questioned, as do 
Anderson’s Euro-centric bias and universalizing tendencies, some of his points are 
well taken.178 Despite local particularities and the impossibility of equivalence, the 
allure of the nation lies in its ostensibly universal offerings. It portends political 
sovereignty, equal citizenship rights, international recognition of belonging, and the 
prospect of economic development.  Connections between members of a nation are 
imagined through myth and shared values, and portrayed through fraternal bonds – 
members of a nation are brothers who would shed blood for each others’ protection. 
Nationalisms generally assume this gendered dimension and “typically [spring] from 
masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope.”179   
African nations had to be imagined. They were fashioned after Western models 
and intended to unite people horizontally across bounded or cultural territories.  As 
empire waned, a variety of African nationalisms were expressed by dispossessed 
peasants, market women, traditional authorities, and lettered men.  It is this last group, 
however, whose voices carried loudest in the cacophony of nationalist discourses.  In 
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their attempts to imagine African nations, Western-educated Africans subsumed 
regional, ethnic, religious, gender, and linguistic differences into racial or territorial 
national identities. Drawing on pan-African values and discontent with colonial 
occupation, Western-educated Africans advocated for Black independence and 
national rights of citizenship.  As Toyin Falola writes, “The most significant 
intellectual project…has been to reshape Africa according to the image constructed by 
its educated elite.”180 As a function of their position astride Africa and the West, 
Western-educated Africans dominated discourses of modernity at the end of empire 
and presented their imagination of African nations as authentic and representative of 
the interests of African people at large.  Equally as significant for our present 
discussion, however, was the expansion of politically engaged literate Africans who 
participated in the production, distribution and consumption of African newspapers, 
cultural critiques, and literary contributions. 
 
Print Media and African ‘Authenticity’ 
As numbers of literate Africans grew in West Africa and elsewhere, African-oriented 
newspapers and pamphlets also became more widely available.  The Lagos Weekly 
Record (founded in 1890) and Lagos Standard (founded in 1895), for example, 
enjoyed large indigenous readership and garnered regional attention due to their 
critical evaluation of colonial governments.181  Michael Crowder writes, “The most 
powerful political weapon possessed by the élite was the Press. Through this they 
were able to bring their grievances to the attention not only of local people, but of 
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members of the élite up and down the coast.”182 He notes, however, that significant 
differences existed within French and British-controlled West Africa. France’s 
education policies kept literacy levels low in the majority of their territories which, 
when combined with strict censorship by the government, limited the growth of 
African Press. In British-administered West Africa, the Press had a “long and 
distinguished history of criticism of Government” and, as early as 1900, over 50 
newspapers had been published between the two colonies of Sierra Leone and the 
Gold Coast.183  
In 1920, the Lagos Weekly Record launched a satellite in London called the 
African Sentinel, adding to a growing international Black Press and illustrating the 
perceived importance of African representation in Europe.   ‘Negro’ political 
organizations sprouted in Paris and London, and engaged with pan-Africanism and 
rising Négritude movement.  By the 1930s and ‘40s, African print capitalism was fully 
developed and widely circulated newspapers, bulletins, and manuscripts facilitated 
collective nationalist imagining.184  The performative action of reading African-
centered print in European languages created communities of people across disparate 
territories who shared concerns about other ‘Africans’ and espoused nationalist beliefs 
as solutions to their collective subordination.  As Anderson writes, “the 
newspaper…created an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-
readers.”185  African-controlled journals like the West African Pilot (established 1937) 
and Présence Africaine (established 1947) emerged as instrumental sources of 
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political and cultural intellection; disseminating news items and nationalist ideas to 
ever-widening audiences of literate Africans and people of African descent.    
In addition, numerous student groups and activist organizations founded by 
Africans in the Diaspora were also contributed significantly to emancipatory 
discourses in Diaspora communities. In London especially, the 1930s and 1940s 
heralded the exchange of ideas and experiences through organizations such as the 
West African Students’ Union (WASU) and personalities like Isaac Wallace Johnson, 
Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore, and C.L.R. James.  While based in London these 
organizations and personas channeled energy towards the formation of pan-African 
programs, furthering anti-imperial campaigns, and defining African identity.  Of his 
experience in London, Paul Robeson wrote:  
 
London was the centre of the British empire and it was there that I ‘discovered’ 
Africa. That discovery, which has influenced my life ever since, made it clear 
that I would not live out my life as an adopted Englishman, and I came to 
consider that I was an African.186  
 
In the transition from empire to nation, therefore, fluency in European languages, 
access to print media, and participation in anti-colonial organizations afforded 
Western-educated Africans the opportunity to forge their identity as ‘Africans’, and 
the privilege of speaking and writing on behalf of the African continent.  Disturbed by 
the restrictions of racial ceilings and outraged by maltreatment and exploitation of 
Black people, they dialogued with people of African descent in Europe, the Caribbean 
and the Americas to construct various (oftentimes conflicting) narratives about what 
they saw as the African, or Black, predicament.  These discussions largely excluded 
illiterate and non-Western-educated populations and constructed imperialists as the 
enemy.  As such, the views presented belonged to particular segments of African 
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populations.  As self-appointed representatives of African people, the visions and 
voices of Western-educated Africans occupied privileged positions in debates about 
African identity, racial solidarity, self-determination, and nationalism.  Despite their 
peculiar positions as formally educated minorities, they projected their perspectives as 
universally representative.  It is clear, however, that their ideas represented their dual 
Western and African heritage, as well as their international exposure through travel 
and Diasporic dialogue. Their ability to present their ideas as representative reflects 
their privileged positions within colonial edifices as well as their increasing power 
over ‘traditional’ African authorities.  
 
Négritude and Black/African Identity 
The 1930s witnessed the development and expansion of the literary and ideological 
movement known as Négritude.  The movement convened African writers, artists, 
scholars, and political activists in order to found solidarity in a black identity, and 
support political and cultural struggles of pan-Africanism.  The Négritude movement 
drew from the Harlem Renaissance for inspiration and focused attention on reclaiming 
blackness as a source of pride for African peoples. It espoused the notion that black 
solidarity was the best weapon against French colonial racism.  Notable figures such 
as Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sedar Senghor, Léon Damas, and Jean Paul Sartre 
contributed to rearticulating an ‘authentic’ African identity, and developing various 
forms of cultural nationalism.187  Other pan-African advocates featured in the 
periodical included Richard Wright, Horace Cayton, C.L. R. James, Gwendolyn 
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Brooks, E.F. Frazier and S. W. Allen, all of whom wrestled with the place of the 
Negro in a world dominate by imperialism, white power, and Euro-centricity.188  
Contributors to Negritude discourses confronted the historical, social and cultural 
assault laid on people of African descent by western domination, and attempted to 
restore social and psychological balance to a traumatized people. The Negritude 
movement, therefore, was not simply a philosophical idea about a Negro essence or a 
movement advocating African unity, it was also a conscious attempt to restore social, 
cultural and psychological balance to long traumatized people.189 With ideologies of 
anti-colonialism, pan-African solidarity, and notions about African empowerment 
emanating from the Diaspora – oftentimes from London, Paris and cities in the United 
States – networks in the Diaspora proved just as important as continental partnerships 
in constructing nationalist discourses and conceptions of African modernity at the end 
of empire.190  
A clear example of the representative authority assumed by West African 
literati is found in the opening lines of a 1958 journal article about the Négritude-
promoting magazine Présence Africain. The article in Revue Culturelle du Monde 
Noir starts, “Presence Africaine is the only magazine currently published in France by 
Africans which authentically expresses the traditions and aspirations of the Negro 
World. Its readers are by no means limited to France.”191  This introduction captures 
the ability of African intellectuals, critics, activists and other politically engaged folks 
to forward their ideas as “authentically” African, proudly Negro, and worthy of 
international attention.  Alioune Diop, a Senegalese intellectual and political 
organizer, founded Présence Africaine with the intention of convening “all 
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contributors of good will (White, Yellow or Black), who might be able to help to 
define African originality and to hasten its introduction into the modern world.”192 
Published as a monthly magazine, Présence Africaine became the preeminent voice of 
the Négritude movement.   
 
From Colonial to Nation-State: Moving Into the ‘Modern’ World 
The efforts to unite and elevate Black people outlined above can be viewed as the dual 
processes of fratenizing and worlding Africa. 193  Fratenizing describes the association 
and union of disparate people of African ancestry.  For Western-educated Africans in 
the first half of the twentieth century, this process was accomplished in large part 
through attendance at international meetings and conferences, pursuit of higher 
education in Europe and the United States, and the reading and writing of Afro-centric 
print media.  Contact with Africans on the continent and in various Diasporas exposed 
the extent and similarities of racial denigration, and developed anti-imperial 
sentiments across colonial boundaries and ocean frontiers.  Fraternizing constituted a 
major role in the construction of black solidarity and generated feelings of shared 
purpose amongst people of African descent; it openly remonstrated racial oppression, 
and expanded consciousness and pride in ‘African’ identity.  Through the building of 
horizontal linkages, black people increasingly identified as ‘African’ and became more 
sympathetic to anti-colonial struggles in regions far from their local struggles.  This 
process of fraternizing built a cultural and political community on both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean.  
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Worlding, on the other hand, entailed rejection of the inferior status given 
Africans by slavery and imperial conquest, and insistence on the equality of Africans 
with other humans in the modern world.  Nationalism was central to worlding projects 
as the nation portended modern rights, protections and global recognition for 
subjugated Africans.  Referring to the role of nationalism in the worlding process one 
scholar explains, “Insofar…as Africa [was] seen as occupying a place “below” “the 
world,” worlding [was] inscribed in a nationalist imaginary as an agenda for Africa’s 
vertical integration within the human family”.194  Both fraternizing and worlding were 
especially undertaken by Western-educated Africans as their fluency in European 
languages and literacy allowed access to print media and dissemination of their ideas 
in widely utilized European languages.   
As literary Africans developed a sense of their own African identity, identified 
African ‘authenticity’, formulated political ideology, and tackled issues of imperialism 
as they saw it, they inserted themselves into postcolonial visions as indispensable 
harbingers of progress.  In the 1940s and 1950s, a cadre of charismatic Western-
educated men emerged from literate ranks across the African continent and the 
Diaspora, and expressed nationalist visions of African liberation and self-
determination.  This emergent class of highly educated political leaders in West Africa 
included the likes of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Herbert Macaulay, and Obafemi Awolowo 
(Nigeria), Milton Margai (Sierra Leone), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Amilcar Cabral 
(Guinea Bissau), Léopold Senghor (Senegal), Dawda Kairaba Jawara (the Gambia) 
and others. 195 All of these figures studied in Europe and/or the United States and 
acquired professional degrees before returning to their home colonies and engaging 
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politically.  They represented a new type of African political leadership that 
commanded attention from Western authorities by using imperial languages to press 
for African claims.196  Despite variation in their tactics and objectives, these lettered 
men largely envisioned the nation as Africa’s ticket of admission to the modern world.   
In addition to constructing various nationalist beliefs to overthrow imperialism, 
they also formulated nation-state ideology after assuming the reins of power.  As 
many of the first governors, prime ministers, and presidents of their respective 
territories, these Western-educated political leaders developed visions of their nation-
states and considered how to relate with others in the world system.  Assembling the 
nation-state necessitated internal political organization through constitutional ordering, 
institutional arrangements, economic planning, foreign policy positioning, and 
formation of international alliances.  Not surprisingly, ideas and institutions from 
Europe and North America influenced African leaders’ projections of the nation-state. 
After independence, nation-state ideology, the set of connected ideas that define the 
national character, developed in Africa in the context of the Cold War and global 
concern with capitalist and socialist development.  The second part of this chapter 
outlines two particular visions of how to incorporate African nations into the comity of 
nations. 
Nkrumah and Houphouёt-Boigny – Antagonistic Visions of Progress 
 
Kwame Nkrumah and Félix Houphouёt-Boigny, the first presidents of Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire respectively, were highly influential personalities in the transition from 
empire to nation in West Africa.  Their distinct perspectives on how African nations 
should proceed into the modern world reflected personal experiences and political 
orientations as well as engagement with various discourses of progress. Although both 
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Nkrumah and Houphouёt-Boigny were quite squarely political ‘élites’, their 
perspectives reveal the contested and contradictory meanings associated with 
liberation and the nation-state amongst Western-educated Africans.  As dramatically 
different nationalist pioneers, Nkrumah and Houpouet-Boigny illustrate a variety of 
ideas of progress and ‘African modernity’.  Their ideas fall into three main opposed 
categories: 1.) Pan-African versus national sovereignty; 2.) socialist versus capitalist 
development; and 3.) anti-colonial versus neo-colonial orientation.  Nkrumah and 
Houphouёt-Boigny demonstrate that the entry of African nations into the ‘modern 
world’ was a moment of grand imagining forged against the backdrop of pan-
Africanist debates, Cold War considerations, and continued imperial influence.  These 
two leaders, arguably more than any others in West Africa at the time, helped to shape 
ideas about Africa’s postcolonial future.  The next sections, therefore, describe 
Nkrumah and Houphouёt-Boigny’s ideational and discursive contributions to visions 
and discourses of African progress at the end of empire. 
 
Kwame Nkrumah: Radical ‘Father’ of Pan-Africanism 
Fela Kuti, the Nigerian music legend, opens one of his popular songs with, “The father 
of pan-Africanism, Doctor Kwame Nkrumah, says the secret of life is to have no 
fear."197  This erroneous but popular sentiment, that Kwame Nkrumah founded pan-
Africanism, reflects Nkrumah’s passion and profound impact on pan-African 
ideology. Nkrumah is known for his ideas about the ‘African personality’, African 
socialism, and neo-colonialism, but it is perhaps his pan-African legacy that left the 
strongest stamp of all.  
                                                 
197 “Fear not for man”, Fela Kuti (1977). 
 93 
 
Nkrumah was one of the radical visionaries of the nationalist era. As a ‘radical’ 
he advocated fundamental structural changes to colonial social relations; proposing 
continental self-determination and altered relations of production.  He was decidedly 
Pan-African, socialist, and anti-colonial in his orientation.  Nkrumah not only desired 
profound changes on the continent, he demanded them urgently, expressing strong 
support for immediate social transformation rather than gradual reform.   Our present 
discussion cannot delve into details of the politics around Nkrumah’s rise to power, 
actions in government, or untimely ousting.  I focus instead on the ideas underlying 
his politics and theories animating his ideological positions.  
Kwame Nkrumah was born in the British administered Gold Coast colony in 
1909.  He was educated at the famed Achimota School in Accra and later attended a 
Roman Catholic Seminary.  He left the Gold Coast in his mid-twenties to further his 
studies in the United States, where he earned a Bachelor of Sacred Theology from 
Lincoln University and Masters Certificates in education and philosophy from the 
University of Pennsylvania.  While in the United States, Nkrumah was introduced to 
the ideas of Marcus Garvey and exposed to the denigration characteristic of the Black 
experience in the Americas.  Nkrumah credited Marcus Garvey for “awakening” the 
Negro race and providing specific objectives for racial advancement.  Garvey’s 
slogans about the ‘Redemption of Africa’, ‘Peoples of Africa, Unite!’, ‘Hands  Off 
Africa’ and ‘Africa for Africans’ girded Nkrumah’s political ideology and served as 
the foundational principles for his pan-African and anti-imperialist philosophies.198  
Also during his time in the United States, Nkrumah learned principles of Marxism, 
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namely of the Trotskyite and Maoist varieties, that he later interwove into his Pan-
African ideologies. 199  
Nkrumah declared himself to be “unalterably opposed to imperialism in any 
form” and believed black solidarity was necessary to resist imperial domination.200  
While his pan-African ideas germinated in the United States they came into full bloom 
during his time in England.  During his time in England, Nkrumah collaborated with 
George Padmore and W.E.B. DuBois to organize the Fifth Pan-African Congress.201  
At the forefront of this conference, Nkrumah and his ideological associates identified 
African nationalism as the most important ideological imperative and adopted Marxist 
socialism as its underlying philosophy.  Nkrumah asserted that the “three political 
components of [African] liberation… [were] 1) Nationalism, 2) Pan-Africanism, 3) 
Socialism.”202 For Nkrumah, there appeared to be no contradictions between claims 
for territorial sovereignty, race-based ideology, and class-centered philosophies.203 
Indeed he saw each of these dimensions as indispensable.  Nationalism and pan-
Africanism channeled Black solidarity towards political liberation, while socialism 
augured economic liberation in the form of industrial development and progressive 
distribution.   
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African Redemption and Redirection 
By the time Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast in 1947 he had acquired distinctly 
revolutionary vocabulary and fully developed political philosophies.  He advocated 
“self-government now” and called for the complete independence of African 
territories from political and economic domination by imperial powers. When the 
Gold Coast achieved independence in 1957 Nkrumah was hailed president and 
Osagyefo, “redeemer”, of the new nation he called Ghana.  Nkrumah borrowed the 
name ‘Ghana’ from an ancient empire talked about in pan-African circles.  The Ghana 
Empire had flourished a thousand years prior to Nkrumah’s time and was located in a 
region reaching across present-day Mali and Mauritania.  By calling the Gold Coast 
‘Ghana’ Nkrumah reclaimed Africa’s glorious past and refashioned it into a new 
political and cultural national identity.  However, Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah 
asserted, was meaningless without the liberation of all Africans from the tyranny of 
colonialism.  Nkrumah’s nationalism was characterized by its continental concern and 
an avowed commitment to decolonization of the entire continent.  Once in power he 
championed national independence movements across the continent and furthered his 
pan-African ideas by urging continental federation. He spearheaded the All-African 
Peoples’ Conference in 1958 where declared his intentions to support revolutions and 
political movements for emancipation in Arab and Black Africa.  Success, he 
contended, hinged on prioritizing continental unity over all other affiliations. Nkrumah 
expressed this sentiment saying, “The overriding importance of African unity demands 
the sacrifice of all personal, tribal and regional objectives and considerations…If we 
cannot make an effort in this direction, we might as well begin to throw up our hands 
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in despair.”204 Even within Ghana he discouraged regional affiliations and stressed the 
importance of building national and continental identity.   
In addition to decolonization and “continent-building”, Nkrumah also argued 
for the importance of the African Personality, African socialism and neocolonialism.  
The African Personality was an emotional and ethical ontology that Nkrumah 
associated with pre-colonial African societies. He believed African societies prior to 
colonialism practiced forms of egalitarianism, humanism, and communalism that 
imperialism had destroyed or disrupted. An objective of postcolonial African nations, 
he insisted, would be the recovery of this lost or distorted identity through African 
socialism.  Nkrumah’s visions of African emancipation recalled the notion of Sankofa, 
the reclamation of African ancestry for strength and vision into the future. African 
socialism, he suggested, would restore ‘African society’ by expelling remnants of 
European capitalism, and reintroducing African cultural norms while propelling Africa 
in industrial production and modern living standards.  African socialism was loosely 
Marxist in that it critiqued capitalism and called for reordering of social relations, 
however, it relied on Nkrumah’s notion of humanism in “traditional African society”.  
He contended revolution was necessary to overturn bourgeois capitalism and institute 
a classless society championed by a vanguard proletarian class. African 
industrialization was necessary to expand proletariat class-conscious and prepare for 
the eventual eradication of class differences.  African socialism was premised on three 
central tenets: 1.) control of the state by a nationalist self-conscious class; 2.) rapid 
industrialization and expansion of the proletariat, and 3.) pan-Africanist solidarity to 
combat neocolonial dependencies.205  He envisioned state-managed projects as the 
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driving force of industrialization and placed national planning as one of the primary 
state responsibilities.   
Nkrumah believed the transition to socialism would reconstruct African society 
“in such a manner that the humanism of traditional African life reasserts itself in a 
modern technical community.”206 However, recovery of African communalist 
principles was equally important as the introduction modern circumstances to 
emerging nations.  Nkrumah’s vision of modernity included development of industrial 
and nuclear technologies in order to elevate Africa’s status in the world.  He argued, 
for example:   
 
We must ourselves take part in the pursuit of scientific and 
technological research as a means of providing the basis of our socialist 
society. Socialism without science is void…We have therefore been 
compelled to enter the field of atomic energy because this already 
promises to yield the greatest economic source of power since the 
beginning of man.207 
         
Nkrumah also coined and popularized the notion of ‘neocolonialism’ and was an 
important exponent of the idea of ‘under-development’.  The seeming sovereignty of 
nation-states, he argued, deceptively gave the impression of autonomy when in 
actuality former colonies remained subservient to the capital and political 
machinations of more power nations.  Nkrumah accused power-hungry ‘neo-
colonialists’ in Europe and African territories of conspiring to maintain their economic 
and political advantage by urging incremental step by step decolonization.208  He also 
identified neocolonialism as the primary impediment to national development and 
pinpointed continental unity as the only appropriate tool to combat and bring down 
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neo-colonial structures.209 Nkrumah advocated African autonomy from the strictures 
of (neo)colonialism as well from the intrigues and affiliations of Cold War politics.  
He promoted African non-alliance in the Cold War, famously declaring, “We face 
neither East nor West, we face forward.”  Ideologically, Nkrumah stood for immediate 
African self determination and envisioned the nation as the medium of modernity.  
African progress would come through continental pan-Africanism, African socialism 
and development through the nation-state.   
 
Houpouet-Boigny: Conservative and Capitalist 
 Félix Houpouet-Boigny assumed contrary positions to Kwame Nkrumah on almost 
every issue.  Initially opposed to African independence, Houphouёt-Boigny later 
supported African nationalism, but advocated continued collaboration with European 
powers.  Whereas Nkrumah stressed pan-Africanism as a countervailing force to neo-
colonialism, Houphouёt-Boigny encouraged newly independent nations to embrace 
the benefits of ‘fraternité’ with more ‘advanced’ regions in order to enjoy cultural and 
economic progress.  Houphouёt-Boigny was expressly capitalist in his economic 
orientation; he not only promoted economic liberalism in Côte d’Ivoire but denounced 
socialist and communist movements in Africa and around the world.  As he aspired to 
expand capitalist development, he also promoted regional federations and national 
development programs over efforts to create economic or political continental 
solidarity.  In all, Houphouёt-Boigny imagined a politically and socially conservative 
postcolonial future for African nations propelled by capitalist development under the 
auspices of Western powers.  
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Dia Houphouёt was born in Yamoussoukro in the colony of Côte d’Ivoire in 
1905.  He hailed from a family of chiefs and royal lineage on his mother’s side, and 
inherited leadership obligations to the Baoulé people. At the age of ten he converted to 
Christianity and changed his first name to Félix; he  added Boigny (meaning 
“irresistible force”) to his last name when he launched his political career in the 1940s.  
Houphouёt-Boigny matriculated at the École primaire supérieure and later moved to 
Senegal to attend the École William Ponty and École de médecine de l'AOF  (French 
West Africa School of Medicine).  He trained to become a teacher and doctor, and 
despite excelling in his studies never completed his medical studies.  Houphouёt-
Boigny worked as a medical assistant before returning to his village in 1939 to assume 
the position of chef de canton.  He also began administering his family’s cocoa 
plantation which he expanded and developed into a highly profitable agricultural 
venture.  Despite being one of the wealthiest plantation owners in the region, 
Houphouёt-Boigny took great interest in the lot of farmers and championed the growth 
of planter unions, namely the Syndicat Agricole Africain (founded in 1944). The 
farmers union took issue with unfair advantages given French plantation owners and 
worked to restore more equity.  It was from this base in union organizing that 
Houphouёt-Boigny launched into politics and acquired local and international 
recognition as an erudite and impassioned political figure.  Following successful 
rallying through his political organization, Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
(RDA), Houphouёt-Boigny was elected into the French Parliament in 1956 as the first 
‘West African Negro’ in the French cabinet.  Perhaps his most important contribution 
in this position was to help pass the loi cadre which transferred some French powers 
over to local representatives in overseas territories.210  Importantly, the law provided 
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universal suffrage for African subjects in French colonies.  In 1957, following the 
Bamako Conference, Houphouёt-Boigny was elected Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire 
and in 1958 he obtained a place for the colony in the French Community – a political 
entity granting partial autonomy to colonies while France maintained control of 
defense, foreign affairs and currency.211 
 
Côte d’Ivoire and Collaboration 
Houphouёt-Boigny was acutely aware of economic dependence of the colonies on 
France and opposed motions to alter this relationship through national independence 
or movements for radical self-determination. He became, therefore, the “international 
salesman for the French Community”, promoting the virtues of gradual, guided 
transfer of economic and political responsibility from France to West African 
territories.212  In an address to the United Nations in 1957, Houphouёt-Boigny 
declared “We [Africans] cannot accept isolation. As political leaders of black Africa 
and whatever our political affiliations, we wish to cooperate fraternally…on a basis of 
absolute equality of rights and duties.213 Ivorian development, he believed, would 
result only as a function of continued partnership with France on economic, military, 
and cultural fronts.  He anticipated Africans would confront tremendous difficulty 
after independence because of general “technological backwardness.”214 He 
envisioned French contributions augmenting Côte d’Ivoire’s budget, military strength, 
health programs, engineering projects and, above all, education programs.215   
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Consequently, when France granted Côte d’Ivoire independence in 1960, 
Houphouёt-Boigny invoked the notion of ‘fraternité’ and proclaimed continued 
association with France and other nations of Europe to “hasten the economic progress 
and social evolution” of the Ivorian people.216  Keeping the colonial name ‘Cote 
d’Ivoire’, Houphouёt-Boigny was elected president and placed the new nation on the 
capitalist track of development laid by French colonialism.  Independence, he insisted, 
would not disrupt French influence in West Africa and every effort would be made to 
develop French West Africa in the modern likeness of Europe nations. Paradoxically 
promoting “controlled” liberalism, Houphouёt-Boigny set Côte d’Ivoire on a course to 
become the “Switzerland of West Africa” through foreign investment, technical 
assistance and state-planned enhancement of local capitalist sectors.217  Houphouёt-
Boigny even endorsed retention of the French flag for one full year after independence 
with the assumption that foreign investors who would more readily trust the tricolore 
than some newly fashioned African flag.218  
His firm alliance with the Western world prompted Houphouёt-Boigny 
supporters in Europe and the United States to assign him the magnanimous moniker 
“Sage of Africa”, while his admirers in Côte d’Ivoire referred to him affectionately as 
‘Pap’ or ‘le vieux’.  He built close ties with France, and fostered an alliance known as 
Françafrique.  His loyalty to Western powers prompted derision from socialist and 
communist camps, namely in the form of invectives and threats.  Houphouёt-Boigny 
in turn spurned trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, and 
censured African countries that hid behind the pretext of ‘non-alliance’ or neutrality.  
All efforts, he insisted, should be made to arrest the spread of international 
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communism and contain its detrimental effects.  In accordance with his anti-
communist sentiments, Houphouёt-Boigny sabotaged revolutionary campaigns across 
the African continent, and supported conditions for capitalist accumulation instead.219   
The Conseil de l’Entente was founded in 1959 by Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, 
Dahomey (present-day Benin), Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), and 
(eventually) Togo, and worked towards promoting regional cooperation between 
former French colonies.  Houphouёt-Boigny was instrumental to the founding of the 
council and popularization of the notion that regional, not continental, solidarity was 
necessary for economic development.220   Since he viewed autonomous national 
development as economic self-destruction, Houphouёt-Boigny advocated regional 
fund raising, loan granting, trade and investment.  His visions of African modernity 
were, therefore, virtually antithetical to Nkrumah’s.  While these two leaders’ 
conceptions present extremes of a range of nationalist and development ideologies 
composed by Western-educated Africans, they do not cover the entire gamut.  A 
complex of contradictory variously motivated theories of African progress were 
presented by the cadre of Western-educated Africans that assumed political power as 
well as other Western-educated Africans who assumed official, professional, and 
service-related occupations in the transition from empire to nation.  In general, 
however, ideas of progress imagined by Western-educated Africans sought to elevate 
Africans from denigration and extract them from backwardness through the nation-
state, economic development, technological advancement, and state-led modernization 
projects.   
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Conclusion 
Frederick Cooper writes, the “national order of things should neither be taken as 
natural nor dismissed as an artificial imposition on Africa.”221 The truth of this 
statement is particularly evident in the notions of progress proffered by Western-
educated Africans from 1860s to the 1960s.  Meanings of nationalism and visions of 
modernity were far from given, rather they reflected a host of contradictory, 
contingent, and constructed racial, political, cultural and economic aspirations.  Both 
the radical and conservative conceptions of nationalism and independence highlighted 
above illustrate the centrality of modernity in the minds of Western-educated Africans 
at the end of empire.  To varying degrees, they promoted an ‘African identity’, 
liberation of Africans through the nation, anti-colonial orientation and continued 
collaboration with European powers. Despite variation, discourses of progress sought 
to improve the treatment and status of ‘backwards’ Africans and propel Africans into 
the modern world.  The tremendous optimism shared about Africa’s potential in the 
modern world of nations was fueled by developmentalist notions that state-led 
development projects could rapidly industrialize and modernize societies.  The next 
chapter reviews conceptions of development in this transition period and the rise of 
developmentalist regimes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Re-making the World System: Reconstruction and post-war 
‘Development’ 
World War II summoned the most concentrated death and destruction the world has 
ever seen.  The horrors of concentration camps, protracted battles, two atomic bombs, 
and war-related diseases and starvation left over 60 million dead, and scores of 
casualties from every continent.  Aftershocks of the disaster in Europe rippled out to 
the colonies and, at the war’s end, inter-national rescue forces appeared in the form of 
humanitarian and financial institutions.222  Efforts to rebuild Europe, quell agitation in 
the colonies, and build newly independent nations spurred a host of ‘development 
projects’ around the world.  The period between the 1940s and 1970s, therefore, was 
characterized by discourses of development that framed national recovery and social 
progress as a state-managed process of economic growth and social reconstruction.  At 
the same time, however, there was a significant shift in global power from its base in 
Western Europe to new centers in the ‘East’ and ‘West’.  The rise of the United States 
and Soviet Union as global superpowers produced new discourses of progress and 
directed nation-states towards particular development projects.  In both the ideological 
and academic discourses of development in this era, modernization and 
industrialization took center stage.   
At the close of World War II, imperial powers used the notion of development 
in futile attempts to maintain control of their territories in West Africa.   As 
independent African states emerged, however, development persisted as a state-led 
endeavor believed to drive modernization and industrialization.  In both socialist and 
capitalist projections of African development, the state was expected to engineer and 
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expedite African evolution out of traditional backwardness and toward more modern 
societies.  The more thoroughly Africans embraced modern mannerisms and adopted 
industrial cultures, the more quickly they were expected to experience ‘development’.  
Africans in state offices, therefore, constructed projects for rapid industrialization 
while development experts stressed the importance of expanding Western education 
(and its associated lifestyles) to more numbers of Africans. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
therefore, state-led development projects set about transforming family affairs, 
agriculture, and industrial production. 
This chapter elucidates how the meaning of development shifted in the 
transition from empire to nation. I emphasize modernization and industrialization as 
paradigmatic notions of progress in the period following World War II up until the 
1980s. By tracing the history and logic behind these discourses of development the 
chapter underscores the strength of these theories in constructing enduring ideas about 
the composition of African societies as well as formulas for how to ‘fix’ them.  The 
first part of the chapter examines development as: a colonial strategy, an influential 
academic discourse, and an internationally approved knowledge regime. I then discuss 
the emergence of modernization theory and predominance of modernization 
paradigms.  The chapter concludes with discussion of Western education and 
modernization strategies in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire from approximately 1940 to 
1980. Despite differences put in place by their respective colonial regimes as well as 
disparate allegiances during the Cold War, post-independence administrations in both 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire attempted to modernize and industrialize their nations with 
the state as the central engine of development.   I highlight some of the development 
projects undertaken to introduce modern institutions and lifestyles to Ghanaian and 
Ivorian families, societies, and nations. While development strategies have changed 
significantly since the period immediately following World War II and African 
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independence, this era laid important foundations for contemporary conceptions of 
African development and modernity. 
 
World War II and the rise of Developmentalism 
The influence of World War II in restructuring global power cannot be overstated.  
Devastation across Europe permitted the United States to assume a lead role in 
establishing a new world order.  As the United Nations, established for the 
maintenance of peace, and the Marshall Plan (originally called the European Recovery 
Plan) were put into action, international financial institutions like the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund also entered the world scene and worked to reconstruct 
shattered economies and build international consensus.223   These institutional changes 
inspired new discourses about human rights, political self-determination, regulation of 
economies, and nation building.  Accompanying and underpinning these changes was 
the belief that state and public sector intervention was necessary to stimulate and 
stabilize national economies.  The acclaimed British economist, John Maynard 
Keynes, supported government involvement in the construction of monetary and fiscal 
policy, and operation of central banks.  Keynesianism gained favor during 
reconstruction and practically became post-war orthodoxy.  Consequently, from the 
mid-1940s until approximately 1980, the logic of laissez-faire capitalism took a back 
seat to a new international commitment to state-managed recovery and 
‘development’.224   
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 ‘Development’ is a catchall phrase for progress that typically refers to social 
improvement and economic growth.  As Gilbert Rist notes, development is incredibly 
seductive in its elusive promise of ‘better’ lives for all, and its mobilizing moral 
undertones.225  ‘Development’ assumes a normative high ground, and unapologetically 
pronounces what progress looks like and how things ‘should’ be.  Couched in these 
terms it becomes almost anathema to oppose ‘development’.  In general, development 
discourses describe social problems and outline strategies to combat them; addressing 
cultural, political and economic deficiencies or dysfunctions as mutable phenomena.  
However development discourses also demonstrate dynamics of power in the choices 
of which social issues, concepts, theories, and practices are changed or reproduced.226  
Development discourses establish knowledge and set policies in motion – they are at 
once theoretical and practical. While development discourses are diffuse and contested 
dominant forms emerge as expressions of power; they suppress or subsume competing 
constructions and impose themselves as prevailing narratives of progress.    
The predominant development narrative in the period between 1940 and 1970 
can be described as ‘developmentalist’. This characterization comes not only from the 
host of institutions established at this time with the specific mandate to ‘develop’, but 
also from a general commitment to planned development orchestrated by the nation-
state. After the war, the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions set about 
providing and regulating global capital, and assisting national growth. Economic 
growth through industrialization and social transformation in the form of 
modernization were the two dominant components of development theories in this 
period and the backbone of developmentalist regimes.  Accompanying this attention to 
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industrialization and modernization were new mathematical aggregates and averages 
designed to provide indicators of progress and rankings of the economic standing of 
nations.  The American economist Simon Kuznets created a measure he called the 
‘gross national product’ (GNP), which served as a foundation for a growing list of 
indices and methods of accounting for national inputs and outputs.  With novel metrics 
in place and post-war focus on state-managed national growth, developmentalism 
assumed an econometric and technical dimension in the mid-twentieth century that 
fixed the nation-state as its primary unit of analysis, and the state as the primary agent 
of development. 
 
Colonial Development at the End of Empire 
Developmentalism as described above was originally designed for devastated nations 
in Europe; with national autonomy and economic recovery portrayed as global 
priorities.  However, the rise of nation-states as the unit of political and economic 
legitimacy coincided with the decline of France and Britain as global superpowers.  In 
addition to tremendous material damage suffered by both France and Britain during 
the war, the logic of empire was also much impaired.  On one end pressure mounted 
from the United States which, in a bid to further establish its global hegemony, used 
the notion of sovereignty to challenge its geo-political rivals and call for Britain and 
France to justify or relinquish their overseas territories.  On the other end, labor unrest, 
riots and nationalist movements emerged within colonies; destabilizing or 
undermining imperial control.   
African colonies were no exception.  Starting in the 1920s African workers 
demanded better wages and labor protections, engaged in strikes and riots, and 
 109 
 
organized actions to resist labor inequalities.227  A common appeal from African labor 
movements at this time was for African workers to receive remuneration and treatment 
equal to European workers (Cooper 1996). If, African workers argued, they were 
subjected to European-style labor practices, they should receive European-style 
payment and benefits.  Labor was the linchpin of colonial extraction, and disruptions 
in the supply and control of African labor threatened to completely destabilize 
imperial order.  Adding to colonial powers’ woes were the disparate and growing 
numbers of anti-colonial movements gaining momentum in the form of guerrilla 
movements, political parties, mass protests and the like. Calls for African ‘self-
determination’ grew louder as anti-colonial movements expanded in West Africa and 
across British and French empires.  Assaults on empire from within and without 
provoked France and Britain to introduce the notion of colonial development as a 
desperate last-ditch effort to justify holding on to their slipping colonies. 228 
In British colonial offices, the case was made that Britain had a moral duty to 
supervise economic and social development in the colonies.  In respect to Africa in 
particular, British officials insisted on the political unpreparedness of Africans for 
self-government and the economic and social responsibilities of imperial 
trusteeship.229  Starting in the 1940s, British colonial policies emphasized the 
importance of “improved labor standards, economic advancement and social 
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security…to [produce] rising standards of life” in African colonies.230  The Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was among Britain’s first efforts to preserve 
empire under the guise of imperial benevolence.  The Act claimed to improve the lives 
of a critical “mass of the colonial populations” by funding large-scale health and 
education programs, and increasing basic wages.231   In addition to legitimizing 
continued imperial control, colonial ‘development’ programs also permitted 
surveillance of Africans.  In order to be eligible for and receive social services, 
Africans were required to conform to British definitions of ‘work’ and ‘family’.232  
Britain’s rhetorical position, however, was that development improved the lot of all 
colonial subjects by introducing labor protections, increasing social services in urban 
centers and expanding general education.  Despite British policies encouraging 
improved African well-being, in practice, colonial officers made concerted efforts to 
restrict the economic and political power of educated, skilled, and wealthy Africans 
through systematic enforcement of the color bar.233  
For the French, colonial development was never intended to transform African 
society wholesale but, rather, to educate, assimilate and prepare an élite subsection of 
Africans for the eventual takeover of political and administrative duties.  A small 
group of ‘évolués’ were granted rights of citizenship while the majority of Africans 
were labeled ‘subjects’ and governed under a vaguely defined principle of 
‘association’.  The policy of association emphasized flexible administration of the 
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colonies and facilitated “evolution of native groups along their own lines.”234  Subjects 
had no political rights, however, and were coerced into labor in mines, on plantations 
and in the French military.  Even as riots and protests broke out in the 1930s, the 
French continued policies of forced labor.  Frederick Cooper highlights colonial 
commitment to forced labor in French territories stating that even “at the height of 
World War II, Vichy leaders recognized their inability to control the growing “African 
proletariat” [but] set about using more forced labor despite threats of social and 
political upheaval.”235 Vichy France added the notion of “prudent industrialization” to 
their colonial policies which entailed strategic social and economic improvements in 
the colonies in order to pacify restive laborers while preventing African 
empowerment.236   By introducing ‘development’ through improved infrastructure and 
social services the French hoped to allay restive laborers, increase African 
productivity, and appear to be extending the privileges of French citizenship to more 
people in wider territories.  Development in French West Africa attempted to revise 
and perpetuate the notion of an indissoluble French union.  
Despite their variations, French and British colonial officers shared several 
common approaches to development in the final days of empire.  The first was that 
they framed development as a technocratic, knowledge-based process assumed to 
advance in evolutionary stages.  British and French technocrats believed that their 
knowledge of European social history could be transposed onto African contexts and 
used to expedite the movement of African societies along a linear path of 
development.  Even as France and Britain realized that continued imperial control of 
Africa was untenable, they “both held to the belief that their historical experience and 
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the models they had tried to implant in Africa constituted the standard by which their 
successors could be judged.”237  Additionally, colonial supervisors aimed to transform 
Africans from traditionalism and insolvency into modern, prosperous societies – a 
painstaking process that they hoped European imperial powers would oversee for 
multiple generations.238  Colonial officers argued that the extent of African 
‘primitiveness’ and ‘aboriginal poverty’ was so great that colonial oversight was 
needed to govern and develop ‘African society’.   
Colonial officers made the case that it was their social responsibility to 
“prepare Africans for their future in a differentiated, hierarchical structure of labor”, 
and to this end they would strive to “foster liveable wages, security, and cultural 
adaptation” (my emphasis).239   Consequently, while labor issues prompted the 
introduction of development policies, development assumed ever-more inclusive 
meanings for the colonial state.  For example, a 1948 colonial office paper stated:  
 
The African plantation owner, mining prospector, shopkeeper, factory 
manager, skilled mechanic, etc., should be encouraged, for they are at 
present deplorably rare. The development of this class would go far to 
give the African the feeling that he owned his country and exploited its 
resources, instead of seeing these constantly in the hands of the white 
man. - Colonial Office Paper, 1948.240 
 
This quote highlights the shift in colonial development interest from its focus on labor 
to complete transformation of African social relations and cultural practices.  Before 
British (and to a lesser degree French) powers surrendered their colonies they intended 
to “encourage” the growth of African agricultural owners, managers of industry, small 
business owners, and skilled workers.  Recognizing increasingly differentiated 
divisions of labor in African contexts, colonial powers proposed to increase the 
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numbers of African capitalists and middle classes before permitting Africans to govern 
themselves. The above quote also demonstrates that despite facile distinctions often 
made between ‘civilized’ and ‘savage’ Africans, colonial development imperatives 
recognized the need to acknowledge more than a dichotomous class structure.  
 
From Colonies to Countries: Development Imperatives in the New World Order 
Colonial powers eventually relinquished hopes of continued control and imagined 
postcolonial Africa in the nation-state which provided the most palatable possible 
global reconfiguration.  As Frederick Cooper writes: 
 
Colonial governments [were forced] to make a necessary imaginative 
leap…They came to envision a world that they no longer ruled but that 
they thought could function along principles they understood: through 
state institutions, by Western-educated elites, in the interests of 
progress and modernity, through integration with global markets and 
international organization…The one-time Apostles of Disorder – 
Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe – were remade in 
the colonial imagination into the Men of Modernization and 
Modernity.241 
 
Starting with the Gold Coast in 1957, black Africa gradually gained independence.242 
Decolonization brought new characters to the world stage and with it new scripts 
explaining global powers, roles, and inequalities.  Especially important in the 
reframing of the global order was the rivalry between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  The Cold War started at the close of 
World War II and took the form of a nuclear arms race, the formation of military 
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coalitions, and ideological alliances that played out in proxy wars, massive 
propaganda campaigns and sponsored revolutions across several continents.243    
The ascendance of Keynesianism, decline of empire, rise of nation-states, and 
beginning of the Cold War signaled the emergence of a new world order in which 
global hierarchies in wealth and power were explained by differentials in size and 
strength of national economies and nuclear arsenals.  A three tier global hierarchy was 
established with the industrialized U.S. and its allies calling themselves the ‘First 
World’; a conglomeration of communist countries known as the ‘Second World’; and 
the trailing newly independent nations relegated to the bottom tier and known as the 
so-called ‘Third World’.  The discourses that explained and legitimized this global 
reordering were a part of a new development knowledge regime that determined the 
different truths about how to achieve progress.  The status of African territories 
changed colonies to ‘less developed’ nations, necessitating revisions in development 
discourses. The new global order initiated new discursive boundaries as well as new 
possibilities and restrictions for Africans.244   
As the leading superpower, the United States dominated constructions of the 
emerging development industry245 as well as the production of knowledge associated 
with national development.  The U.S. not only perceived Europe as desperate for 
economic assistance and aid, but identified development of ‘underdeveloped areas’ as 
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part of its new mandate as a global superpower.  This sentiment emerged in the fourth 
point of President Truman’s inaugural speech in 1949 in which he declared:  
 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the 
people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their 
food is inadequate. They are victims of disease.  Their economic life is 
primitive and stagnant.  Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to 
them and to more prosperous areas.  For the first time in history, 
humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of 
these people.  The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the 
development of industrial and scientific techniques.  The material 
resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are 
limited.  But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are 
constantly growing and are inexhaustible.246  
 
The Point Four Program, also known as the Bold New Program, emerged out of this 
speech and began a variety of U.S.-sponsored assistance programs in newly 
independent nations. The program expanded the postwar notion of the world as 
malleable, and reinforced the idea that technical expertise from the ‘First World’ was 
necessary for development.247  The United States championed the dissemination of 
technical development knowledge, and provided capital for ‘developing’ nations to 
grow, manage, and regulate their economies.  The next sections explore details of 
post-war developmentalist visions and examine what they portended for West African 
nations in particular.   
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Development Economics and Theories of Social Evolution 
With Western Europe in disarray and the perceived threat of Soviet expansion, experts 
from the United States were forced to generate compelling accounts of the virtues and 
mechanisms of capitalist development.  Persuading newly independent nations to side 
with the U.S. and pursue capitalist development was of utmost importance in the battle 
for material and military primacy.  As Rajani Kanth writes, “Regardless of how Third 
World nations themselves viewed the matter…the macro logic of the world economy, 
locked now in a life-and-death struggle between a resurgent (but restructured) Western 
capitalism…and a militarily powerful Eastern-bloc socialism, dictated that the Third 
World would now be destined to be the pawn in a deadly East-West struggle for the 
hearts, minds, factories, and paddyfields of ex colonies” (emphasis in original).248  
Development economics and modernization theories emerged as the two pillars of 
Western development interventionism in this period. 249   
Western economists identified economic growth as the principal priority for 
so-called ‘Third World’ nations, and framed the relative and absolute growth in wealth 
as the keystone of ‘development’.  They categorized former colonies as precapitalist 
societies and identified their social transformation into advanced capitalism as the 
teleological objective of development.   A new sub-discipline of economics was 
founded on these principles and known as development economics.  It’s founding 
doctrines were composed by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan at the World Bank, Kurt 
Mandelbaum and W. Arthur Lewis at the University of Manchester, Sir Hans 
Wolfgang Singer at the Economics Department of the United Nations, and Ragnar 
Nurkse at Columbia University.  Together they suggested that poor nations were 
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caught in vicious cycles of poverty that they could only escape with focused capital 
formation, strategic government and private capital investment, and increased national 
savings.250 Development economics gained momentum in late 1940s and quickly 
became the guiding force in policy making.251 Development economists suggested that 
all societies would, eventually, reach industrialized modern states. As the American 
economist Clark Kerr expressed:  
 
The best place to start is with a view of the end result; for industrialism 
is a great magnet which is drawing all human life to it and ordering the 
orientation of this life. Whether a society has been matrilineal or 
patrilineal, whether based on family or tribal ownership of land, 
whether responding to the Protestant ethic or the Bantu ethic, or 
whether it goes through a prior commercial revolution or not, it ends up 
following the logic of industrialization. 252  
 
One of the most influential notions proposed by development economists in this era 
came in the form of structural-change theories.  Structural-change had two main 
threads: one emphasized the need to substitute agricultural economies with industries 
and institutions conducive to industrial manufacturing253, and the other focused on 
transferring ‘surplus labor’ from ‘unproductive’ areas to more productive capitalist 
sectors.254  In effect, structural change aimed to industrialize agriculture and engage 
more populations in profit-generating labor. 
W. Arthur Lewis was an especially prominent proponent of structural change 
theory as a process of economic growth.  Lewis was born in Saint Lucia and emigrated 
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to the United Kingdom where he enjoyed a successful career as a development scholar 
and became the first (and to this point only) black recipient of the Noble Prize in 
Economics (1979).  Lewis proposed a ‘two-sector surplus model’ of growth which 
argued that tropical (undeveloped) regions contain large, unproductive subsistence 
sectors that, in effect, constitute ‘surplus labor’.  His writings in the 1950s suggested, 
therefore, that the key to economic development is to maximize labor in capitalist 
sectors which will, in turn, increase production and open opportunities for capital 
accumulation.  In addition to employing idle agriculturalists and placing people in 
“casual jobs” 255 in more productive forms of labor, Lewis also argued, “one of the 
surest ways of increasing the national income is to…create new sources of 
employment for women outside the home.”256  Economic development occurs, he 
believed, when agriculture is made more marginal and labor is maximized in 
productive industrial sectors.   
The ‘two sectors model’ attempts to explain the uneven distribution of capital 
within and between countries.  It suggests poor regions are inhibited by subsistence 
production while rich regions acquire their wealth as a result of engagement in 
industrious capitalist production. For Lewis, and the generation of development 
economists he inspired, “the central fact of economic development is rapid capital 
accumulation (including knowledge and skills with capital).”257  He believed 
accumulation necessitates a class of capitalists, in government or in the private sector, 
that can sagaciously invest capital and generate profit, thereby serving as a “saving 
class”.   Lewis dismissed the ability of unskilled laborers and middle-classes to accrue 
meaningful savings as the former barely subsist and the latter are too busy “struggling 
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to keep up with the Jones’s” to significantly increase their savings.258  He thus 
constructed a ‘dual economy’ that associated subsistence, agriculture and domesticity 
with non-productivity, backwardness and poverty, while pointing to urban capitalist 
production as the link to industrial development and economic expansion.  In his 
theory, agriculture and backwardness stood in contrast to urban, capitalist production 
and economic development.  Commenting on how this duality extends beyond the 
economic realm, Lewis wrote: 
 
We find the same contrasts also outside their economic life.  There are one or 
two modern towns with the finest architecture, water supplies, communications 
and the like, into which people drift from other towns and villages which might 
almost belong to another planet. There is the same contrast even between 
people; between the highly westernized, trousered, natives, educated in 
western universities, speaking western languages, and glorying in Beethoven, 
Mills, Marx or Einstein, and the great mass of their countrymen who live in 
quite other worlds.259  
 
And so two mutually exclusive worlds were imagined; one characterized by idle 
backwardness and the other portrayed as the productive model of modern 
development.   Lewis’s theories suggested that capitalist sectors and the people who 
powered them through government and industry enjoyed a rich and modern way of life 
wholly distinct from and in opposition to traditional agrarian sectors. What was 
needed in this construction of development was structural change from one sector to 
the other.  
A contrasting but also highly influential theory in development economics in 
the 1950s and 1960s emerged in the form of ‘stages of growth’ theory.  Walt Whitman 
Rostow was probably its most famous proponent. His famous book The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto (1960) epitomized the ‘stages of 
growth’ perspective and, while contested, served as one of the central texts of 
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development economics in the Cold War period.  Clearly a rebuttal to communist 
ideologies, Rostow proposed a five stage model of economic growth.260  “All 
societies”, he claimed, begin with “traditional” agricultural economies characterized 
by low-output production per head and the use of pre-Newtonian science and 
technology.  However, when societies meet certain ‘preconditions’ they commence 
modern economic production and experience Rostow’s notorious “take-off” stage.   
According to Rostow:  
 
In Britain and the well-endowed parts of the world populated substantially 
from Britain (the United States, Canada etc.) the proximate stimulus for take-
off was mainly (but not wholly) technological. In the more general case, the 
take-off awaited not only the build-up of social overhead capital and a surge of 
technological development in industry and agriculture, but also the emergence 
to political power of a group prepared to regard the modernization of the 
economy as serious, high-order political business (my emphasis).261 
 
With technological advances and an entrepreneurial class spearheading industrial 
growth, Rostow predicted the expansion of economic (presumably capitalist) 
development through the commercialization of agriculture and extension of urban 
industrialization.  Accompanying the rapid growth of industries and increase in output 
per head anticipated in the ‘take-off stage’, industrializing economies would also yield 
enlarged profit, increases in income, and societies oriented towards high mass 
consumption.  This evolution towards more ‘mature’ economies necessarily resulted in 
transformations in the structure of political and social configurations, including 
intensified migration to urban centers as well as increases in the “proportion of the 
population working in offices or in skilled factory jobs.”262  Rostow, like other 
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development economists of the time, thus proposed a dichotomous scheme of global 
inequalities premised on a distinction between low-producing “traditional” economies 
and “modern” economies.  In his creative macho flair, Rostow also alluded to Western 
nations as “well-endowed” while describing “low producing” regions of the world as 
“enfeebled” and “impotent”, adding to a host of ideologically charged and clearly 
biased analyses.  
Alexander Gerschenkron, an influential economist after World War II, was 
another strong exponent of ‘linear stages’ of development.  He suggested that by 
observing economic activity one could indicate the extent of ‘backwardness’ or 
economic ‘maturity’ in any given sector or society.  Poorer regions needed only to 
‘catch up’ with more advanced economies by hastening the transition from agricultural 
‘backwardness’ to industrial ‘modernity’.  All societies were assumed to evolve in 
identical fashion.  This notion was drawn from an oversimplified reading of the 
experiences of Britain and North American countries, which portrayed their historical 
development as a linear, unidirectional series of stages.  Developed nations, linear-
stage economists argued, had accumulated wealth by separating farmers from their 
land and converting them into workers, consequently creating more intricate divisions 
of labor, increased production, and more technological innovation (especially in urban 
centers).263  They saw, therefore, a progression from simple to more complexly 
organized societies; an evolution they believed correlated with economic growth 
within national boundaries. Economic modernization and mass consumption, they 
believed, were the basic, natural, universal and inevitable trajectories of all societies in 
their march of progress from traditional to modern economies.  The explicit objective 
of development, therefore, was economic growth and its tacit mode of production was 
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capitalist.  Newly independent nations in Asia and Africa were thus encouraged to 
evolve through sequential and linear processes of technological, educational and 
entrepreneurial advancement.  An inordinate but unfounded amount of hope was 
disseminated with these theories, as their teleological framing suggested the high 
living standards and mass consumption levels of Europe and North America would 
soon be enjoyed by poorer regions.   
The theories proffered by development economists in the 1950s and 1960s 
often paid no attention to the uneven nature of capital accumulation, while also 
downplaying the trauma capitalist expansion had historically produced in the form of 
social dislocation, widespread pauperization, alienation across Western Europe and in 
the United States.264 How wealth would be distributed in developing countries was 
effectively ignored.  Instead development economists spread the utilitarian idea that a 
rising tide floats all boats and, so it followed, profit maximization served ‘the greater 
good’.265  The fact that economic policies suggested by development economists 
aligned with U.S. foreign policy interests was neither questioned nor criticized. 
Development economists also ignored contradictions in the West’s supposed fight for 
the spread of democratic ideals, condoning authoritarian regimes in developing nations 
provided they were pro-capitalist.   
Despite their commitment to ‘free market’ capitalism, development economists 
suggested that their strategies be carried out by national governments in order to 
expedite economic and social transformations. In addition to promoting strong state 
intervention, development economists placed high hopes on the expansion of business 
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élites as a catalyst of modern development.  Development planning, they claimed, 
would be propelled by the know-how of Western experts, the achievements of local 
capitalists, and the strategic planning of national governments.  Despite their 
popularity, the flaws of these development economists were quite evident. Their 
theories stemmed from violent abstractions of the historical experience of a few select 
nations as well as essentialized descriptions of ‘traditional’ societies in the ‘Third 
World’ and ‘modern’ societies in the West.  They predicted unidirectional economic 
growth, and (incorrectly) constructed ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies as mutually 
exclusive and antagonistic opposites. These flaws notwithstanding, development 
economists went on to influence (and be influenced by) modernization theories in 
general and the ‘modernization school’ in particular.  
 
Modernization as Development 
The above discussions highlight the importance of industrialization and economic 
growth to notions of development in the 1950s and 1960s.  However, the strength of 
economic growth theories in this period rested on notions of modernization.  
Modernization theories fit roughly into two categories: ‘critical variable’ theories and 
‘dichotomous’ theories.266  Whereas critical variable theories focused on the 
introduction of particular factors needed to transition away from traditionalism, 
dichotomous theories emphasized the evolution from one type of society to another 
through a variety of processes and transformations.  A major shortcoming of critical 
variable theory was that it made modernization synonymous with key variables and, as 
such, reduced modernity to a single or a couple of features like industrialization or 
urbanization.  Most modernization theorists, however, adopted the dichotomous 
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model, and described a variety of practices, ontologies, and epistemologies that 
distinguished ‘traditional’ from ‘modern’ societies.  Instead of isolating variables, they 
indicated mechanisms for developing from simple to more complex societies.   
Modernization theory in its most common variety, therefore, comprised the 
mechanisms of transition associated with the introduction or expansion of “market 
economies, monetization, urbanization, industrialization, the spread of mass 
communications and literacy.”267  
The modernization school gathered steam in the 1950s and featured heavily in 
development discourse until the late 1960s.  Financial support was provided for its 
dissemination by the U.S. government and private foundations eager to accrue 
information and exert influence on emerging nation-states. Interdisciplinary from its 
inception, the modernization school encouraged a new generation of anthropologists, 
psychologists, sociologists, economists and demographers to investigate the so-called 
‘Third World’.  Daniel Chirot defends the description of modernization studies as a 
‘school’ arguing it comprised a “social movement with its own sources of funds, close 
interpersonal links and rivalries, its own journals and publication series, a sense of 
shared mission and camaraderie, and, of course, its hangers on, peripheral allies, and 
even its acceptable heretics.”268  In general, subconsciously and consciously, 
modernization theorists aimed to increase Western linkages in regions susceptible to 
the menace of communism, and provide explanations for global differences in social 
organization, market mentalities, and social development.  Like development 
economists, modernization theorists made claims to their capacity to establish 
scientific truths about the trajectory of former colonies based on their knowledge of 
European and North American societies.  Their theories built on colonial narratives 
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about the deficiencies of primitive peoples, and extended Enlightenment thinking 
about the glories of the Western world.  The Age of Enlightenment in Europe 
forwarded the notion that only one path towards civilization existed, and societies 
were staggered at different points along this trajectory.  ‘Western’ nations, it was 
argued, represented the pinnacle of social evolution, the top echelon in the hierarchy 
of nations.  As Stuart Hall writes, the “Enlightenment provided the language in which 
“modernity” first came to be defined. In Enlightenment discourse, the West was the 
model, the prototype, and the measure of social progress. It was western progress, 
civilization, rationality, and development that were celebrated.”269 This was the milieu 
in which a ‘science of society’ emerged, characterized by its representation of ‘the 
West’ as an advanced version of ‘the Rest’.270   
In the 1950s the American sociologist Talcott Parsons translated texts by Max 
Weber that deepened presumed divisions between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies.  
Weber had developed a dichotomous scheme of societies based on the transition from 
feudal to capitalist economies.  The prerequisites for modernity, Weber contended, 
were the relinquishment of “patrimonial” or “prebendary” relations; introduction of 
rational forms of law; establishment of free labor; and expansion of cities.271  These 
transformations facilitated capital accumulation and, alongside the growth of 
bureaucracies, distinguished traditional and modern societies.  A strong exponent of 
social evolution, Parsons seized Weber’s dualistic model as the foundation for the 
modernization paradigm in the 1950s but added the unilinear telos of Enlightenment 
thinkers to describe the evolutionary processes from traditional to modern society.   
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Parsons’s highly influential structural-functionalist model described traditional 
societies as governed by ascriptive relationships, restrictive cultural mores, 
technological backwardness, and general irrationality.272  Social life in the West, on 
the other hand, was represented as the ideal-typical secular, industrialized, 
meritocratic, rational, bureaucratic and modern society.  While modern societies were 
characterized by certain mentalities and features, the capacity for economic growth 
was always identified as the most important element of modern development.273   
The modernization school promoted this dichotomy for descriptive purposes 
but, more importantly, their theories were used to indicate how social progress would 
proceed.  A centralized state, they argued, could facilitate transition from primitive 
social organization to complex, rational configurations.   Systematic transformation of 
traditional societies could then be expedited through the use of Western knowledge 
and expertise in various industrial and social sectors.   Modernization theorists became 
default ‘experts’ and Western epistemology was elevated to new heights.  Knowledge, 
they suggested, resided in the West, if not in Western experts, and non-western people 
were required to imbibe as much Western culture and know-how as possible for their 
own advancement.  The principles of modernization theory are by now abundantly 
clear and we turn our attention, therefore, to the application of modernization theory in 
African contexts. 
 
Africa and the Modernizing Mission 
As young Africans assumed positions in government and the private sector, Western 
social scientists advocated the need for modern behavior and mentalities to accompany 
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the growth of political and economic institutions.  Modernization, they explained, 
required the relinquishment of African traditions that, purportedly, accounted for 
backwardness in the region.   Rapid industrialization, urbanization and secularization 
would need to take hold in African nations, as would new social norms and practices 
characteristic of Western lifestyles.  African moral economies, for example, were 
viewed as a hindrance to capital accumulation and schemes for their elimination were 
devised.  Viewed negatively, one could say modernization strategies aimed to remove 
or destroy traditional African values.  A more positive reading, however, would 
suggest that they created climates conducive to economic growth and social 
advancement along Western lines.274 
The rapid transformations envisioned required intentional action on the part of 
African governments, business people, as well as ‘ordinary’ Africans.  In their 
guidebook published in 1965, social scientists Charles Obukar and John Williams 
explained: 
 
There has been nothing like it before: a whole continent bridging 
centuries in a decade. Until colonialism the African people lived in the 
traditional ways, undisturbed by the outside world. Then came foreign 
rule, and our people were forced to watch the rest of the world go by as 
they waited for the time when they would again be in a position to 
decide their own fate. That time has come now, and it is the object of 
this guidebook to help ordinary men and women in the difficult task of 
adjusting their lives to the new ways…[W]e have to equip ourselves 
with knowledge and training; we, the African people, will have to learn 
many new ways. Traditions as we knew them may disappear, sad as it 
may seem to the older generation. At the same time we have to learn to 
overcome those habits that have kept many of us back in the past.275 
 
Their guidebook offered advice on how Africans should comport themselves at 
home and work in order to advance individually as well as nationally.  
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Education, they stressed, was key. The challenge, they described, was for 
Africans to acquire “as much knowledge as modern educational methods 
[could] bring them through schools, universities, and colleges, in towns and 
villages right into the smallest hut in the farthest corner of Africa.”276  Western 
education would ensure socialization into the habits, manners, and mentalities 
needed in modern nation-states.   
Following the foundation laid by W. Arthur Lewis, Obukar and 
Williams advocated special attention be paid to attitudes about women.  
Traditional beliefs that projected women as “beasts of burden”, carrying 
firewood and heaving pails of water, would have to give way to more modern 
conceptions of women as economic contributors and potential wage earners.277  
They insisted all the resources and manpower for improvement already existed 
in Africa, and only knowledge and capital were wanting.  Like other social 
scientists of the time, Obukar and Williams encouraged government 
intervention in the planning and administration of modernization projects, but 
they also emphasized the responsibility of African individuals to make ‘good’ 
decisions.   
The imperatives of modernization brought several African populations into 
development scrutiny.  First and foremost were political persona and government 
bureaucrats who were charged with planning development projects and making 
African nations internationally competitive.  Other important segments of the 
population were entrepreneurs and budding capitalists classes whose responsibility it 
was to build productive industries.  Amongst their varied schemes, modernization 
experts proposed to ‘infect’ African businessmen with ‘achievement motivation’ that 
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mirrored the spirit of capitalism in the West and was assumed to be absent or woefully 
inchoate in African contexts.278  Expanding and augmenting the influence of capitalist 
classes was perceived as indispensable to capital formation and capital absorption in 
developing nations.  While capitalists were portrayed as all-important, Western-
educated Africans were also central to economic and political development.  African 
doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers and technicians, it was argued, would become the 
heart of civil society and a crucial component of emerging democracies.279   
According to development economists and modernization theorists, African 
development could be evaluated by the size of modernizing classes and institutions, or 
by the extent to which Africans embraced or mimicked modern attitudes and practices.  
In rural areas the end of traditional subsistence agriculture was foreshadowed as 
agriculturalists, namely peasants, farmers, and small landowners were expected to 
migrate to urban centers or assume more mechanized and large-scale modes of 
production.280  While the majority of development theories emanated from the West, 
they influenced and reflected conventional thinking of the time.  Hurried 
modernization, or development ‘catch-up’, was seen as both a necessity and possibility 
for African territories long held back by their own backwardness.  The challenge as 
Julius Nyerere articulated it was that “we [Africans] must run while others walk.”281 
 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire: Socialist and Capitalist Examples 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire provide interesting examples of how development and 
modernization theories were operationalized in the first couple of decades after 
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independence.  In both countries rapid industrialization and modernization were 
pursued but the focus of state intervention was very different. In Ghana, Kwame 
Nkrumah outrightly rejected capitalist development, and sought to build the economy 
with state enterprises and local expertise.  Félix Houphouёt-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire 
opted to modernize agriculture and develop its capacity for capitalist production with 
the assistance of foreign experts.  The decisions of these African presidents reflected 
their personal proclivities as well as the strengths of their respective nations.  The next 
sections review the availability of expertise in both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire before 
detailing their development objectives and modernization strategies in families, 
agriculture and industry.  
 
Education and Expertise in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
Since development and modernization depended on the use of Western expertise, 
Africans were presented with two options: they could 1.) recruit foreign experts or; 2.) 
cultivate local expertise.  In the Gold Coast missionary and colonial schools had 
created relatively large number of people with numeracy and literacy (especially 
amongst the Fanti and Ga populations).  By the 1940s the Gold Coast had more 
Western-educated and skilled manpower than any other country in black Africa.282  
Educational facilities in the Gold Coast expanded in response to pressure from 
indigenous populations. They believed a curriculum that considered the history and 
culture of local institutions while also teaching Western lessons “would provide 
progress, moral upliftment, religious education, industrial and technical training.283  
By 1906, consequently, there were 17,636 primary school attendees, and African 
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teachers instructed at the primary level duties.284  A few short years later the Gold 
Coast became the first African colony with technical/training colleges.285  Achimota 
College was formally opened in 1927, and it soon gained the reputation of being 
Ghana’s finest educational institution.286  By 1946, a quarter of the Ghanaian 
population was literate, and educated Ghanaians were fast replacing European officials 
and technicians in the colonial administration.287  
As indicated elsewhere in this thesis, education in Côte d’Ivoire was not 
prioritized by French colons (settlers), nor were there intense demands from 
indigenous populations for its provision.  Local pressure for expanded educational 
opportunities in Côte d’Ivoire did not mount until 1969.288 Instead, in the years prior 
and following independence, Ivorians depended on foreign expertise for their 
educational and technical needs.  Highly paid French instituteurs were recruited to 
teach at primary levels, while French technical assistants (cooperants) instructed at 
higher levels.289  In 1960, 35% of 5-14 year olds were enrolled in formal education in 
Côte d’Ivoire, whereas the figure was close to 56% in Ghana.  In the 5-19 year old age 
bracket, only 29% of Ivorian children were enrolled with approximately 55% 
enrollment in Ghana – suggesting high attrition in Côte d’Ivoire after the primary level 
and steady primary and secondary enrolment in Ghana.290  Furthermore, vast numbers 
of French students attended the University of Abidjan, whereas the majority of 
students in Ghana’s three local universities in 1965 were Ghanaian.  Comparative 
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educational data for 1965 are included below. The data demonstrate that Ghana had 
approximately three times as many primary educated students than Côte d’Ivoire, 
more than ten times as many secondary attendees, and more than double the number of 
tertiary-educated Ivorians. 
 
Table 1.1: Levels of Education in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire -1965 
Gross population estimates for 1965 are: Ghana 7,990,000; Côte d’Ivoire, 3,900,000. Age distributions 
for the younger segment of the population are generally similar. 291 
Level Ghana Côte d’Ivoire 
Primary 1,137,500 353,700 
Secondary292 312,700 28,100 
Higher293 4,300 1,900 
 
French bureaucrats held local positions in the colonial administration and 
continued to perform administrative duties in Côte d’Ivoire well after independence. 
Côte d’Ivoire even retained a French finance minister until 1965, and relied heavily on 
counsel from French advisers to direct other ministries.294 The French presence was 
strongest in the civil service as well as the private sector where they established more 
large firms than in any other African country.295  Additionally, following an 
agricultural boom in the 1950s, large numbers of workers from Mali and Burkina Faso 
migrated to Côte d’Ivoire and added to the foreign work force.  As a result, a plethora 
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of jobs in the 1950s were occupied by non-Ivorians, provoking xenophobic riots in 
1958.296  Despite local protest almost a quarter of the agricultural labor force was 
accounted for by non-Ivoiran Africans in the 1960s.297 Foreign expertise and labor was 
extensive in Côte d’Ivoire until the late 1970s when the government attempted to 
Africanize its bureaucracy and indigenize the private sector. This, however, proved a 
herculean task because, as of 1971: an estimated 65,000 French citizens resided in 
Côte d’Ivoire (approximately four times the number at independence); between 
80,000-300,000 Lebanese resided in the country and exerted a strong economic 
presence; and, woefully, only 10 percent of 798 identified executives and technicians 
were Ivorian.298 
 
Ghana: State-led Development and Modernzation 
The Gold Coast was Britain’s model colony in West Africa, providing abundant 
natural resources and goods for extraction.  The most important and high-yielding 
were gold, ivory, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, and rubber.299  When indigenous (namely 
Fanti and Ga) populations became agitated by the paucity of health, education and 
communication facilities in the colony, the colonial state responded with development 
programs.  The first state-led development effort in the Gold Coast was undertaken in 
the 1920s, and overseen by British Governor Guggisberg. 300 The Guggisberg Ten-
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Year Plan, as it was known, started in 1920 and completed its stated objectives by 
1927 – it was widely considered a success.  The project completed railway lines 
between Koforidua, Kumasi, and Sekoni; improved feeder roads to already 
constructed laterite roads; built a Deep Water Harbor at Takoradi; constructed schools 
and hospitals; and erected a host of post offices and telephones facilities.301  The plan 
referred to development as industrialization but, ironically, derived its funding from 
peasant farmers whose revenues, from cocoa especially, had begun a period of 
prosperity in the Gold Coast. As one scholar notes:  
 
There were no plantations, no foreign capital. It was the Ghanaian 
Cocoa Farmer who was the rural entrepreneur throughout the Southern 
and Central forest belt and who made the Economy what it was and 
is…Cocoa built the roads, harbours, railways, schools, hospitals, and 
universities; it capitalized domestic trade and its local markets; it gave 
impetus to the Nationalist movement…and it has continued to finance 
the State and its Military Rulers.302  
 
Through the Guggisberg Plan, small farmers had funded the first large-scale state-led 
development projects.  Ghana’s farmers remained independent, free producers through 
the colonial period and, by the 1950s, they had turned Ghana into the world’s leading 
exporter of cocoa, with an average output of 370,000 tons per year.303  
When Nkrumah assumed control of the state he advocated farming “along East 
European and Soviet lines, with Tractors and other ‘advanced’ farm implements.  The 
rural farmer, [he contended], with his primitive cutlass and hoe was expected to 
‘wither away’.”304 While cocoa production provided the lion’s share of Ghana’s 
revenues at independence, Nkrumah shifted development attention away from 
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agriculture and towards industry.  He saw “industry rather than agriculture [as] the 
means by which rapid improvement in Africa’s living standards [would be] 
possible.”305  Nkrumah also intended to stifle entrepreneurial growth in order to 
promote his visions of socialist development.  Entrepreneurs not only embodied the 
values of capitalist expansion, they also represented a political bloc that had opposed 
Nkrumah during his ascendance to power.   He sought, instead, to build a strong state-
led industrial economy that promoted import substitution and, in so doing, halted 
dependence on foreign nations.  Nkrumah reportedly declared, “Every time we import 
goods that we could manufacture we are continuing our economic dependence and 
delaying our industrial growth.”306  The early sixties, therefore, saw the proliferation 
of state-owned enterprises and the extension of the Ghanaian state into all sorts of 
industrial activity. State and para-statal factories began operations in Building 
Construction, Air Transportation, Brick and Tile production, Diamond Mining, 
Pharmaceuticals, Laundries, Bakeries, Fishing, Publishing, Fruit Processing and Shoe 
Making (to name a few). In the nine years Nkrumah directed development in Ghana, 
approximately 600 factories were authorized to commence operations. 
In addition to intensive factory production, Nkrumah also authorized 
construction of the Akosombo Dam in the Volta region.   The Volta dam project was, 
in fact, the fulcrum of his development initiatives.  Completed in the early sixties, the 
dam was considered a resounding success.  However, funding for the project was 
obtained from the U.S. and British governments as well as the World Bank in the form 
of long-term loans.307  The contradiction of Nkrumah’s effort to avert neocolonial 
development was that he agreed to finance his projects for economic independence 
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with funds from the same Western powers he reviled.  Other problems ensued. Many 
of the factories proposed by the Nkrumah administration did not undergo feasibility 
studies308, and as the states’ corporations grew its capacity to monitor and regulate its 
enterprises diminished.  Nkrumah’s economic development projects were, on the 
whole, impractical and profligate. Spending in the Nkrumah government rose from 
£13 million to £71 million in nine years with only modest GDP growth, while internal 
government debt grew from £39 million in 1960 to £204 million in just five years.309  
Cocoa production decreased, inflation increased, and capital investment diminished. 
The administrative demands and financial strains created by Nkrumah’s development 
projects proved unsustainable and, more importantly, unpopular.  Nkrumah was ousted 
in a coup d’etat in 1966, halting progress on many of his economic development 
initiatives. A series of military regimes followed, each with alternative development 
objectives.310 By the early eighties basic goods were in short supply, and the economy 
was in such great crisis that officials began discussions with the World Bank to 
introduce Economic Recovery Programs (also known as Structural Adjustment 
Programs). 
In terms of modernizing Ghana’s social milieu while Nkrumah was in power, 
however, there were numerous discussions and efforts to regulate marriage, re-order 
family relations, and abolish the matriarchal system.311  These reforms aimed to 
remove mandatory dowry, to determine which customary laws to respect (especially 
those concerning polygamy), and to identify ‘(il)legitimate’ children and clarify 
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parental obligations to them.  Discussions in parliament on the question of polygamy 
were especially heated, with particular concerns raised about what effects outlawing 
polygamy might have on women.  One female MP expressed her concern saying, “the 
ratio is one man to nine women. Therefore, I see no reason why one man should be 
forced by law to marry only one woman. If that is done, the rest of our womenfolk will 
find it very difficult to get married with the result that many of them will become 
prostitutes.”312  As part of these debates feminist movements gained momentum in 
Ghana seeking to defend the interests of “betrayed wives, neglected girlfriends and 
subordinated widows.”313   
 
Côte d’Ivoire: Foreign Capital and Agricultural Development 
Unlike Nkrumah, Houphouёt-Boigny presided over his nation’s development 
strategies for over three decades. The colonial state before him made few attempts to 
initiate development projects.314  Instead, France paid attention to the promotion, 
production, and export of cash crops from Côte d’Ivoire. When Houphouёt-Boigny 
rose to power he opted to: continue nurturing the Ivorian economic relationship with 
France; increase cash crop production and export; and commit the nation to economic 
liberalism and the promotion of private enterprise.  Speaking at independence Boigny 
announced, 
 
These arrangements which we have chosen, and which are going into 
effect now, offer assurances of stability and security – conditions that 
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are indispensable to the creation of economic and social environments 
in which the African people can attain a standard of living comparable 
to that of the peoples of the great modern nations. These institutional 
arrangements are such as to attract investments in all forms – imports 
of capital, technicians and methods – which are indispensable to our 
territories.315  
 
Côte d’Ivoire strengthened bilateral trade arrangements with France, leading to the 
largest percentage of French imports and exports to any African nation, as well as the 
most gross (but not per capita) bilaterial French aid to the continent.316 The Fracno-
Ivorian protocol of 1961 ensured France received preferential tariffs for “coffee, 
cocoa, wood, banana, and pineapple exports from Côte d’Ivoire in exchange for a 
steady price in French imports for wheat, printed cotton cloth, and a variety of 
mechanical and electrical equipment.”317  With steady trade and large investments 
from France as well as cash crop export to other nations, Côte d’Ivoire transitioned 
from colony to nation-state with tremendous economic success; leading to descriptions 
of its development in the 1960s as le miracle ivoirien.  
Agriculture in the 1960s produced large revenues that were channeled towards 
infrastructural development projects including the San Pedro Project which built a 
major port and extensive networks of roads, and the Bandama River Project, which 
constructed the largest hydroelectric facility in Côte d’Ivoire. Education facilities were 
expanded, and massive housing projects were authorized with the intention of 
permanently eliminating slums.318  City developers in the capital Abidjan emphasized 
the need for “modern” architecture, and used the slogan “Construct beautiful, big, and 
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forever” to encourage the construction of grandiose structures.319 The government 
attracted foreign capital for these and other projects by emphasizing the nation’s 
political stability and economically liberal orientation, and by offering favorable 
investment incentives through Côte d’Ivoire’s Investment Code.320  Foreign funds 
received by the government were diverted to developing small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and providing public assistance to agriculture.  Less than four 
percent of the total grants and loans obtained by Côte d’Ivoire between 1960 and 1974 
were allocated to industry.321  Agricultural development was the envisioned mode of 
economic advancement.  
Agriculture contributed to more than one-third of Côte d’Ivoire’s GDP, 
provided approximately half of exports and employed close to 75 percent of the labor 
force.  In the early 1970s, Côte d’Ivoire overtook Ghana as the world’s largest 
producer of cocoa, and also became the leading producer of coconuts and tinned 
pineapple.  It became the world’s third largest exporter of coffee, and produced 
significant amounts of timer, bananas, avocados, cotton, sugar cane, rubber, and 
rice.322 The government imported French equipment and technical expertise to 
enhance agricultural growth and efficiency amongst planters and small farmers.  
Cash crops were either produced on small plots by peasant farmers or on large 
plantations by meagerly remunerated laborers.  The French had aggressively employed 
forced labor on their plantations until the practice was officially abolished in 1946 and 
replaced by “voluntary” labor. Houphouёt-Boigny, the then leader of the Syndicat 
Agricole Africain, was one of the most prominent supporters of voluntary labor. It was 
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intended to provide field workers with options for sharecropping or monthly salaries, 
and also to require landowners to supply accommodation and food to laborers.323 
Improved conditions were argued to increase moral and productivity. From 1947 
onward, wage earning workers campaigned for higher compensation. Also, Europeans 
were gradually pushed out of plantation ownership in the 1940s.  While European 
planters owned approximately 55 percent of coffee production in 1942, they owned 
only 6 percent of production in 1952.  By 1947, it was estimated that African planters 
produced close to 90 percent of total cash crop exports.324 
Despite contributing to labor improvements in the late 1940s, when 
Houphouёt-Boigny assumed control of the national state he systematically denied 
labor protections, and worked to discount the cost of labor for planters.  Shortly after 
independence, Houphouёt-Boigny’s government refused appeals for minimum wage 
for agricultural workers.  He also opened immigration policies but restricted the 
numbers and types of immigrants eligible to move to urban areas.325  As part of its 
efforts to entice migrant labor, the Ivorian government also offered to grant double 
nationality to foreign Africans who chose to work in Côte d’Ivoire.  These actions 
guaranteed an abundant supply of inexpensive agricultural labor for planters to 
“recruit”.  Despite changes in terminology, many of the conditions for “voluntary” 
workers in the 1960s, especially those from foreign countries, resembled forced labor. 
The abundance of (migrant) labor coupled with capital loans from the state allowed 
small farmers, petty commodity producers326, and planters to expand rural capitalism. 
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Houphouёt-Boigny’s administration suggested that agriculture was the “natural 
vocation” of Côte d’Ivoire’s peasantry, but believed more capitalist (i.e. efficient and 
productive) farming had to be established.327  Planters who used modern technical 
methods were praised by Houphouёt-Boigny as “men who could avail themselves of 
the use of more advanced productive forces and thus be an example to their primitive 
brothers and sisters.”328  
The government also intervened in agricultural production by setting the prices 
of certain cash crops. At the beginning of each season, the prices for coffee, cocoa, 
cotton and palm oil were fixed.   Official producers sold their crop at this domestic 
price, and a government-operated Stabilization Fund covered the difference if world 
prices fell below local prices. Farmers and planters were assured a stable cash flow for 
the next season in spite of fluctuations in international pricing.  Additionally, the 
Ivorian government provided new technologies to planters and also exempted 
plantation products from customs duties.329  A host of public enterprises emerged in 
the 1960s to support agricultural development in Côte d’Ivoire.  In the 1970s, an 
approximated third of agricultural production depended on public enterprises in the 
form of transportation, shipping, refining services, construction and electricity.   
Financing for agricultural and agro-associated investments oftentimes came from 
foreign capital which continued to flow into Côte d’Ivoire because of government 
guarantees for select investment opportunities. The government, therefore, became a 
partner with the private sector, helping to bolster its development in agriculture, taking 
funds to support its agricultural initiatives, and earmarking opportunities for foreign 
investors.  Consequently, while the government’s development strategies focused 
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almost exclusively on agriculture, Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed industrialization because of 
private foreign investment.330 
In terms of social modernization reforms, Houphouёt-Boigny’s government 
introduced the Ivorian Civil Code in the 1964.  The national code revised family law 
by abolishing three main practices: payment of a bride price (or dowry); matriarchal 
inheritance331; and polygamy (which would be disallowed after the then current 
generation). The code also required citizens to register family name, birth, marriage 
and death, and laid out stipulations for marriage, separation and divorce.  Obligations 
to children born in and outside of wedlock were outlined as were details regarding 
succession and wills. As one scholar noted, however, “it was made clear from the 
outset that the government had no intention of enforcing all the provisions of the code 
everywhere and immediately.”332 More focus was placed on agricultural production 
and the economy more generally.  
After enjoying nearly two decades of constant growth, the Ivorian economy 
experienced a jolting crash in the late 1970s.  International interest rates soared, and 
cash crop prices plummeted leaving the government as well as agriculturalists in 
precarious positions. These changes coincided with European exodus as well as capital 
flight.  In the early 1980s Côte d’Ivoire, like Ghana, turned to the World Bank for 
economic assistance.  Houphouёt-Boigny maintained power through these changes.  
He died in office in 1993 at the age of 88.  One of his last large development projects 
was the Basilica of Our Lady of Peace, the largest church in the world standing at 
520ft tall and occupying 30,000 square feet built in his home town Yamoussoukrou. 
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He also allegedly had between $7 and $11 billion in personal assets at the time of his 
death, including over a dozen properties in Paris and other locations in Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire both attempted, in very disparate ways, to grow their 
economies and rapidly modernize their populations.  The impulse to construct 
development objectives towards these objectives reflected development thinking of the 
time. Their different post-independence orientations – Ghana to import substitution 
and African socialism, and Côte d’Ivoire to agricultural development and private 
investment – demonstrate a variety of development combinations that were attempted 
based on ideological and practical proclivities. While both nations experienced 
economic prosperity at a point, they also saw economic downturn and industrial 
regression.  Despite desires on Nkrumah’s side to avert neocolonialism, neither he nor 
Houphouёt-Boigny could escape the necessity for foreign capital to fund development 
projects. In both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire managerial expertise was employed from 
the West, but this too created more foreign dependence (in the form of equipment 
imports and/or contracted technicians and advisors).  African nations were trapped in 
structural dependencies.  In the end it was the prevalence of backwards African 
traditions that accounted for stifled economic development, but rather domestic 
resource mismanagement and economic precariousness in the international market.  
The inaccuracies and shortcomings of modernization theory thus come into 
sharp relief. In academic circles, the universalizing, teleological, and evolutionary 
premises on which it rested were attacked as “unrealistically coherent” and 
oversimplified.333  Some of the most devastating critiques, however, came from 
dependency and world systems theorists.  These scholars emphasized connections 
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between the development of the Western ‘core’ and simultaneous underdevelopment 
and dependency of the ‘periphery’.334  Although arguments about peripheral 
dependency had been made by Hans Singer and Raúl Prebisch as early as 1949, Andre 
Gunder Frank’s work in the late sixties initiated a new era in development discourse.  
In general, Africanist dependency theorists contended that the ‘original state’ of 
underdevelopment assigned to African nations overlooked the systematic 
impoverishment of those regions by imperial conquest, simultaneous enrichment of 
European centers, and continued structural inequalities characteristic of global 
economic relations.   Additional critiques of modernization theory highlighted its 
inherent Eurocentric bias, “the self-confidence of ethnocentric achievement” that 
identified the West as the center of progress.335   
Modernization theory extended longstanding conceptions of Africa as a place 
of deficiency and the West as its redemptive, ‘civilizing’ savior. This narrative 
subordinated African knowledges and ontologies in favor of Western epistemes and 
practices.  Its effects are still felt today as African wisdom is ignored until verified by 
Western Science. Perhaps the most enduring error of modernization theory, however, 
was its insistence that modern Western societies were temporally ahead of developing 
regions, and that the latter need only ‘catch-up’.  This notion denied the coevality of 
African and Western peoples, and embedded the still commonly cited trope of African 
‘backwardness’.  The idea that Africans need to surrender traditionalism for the sake 
of modernity still holds sway in the general public and notions about transitioning 
traditional societies into more modern ones continue to be dispersed. 
                                                 
334 Dependistas from Latin America championed this critique of development, and greatly influenced 
African scholars and Africanist exponents of dependency theory.   
335 Ali Mazrui, “From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Traditional Analysis” 
World Politics (1968): 82 
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Critiques of developmentalism and modernization theory mounted in the 1970s 
as global economic crises crippled African economies, corruption escalated and 
political chaos ensued.  The 1980s ushered in debt regimes and neo-liberal economics, 
and developmentalism on the African continent faded as an appropriate approach to 
national development.  Indebted to the World Bank and IMF, and facing Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan’s resolve that There Is No Alternative (TINA) to 
deregulated capitalism, African countries were compelled to create new development 
discourses and directives.   The demise of developmentalism marked the end of an era 
but modernization theory left an indelible and still visible mark on development 
discourse and practice.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
African middle classes encompass a range of people with both rural and urban 
lifestyles. Their ‘modern’ forms pursue greater material security and higher social 
stature through engagement with global markets which, in turn, affords diverse modes 
and standards of living.336  To be sure, the current GDPs of African nations pale in 
comparison to many other countries, but groups of Africans, both on the continent and 
in various Diasporas, enjoy all the possible benefits of economic, political, 
technological, and cultural exchange.  We must remember, however, that the social 
conditions within a given context largely determine the range of lifestyle possibilities 
available to groups and individuals 
The social conditions of colonialism restricted African mobility in economic 
and political terms, and lifestyle choices available to Africans varied dramatically 
according to occupation and exposure to Western education.  While some Africans 
prospered during this time, all were vulnerable to racial discrimination and limits 
imposed by the color bar. However, education in European institutions (both on and 
off the African continent), proficiency in widely spoken European languages, and 
trans-Atlantic travel gave some Africans the opportunity to articulate and disseminate 
their visions of progress for Africans in speech and print; thereby providing a voice for 
‘Africa’ despite the fact that their experiences and ideas were not representative of the 
majority of Africans at the time. Enticed by elements of Western life yet concerned 
with elevating the plight of black peoples, groups of Western-educated Africans 
congealed as a class in the independence era through various nationalist struggles.  As 
African nations emerged, Western-educated Africans assumed control of the state and 
                                                 
336 It is a conceptual trap to attempt to date the beginning of the ‘modern’ period, but if pressed I would 
identify it with European imperial expansion and encounter with other cultures in the late 15th century.  
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set in motion state-led development initiatives intended to improve social conditions 
for rights bearing African citizens. 
This thesis has attempted to detail this transition from colony to country in 
West Africa, with examples from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire aimed at illustrating 
transforming notions of ‘development’, and highlighting the interlacing importance of 
education, the state, and development ideas in rearranging class structures.  Looking 
historically at the morphing meanings of development and acknowledging the 
longstanding existence of African classes allows us to identify, contextualize and, 
ultimately, better understand the nature of contemporary middle classes in West Africa 
and their relation to national development.  During colonialism, African middle 
classes included literate and non-literate groups, those in urban and rural places, 
professionals, artisans, petty commodity traders, farmers and others with relative 
material security, social stability and status.  
Western-educated Africans were a segment of the middle classes who stood 
between ‘traditional’ and supposedly ‘modern’ ideas and institutions and occupied an 
important middling group. Western-educated African middle classes grew in 
significance (though not always in size) because of their ability to communicate to 
colonizers as well as to each other about liberatory projects.  However, as African 
states appeared and national ruling classes emerged, Western-educated African middle 
classes also grew as part of administrative bureaucracies, expanding demand for 
professionals, and development  policies aimed at ushering in ‘modern’ social 
practices.337  Examples from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire show that the degree and speed 
                                                 
337 It is important to remember that while serving in official capacities for the state many administrative 
staff people and civil servants do not necessarily wield significant political power.    Only a handful of 
occupations automatically place individuals in elite political positions, and positions of authority within 
the state bureaucracy do not always translate to material wealth.  Functionaries (especially those with 
simple administrative responsibilities) are part of the governing body but not necessarily the ruling 
classes.  Academic literature often focuses on ruling classes during this period but the state, we must 
acknowledge, is operated by people belonging to a variety of class positions. 
 148 
 
with which Western-educated segments of the middle classes grew was affected by 
each state’s particular development ideologies, policies, and projects. 
In the Gold Coast, local residents had long pursued formal education in 
Western-style institutions and a vibrant literary community propelled political foment 
against the British in newspapers and magazines.  Western-educated African middle 
classes in the colony included missionaries, bureaucratic administrators, and 
professionals (such as teachers, doctors, and lawyers).  When Ghana became 
independent, Western-educated segments of the middle classes were poised to grow.  
Nkrumah’s administration prioritized rapid industrialization and self-sufficiency 
which necessitated building a skilled labor force and cultivating local expertise).  
In Côte d’Ivoire, on the other hand, French colonial policies stifled mass 
education of Africans, and reliance on French bureaucrats and technical experts was 
not only a forced necessity but, eventually, a stated preference. Independent Côte 
d’Ivoire, under the leadership of Houphouёt-Boigny, chose to prolong its dependence 
on France in order to accrue political and material benefits from its close association.  
As a result, groups of Western-educated Africans in Côte d’Ivoire were less numerous 
and less significant than in Ghana.  Houphouёt-Boigny’s development focus on agro-
industrial production further stymied the expansion of Western-educated segments of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s middle classes in the two decades following formal independence.  
As Western-educated Africans occupied their respective states and became 
ruling classes, their visions of progress (issued as development directives) necessarily 
affected the size and strength of local middle classes.  This thesis has not attempted to 
account for how development policies were implemented nor has it provided empirical 
details of numerical changes of Western-educated middle classes in Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Even without these empirical details, however, we know there are often 
tremendous disconnects between what governments proclaim and what transpires in 
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reality.338  Also absent is analysis of how much control these first African regimes 
possessed over their own bureaucratic machines, state institutions, and nationals. I 
have not treated these important issues but have attempted to show how the meaning 
of ‘development’ has transformed, and how each iteration has produced dichotomous 
images of African class stratification. I believe the ways we see African classes affect 
the kinds of development actions taken. Resistance to seeing African middle classes 
continues the long practice of oversimplifying African societies which, invariably, 
leads to incomplete if not incorrect development projections.  While ’development’ 
lies in the implementation of policies and programs, not just envisioning them, it is 
important to know (and challenge) what development priorities and possibilities are 
seen. 
This thesis has pushed us to see more than just the extremes in African 
societies and to consider African middle classes in constructions of development. 
Without including middle classes in examinations of both the history and present 
conditions of African nations, we reproduce erroneous and ultimately damaging 
representations of African people and their ‘development’. For Africans, there is no 
evolutionary transition from being ‘native’ to ‘civilized’, ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’, or 
even poor to rich.  These categories when used in opposition to each other produce 
simplistic dichotomies that reproduce seriously flawed theories of development.   
I have suggested that ‘modern’ African middle classes have a long history and 
that Western-educated segments of the middle classes assumed a particular 
significance in development ideas and projects at the end of colonialism in West 
Africa. As subjects of development, Western-educated West Africans challenged 
colonial suggestions of black inferiority and represented themselves, and other 
                                                 
338
 Breakdowns in the implementation of policy are not necessarily the result of ill-intending or ill-
advised state officials, but also occur as part of geo-political pressure and/or political deadlock. 
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Africans, as capable of self determination. Many of these Africans equated progress 
with membership in the comity of nations, and the nation-state became the central aim 
of development.  Once independent, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire pursued distinct 
development strategies – African socialism in the former and state-assisted capitalism 
in the latter – however, both focused on achieving rapid industrialization and 
modernization.  The first generations of Western-educated African professionals, civil 
servants, politicians and presidents  in these countries appeared as ‘modern’ 
prototypes; proof positive of Africa’s potential to move away from traditionalism and 
enter (if not embrace) social configurations of the modern world. Development 
‘experts’ in this transition period imagined that the more completely modern 
mechanisms and mannerisms were acquired, in rural as well as urban settings, the 
more quickly development would come.  Whether in industry or agriculture, 
modernized Africans became objects of development, and more Western-educated 
(African and European) engineers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, and technicians were 
presumed to be needed to make supposedly backwards people into globally 
competitive citizens.   
In highlighting Western-educated African middle classes as agents and objects 
of transforming visions of development I stress that development was more than just 
the integration of Africans into the comity of nations but also the expedited exchange 
of occupational practices, lifestyles, and consumption patterns typically associated 
with ‘modernity’. West Africa’s long history of trade and exchange between the 
Middle East, Europe, and the Americas produced a mix of social configurations and 
cultural practices that necessarily expanded the range of lifestyle choices available to 
its’ residents.  The lifestyles we identify as ‘modern’ emerge from these cultural 
exchanges which, in many cases, were expedited by European imperial expansion as 
well as development initiatives.  However, Europe did not create modernity and then 
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superimpose it on its colonial conquests.  Rather, the modern world was developed 
over long periods of time through: 1.) specific relations of production (including 
slavery and the exploitation of labor in the Americas as well as in Africa); 2) 
Exchange of technologies; and 3) Sharing of knowledge from regions all around the 
world.339   These market and cultural exchanges, however, were rarely neutral and, in 
fact, created a host of power dynamics and hierarchies between individuals, societies, 
and knowledge systems.  
Africa’s contributions to the development of the modern world were 
systematically discounted or undervalued by colonial representations that portrayed 
African people and traditions as savage and backwards while praising European 
civilization as the source of modernity and harbinger of progress.   This ideology of 
European supremacy was infused into early development theories, and persisted even 
as Africans gained independence and assumed control of their own nation states.  
Unfortunately, Africans remain trapped in this historically produced fallacy that their 
ways of life are inferior to those emanating from the West.  Many representations of 
development and constructions of modernity still insist Africa is behind or beyond the 
‘modern’ (read Western) world.  Considering African modernity and class formation 
is one of many ways to develop fuller appreciation of African social dynamics and 
eschew some of the flat representations of ‘Africa’ given by colonialism and 
                                                 
339 The modern world (i.e. the complex of nation-states shaped by Euro-American imperialist and 
capitalist expansion) was founded, in large part, through enslaved, indentured, and forced labor in the 
Americas, Africa and Asia.  This underbelly of development produced commodities and wealth that 
Europe claimed as its own and as proof of its ‘modern’ progressiveness.  Cotton, rubber, tobacco, 
spices, coffee, tea etc. as well as Christianity and Science were all exported from Europe as supposed 
products of European civilization and industrialization.  This process ignored the fact that a host of 
people around the world contributed (and in cases created) the ideas and products Europe claimed. 
Sidney Mintz (1985) provides a fantastic account of this process in Sweetness and Power. He highlights 
how sugar originated in India and Persia and underwent various technological improvements by Arabs, 
before being mass produced by African slaves in the Caribbean and Americas for European 
consumption.  Supposedly sophisticated English practices such as having tea and biscuits (which both 
need sugar) was not an expression of European cultural superiority or advancement but rather a product 
of multi-regional exchanges of people, ideas, and products.  
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contemporary media portrayals.  Partial or wrong representations of African societies 
will, invariably, lead to inadequate development approaches.  
Instead of furthering the myth of African stagnation in a backwards past we 
must instead acknowledge that development the world over is uneven, and modernity 
is co-produced and simultaneously experienced throughout the world system.  Neither 
development nor modernity necessarily replace ‘traditional’ ways of being, rather they 
add to a range of lifestyle choices available to those who are exposed to them and who 
can afford them.  This is not to say that only the well-to-do experience ‘modernity’ 
but, simply, that lifestyle choices are more limited amongst those with meager means.  
While the majority of citizens in West African nations remain economically deprived, 
growing numbers of Africans have the financial stability to expand their lifestyle 
choices.  Whether one lives in line with longstanding traditions deriving from a 
particular cultural heritage or whether one adopts a lifestyle with more recent origins 
is ultimately a personal choice.   
 Notions about African modernity, therefore, have been entangled in 
development discourses and tied to wrangling over the disposal or replacement of 
African traditions. Despite attempts to exorcise traditional customs and mentalities 
from Africans there persists strong attachment to certain religious practices, socio-
political customs, foods, styles of music, art forms, and modes of dress that are 
considered ‘traditional’. 340  These traditional practices, however, are not static; they 
are constantly transformed with new technologies and ideas.  Visions of development 
as a method of bringing ‘traditional’, ‘backwards’ societies into the modern world are 
inherently flawed. They deny the fact that the modern world was co-produced, and 
they also ignore the tremendous amount of ideological and technological 
                                                 
340 Belief in the occult is widespread in West Africans.  Also, chieftaincy and royal titles are also still 
commonly held.  
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‘leapfrogging’ that occurs.  and Projections of development must come to understand 
that Africans, even those doing traditional, backwards things, are part of the world is 
one – a mélange of economic and socio-cultural exchanges experienced unevenly in 
all regions.  The Western world has championed certain lifestyles and dominated 
discourses but this has never wholly other onto replaced Access to certain lifestyles  
In addition to forwarding certain positions on African modernity, this thesis 
bring us to the fairly straightforward but much forsaken conclusion that development 
policies, especially those constructed and directed by the state, affect the constituency 
and character of African class structures.  Middle classes do not simply emerge; they 
are formed through social change and, in cases, through direct planning.  I suggest 
visions and projects of African development led by the state provide an important lens 
into the formation of African middle classes.  
Additionally, I insist that development thinking abandon presentist or idealized 
perspectives of ‘the middle class’, and consider instead historical formations of 
African middle classes.  Despite colonial constraints and nationally-inscribed poverty, 
middle classes have long existed on the African continent and, as the historical cases 
of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate, their composition in national contexts vary 
tremendously.  There is no transhistorical or conceptually universal ‘middle class’. 
African classes must be identified in historical, socio-economic, political and cultural 
context.  Future research can provide empirical detail of middle classes across 
different African regions, and the data collected will undoubtedly reshape conceptual 
models of development.  Research can also identify different class-based development 
projects; capturing, for example, development visions of middle classes with various 
rural, artisanal, or political affiliations.  Moreover, research can suggest how 
contemporary middle classes are responding to state-led development policies and 
institution-sponsored development programs. Opening our eyes to African middle 
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classes reveals a world of development questions which, in turn, reshapes perceptions 
of the modern world as well as constructions of African development.  
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